

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE AND THE CONCEPT OF
PREDESTINATION IN THE THOUGHT OF AVERROES AND
ST THOMAS AQUINAS : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Ismail Mohamad

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil
at the
University of St Andrews



1985


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This thesis is submitted for the degree of M. Phil.
in the Faculty of Divinity
University of St. Andrews
1984

by
Ismail Mohamad

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this following thesis has been composed by myself, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

ISMAIL MOHAMAD

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ISMAIL MOHAMAD

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I certify that I was registered in the Faculty of Divinity, University of St. Andrews as a full-time research student from October 1980 until October 1983. I am greatly indebted to Dr. G.B. Hall, under whose supervision the present work was carried out. I am also thankful to the typist who typed my thesis.

Finally, I should like to thank my government (Malaysia) for the financial support without which the present work would not have been possible.

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ISMAIL MOHAMAD

CERTIFICATION

I certify that has fulfilled
the conditions of the resolution of the University Court, 1967,
No. 1, and that he is qualified to submit this thesis in
application for the degree of Master of Philosophy.

.....
Supervisor's signature and address

TRANSLITERATION

The following system has been followed for writing Arabic words in Roman characters:

ا	=	ʾ	ز	=	z	ق	=	q
ب		b	س		s	ك		k
ت		t	ش		sh	ل		l
ث		th	ص		ṣ	م		m
ج		j	ض		ḍ	ن		n
ح		ḥ	ط		ṭ	ه		h
خ		kh	ظ		ẓ	و		w
د		d	ع		ʿ	ي		y
ذ		dh	غ		gh			
ر		r	ف		f			

The vowels are used as follows:

Short Vowels

—	a
—	i
—	u

Long Vowels

ى / ا	ā
ي	ī
و	ū

Diphthongs

و —	aw
ي —	ay

Double Vowels

و —	aww
ي —	iyy
و —	uww

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
DECLARATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
CERTIFICATION	iv
TRANSLITERATION	v
INTRODUCTION	1
Notes to Introduction	8
CHAPTER ONE: BIOGRAPHICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND	
A - THE LIFE AND WORKS OF AVERROES	9
B - AVERROES' ATTEMPT IN RECONCILIATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY	17
C - THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS	22
D - AQUINAS' RECONCILIATION OF ARISTOTELIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY	25
Notes to Chapter One	37
CHAPTER TWO: DOCTRINE AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD	
A - GENERAL DOCTRINE OF GOD IN AVERROES AND AQUINAS	49
B - PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD	60
i. God's existence is demonstrable	60
ii. Averroes' proof	65
iii. Aquinas' proof	72
Notes to Chapter Two	91

	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER THREE: GOD'S KNOWLEDGE	
A - GOD IS INTELLIGENT	104
B - THE NATURE OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE	108
i. God's knowledge of contingent events	108
ii. God's knowledge in universal and particular	118
C - GOD'S KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE	123
Notes to Chapter Three	126
CHAPTER FOUR: PREDESTINATION	
A - PRELIMINARY PROBLEM	132
B - GOD'S ATTRIBUTE IN RELATION TO PREDESTINATION	137
i. The will and the power of God	137
a - human power and free will	144
ii. God's justice	152
C - THE CONCEPT OF PREDESTINATION	165
Notes to Chapter four	173
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION	136
BIBLIOGRAPHY	198

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

In the early period of Islam, the term "philosophy" was not in use among Muslims. Their faith in God did not raise any difficult problems for them. Their creed ('aqidah) was simply based on the Quran and the traditions of the prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. However when the current of Greek philosophy penetrated the Muslim world, the situation changed. The contact of Islam with Greek philosophy, as well as with Christian and Jewish theology, produced the rational school of the Mu'tazilites as well as the anti-rational school of the Ash'arites.¹

The centre of the development of Islamic philosophy was the Arabic translation of works originally written in Greek. The age of the development of Islamic philosophy began with the first Muslim peripatetic, al-Kindi (d.810) and continued up to the death of Averroes (d.1198). The relationship between Muslim and Greek philosophy is evident and strong. Al-Kindi, the pioneer ninth century philosopher justified his dependence of Greek philosophy in this way:

"We ought not to be ashamed of appreciating the truth and of acquiring it wherever it comes from, even if it comes from races distant and nations different from us. For the seeker of truth nothing takes precedence over the truth and there is not a disparagement of the truth, nor belittling either of him who speaks it or of him who conveys it." 2

The continuous controversy between the Muslim theologians, who are better known as the 'mutakallimun' and the muslim philosophers reached a climax when al-Ghazali wrote his political philosophical treatise, Tahāfut al-Falāsifat (The Incoherence of the phi-

losophers) as an attack on the philosophers. Averroes' period is regarded as the climax of the development of Islamic philosophy, and his death is generally recognized as the commencement of the decline of Islamic philosophy in the Islamic world.

All scholars, both Muslim and Christian, recognize Averroes as the last great peripatetic philosopher. "His influence, strangely enough, was greater in the Christian than in the Muhammedan world, and the first impact of his writings on Christendom produced a shock which extended to those of Aristotle himself."³ Averroes' works began penetrating the western world during the thirteenth century and many Christian scholars undertook to study his thought, establishing a group in Paris which were called "Averroists" and whose influence later extended to some universities in Italy.

A similar controversy between theologian and philosophers happened in the Christian world during the Middle Ages. At that time theology was the dominant and most respected subject taught at a university. It had never been challenged before. Paris was regarded as the summit of theological studies, and the mastery of theology was naturally looked on as the crown of one's academic career.⁴

Though some Christians tried to prevent Aristotle's thought from penetrating the Christian world, they failed. Its appearance provoked controversy from the beginning. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas, who were two great theologians as well as philosophers, were responsible for purifying what was regarded as the heresy in Aristotelianism. They, in fact, did not reject Aristotelianism in total, nor did they accept it as a whole.

The history of Christian philosophy in the thirteenth century is the history of a conflict arising from the attempts to subordinate philosophy to theology, which was accentuated when the complete works of Aristotle became accessible to scholars through translations into Latin from the Greek and Arabic commentaries. Thomas Aquinas was enthusiastic to show that faith does not conflict with reason. Certain truths of Christian faith are beyond the reach of reason, but they are not contrary to it. Aquinas pointed out that the argument from the authority of God, the revealer, is more solid and powerful than any other.⁵ Christian theology, according to Aquinas, is a science of God,⁶ which is superior to other sciences. So theology judges philosophy in the same sense that philosophy judges sciences, because philosophy is the highest of the human sciences, that is of sciences which know things by the natural light of reason.⁷

Both Averroes and Aquinas held the conviction that philosophy is not opposed to religion, and they also recognized that revelation is superior to intellect. In certain cases reason should incline to the revelation. Aquinas, however, departed from Averroes in many areas, so he did not hesitate to refute those ideas of Averroes which contradicted with Christian teachings. Although Averroes and Aquinas were not contemporaries, it is a fact that Aquinas had the opportunity to study and evaluate some of Averroes' works which already existed at the University of Paris during his time.

The title of this thesis is as a recognition that Averroes and Aquinas were two great scholars of the Middle Ages who represented the two great revealed religions, Christianity and Islam;

Averroes as a representative of Muslim philosophy, and Aquinas as a representative of Christian philosophy. Both drew upon the metaphysics of Aristotelianism, and they both produced careful commentaries on Aristotle's thought. They had the same aspirations, to reconcile religion and philosophy and to diminish the gap between revelation and reason. It is important to recognize that the intellectual relationship between Christians and Muslims in the Middle Ages was very close. It is also an undeniable fact that Muslim thought made an important contribution to western thought, especially in introducing Platonism and Aristotelianism to the Christian world. This contribution took the form of translations, either from Arabic or Greek, by Muslims as well as Jews and Christians. Many works of Muslim philosophy, such as those of al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna and Averroes were to be found in Paris.

The role of the college of translation at Toledo under the direction of Raymon, Bishop of Toledo (1126 - 1151), was to "open a virgin field to scholars and for the first time provide them with direct knowledge of Pagan thought uncontaminated by Christian thought."⁸ Aquinas as a great scholar at the height of the Middle Ages was not a stranger to some of the works of Muslim philosophy such as Avicenna, al-Ghazali and also Averroes.

The author, as a Muslim, is interested to learn of Christian theological thought, and to compare some areas of agreement and disagreement between Christian and Islamic teaching through the study of the chosen topic. As has been mentioned before, Christianity and Islam are religions of revelation. Therefore, the author strongly believes that there should be, in many circumstances,

some similarities, because the source is one, God. Since this is the author's first incursion into the study of Christianity it is inevitable that his arguments and expressions will contain some weaknesses.⁹

The approach used by the author in this study is to consider first Averroes' discussion of each topic examined, and then to follow this by an exposition of Aquinas' position. This regarded as suitable because chronologically Averroes came first, and Aquinas in many circumstances referred to Averroes' works and criticized them.

This thesis is not primarily a critical analysis of the ideas of Averroes and Aquinas, but only a comparative description of the ideas of both. The purpose of this study is to bring out the similarities and dissimilarities in their discussion of the chosen topics. Thus our study is a comparative study and is based on the texts of both men. Averroes' major works which are used in this study are Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, Al-Kashf, Faṣl al-Maqāl and Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'at, while Aquinas' works are the Summa Theologiae and the Summa Contra Gentile.¹⁰

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one discusses briefly the biographical and philosophical background of Averroes and Aquinas, and is divided into four parts. First, it briefly outlines the life and works of Averroes chronologically. Second, there is a discussion of Averroes' attempts to reconcile the controversy between religion and philosophy. The third part deals with the life and works of Aquinas in chronological form, just as with Averroes. Fourth, the author discusses Aquinas' reconciliation

of Christianity and Aristotelinism.

Chapter two is a discussion of the general doctrine of God and of the existence of God. It is divided into two parts. First, there is given a brief discussion of the doctrine of God in Averroes' and Aquinas' thought. The second part deals with a treatment of the proof of the existence of God which is divided into three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, the author lays down Averroes' and Aquinas' position on the demonstraability of the existence of God. The second sub-section is a discussion of Averroes' argument which proves God exists. Lastly there is a treatment of Aquinas' argument about the existence of God.

Chapter three is a discussion of God's knowledge, and it is divided into three parts. First is a discussion of the question on whether or not we can speak of God's intelligence. The second part contains a discussion of some of the characteristics of God's knowledge. This part is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section deals with God's knowledge of contingent events, whether He knows or does not know them. The second treats God's knowledge of contingent events, whether His knowledge of them is in general or in particular. The third part discusses God's knowledge and human knowledge, and the relationship between them.

Chapter four discusses the predestination of God, and it is divided into three parts. First, the preliminary problem is stated. In this part there is a discussion of the basic problem arising in Christianity and in Islam concerning predestination, and the controversy among theologians about this concept. The second part dis-

cusses certain of God's attributes in relation to predestination, and it is divided into two sub-sections. First is the discussion of God's will and power. In this sub-section there is a discussion of human free will and power, because human free will and power have a close relationship to God's will and power. Second is a discussion of God's justic. This discussion focuses on whether God can be said to be just or unjust. The third part outlines and discusses the concept of predestination as the conclusion to be drawn from this chapter.

Chapter five concludes our study and consists of a summary of the whole discussion. The author evaluates and compares the ideas of Averroes and Aquinas covered in the previous chapters.

Notes to Introduction

1. George J. Taweh, "The Climax of Philosophical Conflict in Islam," Muslim World, Vol. 42, 1952, p. 173.
2. Al-Kindi, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics, trn. with intro. and comm. by Alfred L. Irvy, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1974, p. 58.
3. C.H. Haskin, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 7th ed., 1979, p. 347.
4. F.C. Copleston, A history of Medieval Philosophy, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1972, p. 153.
5. ST1a, q. 1, a. 8.
6. ST1a, q. 1, a. 3.
7. J. Maritain, An Introduction to philosophy, tr. by E.I. Watkin, London, Sheed & Ward, 1956, p. 93.
8. E. Brehier, The Middle Ages and Renaissance, tr. by Wade Baskin, 1st Phoenix ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1967, p. 116.
9. The author is not well acquainted with Christian thought, and in consequence his knowledge of Christianity is limited. Further, English is not the author's first language, nor is Arabic. However, the author's knowledge of Arabic is better than his knowledge of English. For this reason all translations from Arabic texts used in this thesis are that of the author.
10. Though there are many other works of Aquinas such as De Veritate and Questiones Disputate which include important discussions of God, the works mentioned above are perhaps sufficient for the limited purposes of this study.

CHAPTER ONE

BIOGRAPHICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
BACKGROUND

A. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF AVERROES

In the philosophical world the name of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) is not unknown especially among researchers in philosophy, and he was highly esteemed by both Islamic and Christian philosophers in the Middle Ages. His popularity in the Jewish and Christian worlds was primarily as a commentator on Aristotle.

His name was Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Rushd, but in the Muslim world he was better known as Ibn Rushd though to western Christians, he was known by the name of Averroes, a scholar of the Quran, natural science, theology and philosophy.

He was born in 1126 in Cordova, the largest town¹ in Spain at that time. He belonged to a renowned family which produced scholars of jurisprudence and law. Due to their scholarship, members of the family of Averroes held the post of judge (qāḍi) at different times. His grandfather (450 - 520 H.), who was an expert in fiqh of the Malikite sect was a great scholar or jurisprudence.² He was appointed as a judge during the period of the caliphate of al-Murabit (Almuravides). His father³ (d.564 H.) as his grandfather, was also skilled in fiqh of the Malikite sect and was appointed as a judge in Cordova during the caliphate of al-Muwahḥid (Almohades). Historical accounts show that Averroes undoubtedly inherited the intellectual ability of his grandfather. He grew up and was educated in this highly intellectual environment. His elementary education was at his home, and his first teacher was his own father who taught him the fiqh of the Malik sect, the traditions of the prophet (hadith) and the theology of Ash'ari.

In addition to his father were many other teachers such as Abū Muḥammad ibn Rizq (530 - 560 H.), Abū Bakr ibn al-ʿArabi (468 - 543 H.), Abū Marwan ibn Masarrat (d.552 H.) and Abū Qāsim ibn Bashkuwal (495 - 578 H.). All of them taught him fiqh and hadith. He was said to have learned philosophy from Ibn Bajjat (d.533 H./ 1138 A.D.) and Ibn Tūfayl (d.1185 A.D.). There has been some doubt cast as to whether he actually studied philosophy under the former. The latter, Ibn Tūfayl, however played an important role in Averroes' career. Medicine he learned from Abū Marwan ibn Zuhr (484 - 557 H.) and from Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zuhr (504 - 595 H.). He also learned philosophy and medicine from Abū Jaʿfar Harūn al-Turjālī (484-558 H.).

Averroes was one of the graduates of the University of Cordova, but there exists no exact date of his graduation. He, however, was an educated man when he was 28 years old, for in 1153 he was invited by the caliph al-Muwaḥḥid ʿAbd al-Mu'min (526 - 558 H.) to come to Morocco and give guidance to the caliph in building of schools and colleges. He also was engaged there in astronomical observation. After some time he came back to Cordova, involving himself in teaching at the University of Cordova for about 9 years.

During his teaching at this university he began his career as a productive writer. He wrote al-Kulliyāt Fī al-Ṭibb or College (1162), a great medical work which contains seven volumes and was used in Europe for centuries.

Ibn Tūfayl, in addition to being his teacher, was also responsible for introducing Averroes to the caliph Abū Yaʿaqub ibn Abd al-Mu'min around 1169. At his first meeting the caliph discussed

with him some philosophical problems. The meeting with the caliph had two concrete results: one was the appointment of Averroes as a judge in Seville in 1169; the other was his undertaking, in deference to the wish of the caliph, to comment upon Aristotle's works. This was because the caliph himself complained about the obscurity of Aristotle's works and of their previous translations. He wished them to be clearly explained. He asked Ibn Taufayl to undertake this work, but at that time he was too old and too busy, so he asked Averroes to undertake the work.⁶

Averroes did not finish his commentaries on Aristotle at Seville because in 1171 he came back to Cordova and was appointed as a judge there, and then as the chief of judges. At Cordova he continued his work begun at Seville. His careful study and analysis of Aristotle's texts was more complete and in greater detail than any other study undertaken by previous Muslim philosophers. He collected all available translations of Aristotle's works which had been done up to his time, and compared them before he began his commentary.⁷ His commentaries on Aristotle which imply various branches of knowledge⁸ are divided into three kinds: short, medium and long. Most of his commentaries were translated into Latin. Part of them through Latin translations reached Thomas Aquinas while he was in Paris.

During his appointment as the chief of judges (qādi al-Qudāt) in Cordova he also wrote two theological treatises: Al-Kashf an-Manāhij⁹ written around 1179 and Faṣl al-Maqāl¹⁰ written between 1179 - 1180. The whole content of the former treatise is concerned with theological discussions. In it he criticized Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn), especially the Ash'arites whose method in discussion

of God, according to him, was unscriptural and beyond the comprehension of the masses, and at the same time their methods were not of the type containing apodeictic proofs.¹¹ So to rectify this problem he formed his own method of discussion of God by referring to the Quran. The latter treatise is Averroes' effort to reconcile philosophy and religion, for, according to him, philosophy and religion are not mutually contradictory.¹² At the end of *Fasl al-Maqal* there is an appendix called *al-Damimat* where Averroes tried to solve the problem of God's knowledge.

In 1182 Averroes was appointed as a personal physician to the caliph Abu Yusuf al-Mansur in Marakesh and continued in this role until he was sued before the court in 1195. During his service in the caliph's court he wrote the Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (the Incoherence of the Incoherence) in 1180 - one of his greatest philosophical-theological works. This work was written to refute al-Ghazali's attack on philosophers¹³ who wrote Tahāfut al-Falāsifat (the Incoherence of the Philosophers). Tahāfut al-Tahāfut is the product of Averroes' maturest thought, a masterly exposition in which the author's most fundamental thoughts are brought into focus.

Averroes continued in favour during the beginning of the reign of Ya'qub Yūsuf 'Abd al-Mu'min to the caliph Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr, where in the caliphate of al-Manṣūr he reached his highest position when he suddenly fell into disgrace. This was the result of the opposition shown to his writings by the mutakallimun and the fuqaha'.¹⁴

Averroes accused the mutakallimun of separating muslims in-

to various groups¹⁵ by using dialectical arguments (jadal) and allegorical interpretations (ta'wīl) of scripture. The allegorical interpretation of scripture cannot be disclosed to all men, because according to him men are on different levels with respect to their path of assent (tasdīq). Some men come to assent through demonstration, some come to assent through dialectical argument, and others come to assent through rhetorical argument.¹⁶ The demonstrative method is only for the demonstrative classes who have deep intellectual capacity to understand philosophy (al-hikmat). The dialectical argument is used by those who also have intellectual ability but their ability to understand philosophy (hikmat) is lower than what belongs to the demonstrative class although they also try to interpret ambiguous scriptural passages. Those in this groups are generally mutakallimun. The rhetorical argument according to Averroes is for the masses. They just take these passages in their apparent meaning, and allegorical interpretation of them is unbelief.¹⁷

Averroes tried to narrow the gap between religion and philosophy by turning to the Quran. He wished to assert his judgement by looking at its apparent meaning without interpreting any of it allegorically except when the allegorical meaning was self evident. His effort to achieve this purpose can be found in his two treatises - Faṣl al-Maqāl and Al-Kashf 'an Manāḥij.

Averroes held that revealed law (shar') and philosophy have the same purpose - to seek the truth. Philosophy can show by demonstrative argument (burhān) the nature of the truth contained in the law. Only philosophers according to him can properly use demonstrative argument to illuminate the hidden meaning of revealed truth.

This, however, does not mean that the two other arguments are wrong. They are also valid but acceptance is less rational than acceptance based upon demonstrative argument.

Averroes' philosophy was Aristotelian on the whole, but there were inevitably development and accretions of his own as a Muslim who was influenced by the Quran. As a follower of Aristotelianism, some of his doctrines such as the eternity of the world, God's knowledge, the soul and intellect and the double truth theory created controversy and were strongly opposed by the mutakallimun. Even his doctrine of the unity of intellect caused conflict among Christians in the thirteenth century at the University of Paris where Thomas Aquinas wrote a treatise to refute it.

The mutakallimun and the fuqaha' were suspicious of the influence of Averroes and they accused him of diviating from Islam. They had opposed Averroes since the caliphate of Abu Ya'aqub, but they did not succeed in the beginning, for the caliph Abū Ya'aqub was very keenly interested in philosophy.¹⁸ So their complaint proved to be ineffective. However, they got their chance to refute him when Yūsuf al-Manṣūr, Abū Ya'aqub's son, became the caliph (1184 - 1199) especially in the last years of his reign. Though at the beginning, the caliph Yūsuf al-Manṣūr was interested in philosophy, he tended towards sufism at the end of his life. He commanded the people to refer to the Quran and the traditions (hadith).¹⁹ This gave a chance to those who disliked philosophy to oppose Averroes as a philosopher. They appealed to the caliph that philosophers in general and Averroes in particular should not be given freedom to speak and write whatever they wished. The caliph accepted their suggestion and he expelled

Averroes to Lucena, a place outside of Cordova. At that time Averroes was over 70 years old. The caliph did not only banish Averroes but also ordered that all philosophical works which were considered dangerous to religion,²⁰ including Averroes', should be burned and forbidden to be learned.

Though there are various reasons²¹ given why the caliph expelled Averroes, what was obvious was the attitude of the 'ulamā'²² who disliked philosophy in general and Averroes himself in particular, because of his high position in the caliphate of al-Muwahhid. The judgement concerning Averroes carried out by the caliph was forced and urged on him by those who were jealous of Averroes. Their accusation was hidden under the banner of religion, ethics and sometimes politics, but really their enmity was personal.²³

During the caliphate Abū Yusūf al-Mansūr there was a controversy between the 'ulamā' and the philosophers.²⁴ The fundamental conflict revolved around two aspects; the first was the political aspect, and the second was the aspect relating to religious sects.²⁵ Averroes as the chief of judges, had influence in the al-Muwahhid's administration. At the same period the caliph Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr was engaged in Spain in a war against Christian,²⁶ so he needed the support of the fuqaha' who had long imposed on the people their rigorous orthodoxy. This opportunity was taken by the fuqaha' to influence the caliph to take action against philosopher and their teachings.

After one year of banishment, Averroes was recalled by the caliph to Morocco. After which the caliph allowed people to again

take up the study of philosophy.²⁷ Averroes did not have long to enjoy this return to favour, for he died in Marakesh in December, 1198 at the age of 72 years. He was buried at Marakesh, and after about three months his body was taken to Cordova to be buried there.

After the death of Averroes the world of Islamic philosophy fell into decline. He had not so many disciples among muslims, and his popularity was less among them than among Christians. Most of his works were preserved in Hebraic and Latin translations. The Hebraic translations were done by such authors as Moses bin Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Kalonymus bin Kalonymus, Jacob Antolio and others,²⁸ while the Latin translators were such as Michael Scot (d. ca 1235), Herman the German (d.1272) and William de Lunis,²⁹ Half of his life was devoted in producing his works whether they were original or his commentaries.³⁰

Part of his doctrine was not only opposed by muslim but also by Christians, and was developed in the thirteenth century at the University of Paris by Latin Averroists. At that time Thomas Aquinas played an important part to refute Averroes' doctrine. And in the fourteenth century Averroism spread to the University of Bologna³¹ and the University of Padua³² in Italy.

B. AVERROES' ATTEMPT IN RECONCILIATION
BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

Averroes was not the first muslim philosopher who tried to reconcile religion and philosophy. His predecessors,³³ for example, Al-Kindi in "Rasā'il al-Kindi al Falasafiyyat", Avicenna in "Al-Najāt" and "Al-Ishārāt", Ibn Tufayl in "Hayy Yaqẓan", Al-Farabi in "Al-Jam' Bayn Ra'yi Hakīmayn" had all tried to deal with this matter.

Averroes, a great patron and admirer of Aristotle,³⁴ strove valiantly to promote and defend the study of philosophy against the more conservative theologians who prescribed its study as heresy. He developed a theological method of far greater stringency than his predecessors.

In his book "Tahāfut al-Tahāfut" he was concerned with intellectual discussion, defending philosophers' ideas than in his "Kashf 'an-Manāhij" in which he dealt with the opinions of the theologians (mutakallimun) especially the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites. The discussion in this book was aimed at the masses,³⁵ therefore there was no philosophical arguments used in it.

In his effort to reconcile religion and philosophy,³⁶ Averroes proposed the problem of whether Islam (Shar') allows or prohibits us to study philosophy. To answer this, he firmly stated that the revealed law (shar') encourages us to study it.³⁷ For him philosophy was nothing other than the study of existents (al-Mawjūdāt) and reflection (i'tibār) on them as an indication of the Divine Artisan.³⁸ This means that philosophy is an effort to know the Creator from His creation. Thus philosophy, the aim of which is to study nature,

which brings us to the knowledge of God, is not contradictory to the revealed law.³⁹ What is different is the method of reaching the truth. The truth is one, so truth does not oppose truth, but accords with it and bears witness to it.⁴⁰

Averroes was committed to the postulate of the unity of truth. He was also committed to the authority of the Quran, because the knowledge which comes from its revelation completes intellectual knowledge.⁴¹

Averroes, in strengthening the idea in which "Shar'" encourages us to study philosophy, referred to some verses of the Quran which urge us to use the intellect. For example, "Therefore take heed, you who have eyes",⁴² "Have they not considered the dominion of the heaven and of the earth, and what things God has created?"⁴³ and there are many other examples. Averroes also insisted that if a lawyer (faqīh) could infer from many Quranic verses in order to make a judgement using legal categories (qiyas fiqhiy), then there was no reason why a philosopher (al-ʿārif) could not do the same thing using intellectual reasoning (qiyās ʿaqliy) to make a judgement about the existence of God. In fact, he argued that it was even more fitting to do so.⁴⁴

The Quran, according to Averroes, has two meanings;⁴⁵ an exterior meaning (dāhir) and an interior meaning (bātin). The reason why the Quran has two meanings is because human beings are at different levels with respect to their faith (taṣdīq).⁴⁶ Averroes used three terms to distinguish the level of three kinds of human beings. First, "Jumhur" (the masses) are the majority of people;

second are the "Mutakallimun" (theologians); and third are the "ʿUlamā'" or the "ʿĀrifīn" (philosophers) who are the minority of people. The arguments used by these three kinds in respect to their faith according to Averroes are also different. The Jumhur uses rhetorical arguments (Khitābiyyat). This type of argument according to Averroes neither uses complicated reasoning nor allegorical interpretation of the Quran. The Mutakallimun, whose intellectual capacity is higher than the jumhur, uses dialectical arguments (jadalīyyat). This type of proof is based on many logical premises used to reach a conclusion. The group of 'ulamā' uses demonstrative arguments (burhān) which are different from the two aforementioned types of argument. It is distinguished from statements which are not demonstrative by being considered in the genus of science which is under investigation. Thus demonstrative arguments according to Averroes are "those statements which can be subsumed under the definition of this genus of science of which comprise in their definition of this genus of science."⁴⁷ These demonstrative arguments are hard to learn and need much time even for those who qualified to learn them.⁴⁸ Thus these arguments are very rare. Averroes regarded this type of proof as the highest and its value in relation to others is "as unalloyed gold to the other minerals and the pure pearl to the other jewels."⁴⁹ Accordingly, Averroes said, we cannot explain this type of proof to the masses.⁵⁰ The teaching of sharʿ, which contains all three levels of arguments, is concerned more with the masses,⁵¹ because they are the majority group, however, it also does not neglect the learned (Khawāṣ). Therefore the prevailing methods of expression in sharʿ are the common methods by which

the majority comes to form a concept and a judgement.⁵²

The duty of the masses is to accept the exterior meaning of the Quran, and we cannot expose its hidden meaning to them through the method of allegorical interpretation (ta'wīl),⁵³ because exposing it for them would destroy their faith.⁵⁴

If al-Kindi (d.873 A.D.) recommended and practised the method of interpretation, Averroes also used it in his interpretation of sharḥ, but he did not permit its use freely.⁵⁵ He underlines some condition.⁵⁶ For example, we cannot make any interpretation if the meaning of the Quran is quite clear, but we can do it if its meanings are in the form of illustrations. According to Averroes, the task to interpret the illustrations mentioned in the Quran are only for the philosophers,⁵⁷ because they use demonstrative arguments - the highest level for the human mind with respect to faith, and demonstrative arguments do not lead to a conflict with what is given by sharḥ (Quran).⁵⁸ Furthermore, Averroes mentioned that if unanimous agreement (ijmāʿ) is reached by unexceptionable means (ṭarīq yaqīniy), such a result allows no further interpretation. If, however, the agreement on a particular problem is a matter only of opinion (ẓanniy), then further interpretation is valid.⁵⁹

Averroes in his theological discussions was very concerned for the masses lest their belief contradict revelation. He explained any concept of God according to their capacity of thinking. He based this idea on a tradition of the prophet Muhammad who said, "We, the prophets, have been commanded to adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them according to their intelligence."

This is because they do not believe a thing except insofar they can imagine it.⁶⁰ He criticized theologians (mutakallimun) who expounded interpretations of ambiguous verses to them, the masses.

Averroes devoted half of his life in bringing together more closely philosophy and religion. He regarded them as "two brothers who sucked a single milk",⁶¹ and helped each other for the happiness of human beings. One of his purposes in reconciling philosophy and religion was to preserve the unity of truth between philosophy and the revealed law (shar') without sacrificing one or the other.

C. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Thomas Aquinas was the single most significant Christian philosopher-theologian in the Middle Ages. Owing to his high intellectual ability, he was regarded even by his opponents such as Siger of Brabant, as of the outstanding philosophers of the time. He also was acknowledged as the prince of the thirteenth century theologians. He did not only expound theological teaching and give new and comprehensive solutions to a multitude of questions but above all he co-ordinated the material of Catholic theology in a monumental system which has won the admiration of posterity.⁶²

He was born early in the year of 1225 at the castle of Reccasecca, near the small town of Aquino: which was situated between Naples and Rome. He was of noble birth, his family holding a high position in the society of Aquino. His father, Landulf, count of Aquino was of Lombard nobility, and his mother, Theodora, was a noble woman from Naples and of Norman origin.

At the age of five years (1230) he was sent by his parents to Monte Cassino in the hope that he would become a Benedictine monk.⁶³ The teaching at Monte Cassino was basically religious, but it also involved learning Latin and Vernacular grammar, reading, writing, elementary mathematics and harmony.⁶⁴

After nine years of elementary studies at Monte Cassino, he was sent to the University of Naples in the Faculty of Arts. This was because King Frederik II was involved in a quarrell with the Pope, and some of the monks were expelled from Monte Cassino.

Aquinas matriculated at the University of Naples in 1239. There he studied the seven liberal arts of grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. At the University, he was trained under several teachers including Master Martin (d.1278) for grammar and logic, Peter of Ireland (d.1260) for natural philosophy, and others. Peter of Ireland was very important not only in introducing Aristotelianism but also Averroism to Aquinas. This is because Peter of Ireland took his Aristotelianism with large infusions of Averroism.⁶⁵ He certainly used Scouts' translations of Averroes, and held him in high regard.⁶⁶

It is a historical fact that the role of King Frederick II in translating the work of Aristotle and commentaries of Averroes was important. He disposed of a large collection of Arabic manuscripts, including the work of Aristotle and Averroes which he caused to be translated.⁶⁷ These works were used in the curriculum at Naples; even in his court the doctrines of Averroes were well known and discussed.⁶⁸

Michael Scot (d.1235) and Herman the German (d.1272) were among those who played a direct and important part in the Latin translations. They translated fifteen out of the thirty eight titles of Averroes' works.⁶⁹ This means that Aquinas had already been exposed to Aristotle's and Averroes' works before entering the University of Paris.

While he was studying at Naples, he joined the Dominican Order,⁷⁰ and became a friar in 1244. This step was by no means acceptable to his family, who no doubt wished him to become a

Benedictine oblet. Taking the Dominican habit in 1224 he was on his way to Paris when he was kidnapped by his brother and held in custody for about one year. When released, he proceeded to Paris in 1245.

In the thirteenth century, the University of Paris was the foremost university in the field of theology which was regarded as the queen of sciences and speculative philosophy.⁷¹ In the middle of the thirteenth century many of Aristotle's writings on scientific subjects came to be known in the west, partly through Arabic translations and partly through translations from the Greek original. Though, at the beginning, Aristotle's natural philosophy was prohibited at the University of Paris, about 1255, however, all the known works of Aristotle were being lectured on at Paris.⁷²

At the University, Aquinas studied theology and Aristotelianism in the Faculty of Arts under Albert the Great. Here, Aquinas for the second time was exposed to Aristotelianism and Averroism. Averroes was a useful friend of Albert's philosophical youth, and when Averroes' works were introduced to the Latin west through the Latin translations of Michael Scot, one of the very first to meet was St. Albert.⁷³ This inevitably, was more or less Averroes' influence on Albert where, for example, seventy precise quotations from Averroes appear in Albert's *Summa de Creaturis*.⁷⁴ When Aquinas was trained under Albert, there was a probability that Averroism was exposed to him.

Aristotelianism, which was lectured at the University, was more developed and stronger in the Faculty of Arts than the Theology

Faculty. This was because in the Theology Faculty the Bible and the Sentences of Peter Lombard were the text books,⁷⁵ while the writings of Aristotle were the fundamental text books in the Faculty of Arts. In addition to Aristotelianism, there were also many writings of Arabic philosophers such as Avicenna and Averroes. Averroes' works began to penetrate into the University of Paris about 1230, and Avicenna's works penetrated even earlier than that.

After three years studying at Paris, Aquinas proceeded to study theology at Cologne (1248 - 1252) where he was also under Albert the Great. After he completed his studying at Cologne, he returned to Paris to teach there as a 'bachelor' on the scripture, and on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. While he was a 'bachelor' he made commentaries on the Sentences.⁷⁶ This was his first work where we find in it all the most characteristic elements of his philosophy.⁷⁷ During his first period in Paris he also wrote a part of *Questiones di Quodlibet*.⁷⁸ Besides lecturing and taking part in disputations, Aquinas, even though still only a 'bachelor', wrote two short monographs at the request of the Dominican colleagues.

At the end of 1225 Aquinas received his licence to teach in theology, but he may not have begun teaching until the following academic year, because his master licence had not been formally recognized by the University. The reason for this delay was the dispute between the secular clergy and the new religious orders. At that time anti-Dominican feelings in Paris were so strong that the priory needed a guard of royal troops twenty four hours a day.⁷⁹ The campaign⁸⁰ was carried on in Paris against the medicants, particularly against the Dominicans, who were still excluded from the

consortium of masters.⁸¹ Aquinas, however, presided over the inception of his successor in the Cominican chair for foreigners in 1259.

During Aquinas' first three years at Paris as a Master in theology, he was to lecture on texts drawn from the Bible, namely Isaiah and Matthew. In this period also, he began, possibly in 1258, to write Summa Contra Gentiles,⁸² and completed it in 1264. His writing was a synthesis covering the entire range of Catholic truth specially for defending the faith apparently for the use of the Dominicans in Spain. This work was suggested by the Master General of the Dominican Order, Raymond Ranafort⁸³ (d.1275), who evangelised non-Christians in Spain and North Africa. In addition, Aquinas wrote this work with a full awareness of the development of Arabian Aristotelianism in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris.⁸⁴ The influence of Aristotle's teaching and Averroes' writing, as mentioned before, had been developed at the University of Paris. From 1210 to 1265 Aristotelianism had developed continuously in the Faculty of Arts and then in the Theology Faculty. In 1255 all the known works of Aristotle were placed on the syllabus for the Faculty of Arts.⁸⁵

At that time Siger of Brabant (c.1235 - 1282) was a leader of Latin Averroism,⁸⁶ who developed Aristotle's teaching and an Averroistic doctrine⁸⁷ in the Faculty of Arts. So Aquinas as a Master of Theology was responsible to block what were considered dangerous philosophical proclivities in the Faculty of Arts. In fact, Aquinas did not oppose all of Aristotle's works, but he tried to show that they were not in contradiction to the Christian dogma. Aquinas was trying to be a good Aristotelian and a good Christian at the same time.⁸⁸ Aquinas tried to interpret Aristotle's works

according to Christianity, and not to follow Arabic commentators, especially Averroes, though he regarded him as the best exponent of the Aristotelian text and the supreme master in logic, but heretical in his metaphysics and philosophy.⁸⁹ As a matter of fact, Aquinas took many things from Averroes as did Albert the Great from Avicenna, but he approached the text of Ibn Rashd (Averroes) in quite a different frame of mind.⁹⁰

Summa Contra Gentiles consists of four books; the first book deals with the nature of God, the second concerns the created world, the third explains the way in which rational creatures are to find their happiness in God, and the fourth is devoted specifically to Christian doctrine such as the Trinity, the incarnation and the like. One of Aquinas' aim in writing Summa Contra Gentiles was to show that the Christian faith is built on a rational foundation and that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily lead to a view of the world which excludes Christianity either implicitly or explicitly. Aquinas himself mentions this as follows:

"I have set myself the task of making known, as far as my limited power will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the errors that are opposed to it." 91

Thomas did not finish his Summa Contra Gentiles in Paris because in 1259 he returned to Italy. He remained there for nine years, and during that time he completed it. While Aquinas was in Rome in 1266 he started to write the Summa Theologiae⁹² which was Aquinas' longest and most important contribution to the science of theology.

The Summa Theologiae, divided into three parts, was written for beginners in the study of theology to replace the Sentences of Peter Lombard.⁹³ The first part discusses the subject of God and creation, the second was subdivided into two parts; Prima Secundae concerns man's moral life, and Secunda Secundae deals with particular virtues and vices; and the third is concerned with strictly theological topics, such as the Trinity, the Sacrament, and the like. Aquinas continued his writing in his second period in Paris (1266 - 1272) and during his life in Naples. It, however, was not finished, and was completed after his death by the historian Tolomeo of Lucca.⁹⁴ In both Summas there are many similar discussions, namely, what is already discussed in the Summa Contra Gentile is discussed again in the Summa Theologiae, but the discussions dealt with the Summa Contra Gentiles are more philosophical than in the Summa Theologiae.

In 1268 Aquinas was recalled to Paris where the academic situation had become serious. This was because the Averroist group which was led by Siger of Brabant rose up in the University of Paris. The philosophical movement in the Faculty of Arts was becoming increasingly independent, rationalistic and daring, which finally led to Siger's doctrines being condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1270 and 1277. Aquinas, in fact, did not only face the Averroist group but also the traditional theologians called the Augustinians who were led by William of St. Amour.

In his second Parisian period Thomas wrote many polemical writings against the secular masters. For example, there was "On

the Unity of the Intellect" against Averroist which was particularly aimed to attack Siger of Brabant who threatened to secure the triumph of Averroes in the Faculty of Arts under the colours of Aristotle, and so to compromise the whole peripatetic movement. This was written in 1270. To refute the attack of William of St. Amour, Aquinas wrote Contra Impugnator Dei Cultum et Religionem. In the same period Aquinas made commentaries on Aristotle. A part of his commentaries were done at the end of his life in Naples, that was between 1268 - 1273. Some of his commentaries on Aristotle were based on a text of William of Moerbeke (1215 - 1286), a friend of Aquinas.⁹⁵

During Aquinas' last year in Paris, a strong bond of mutual understanding and friendship had developed between Aquinas and a large number of masters and students in the Faculty of Arts. Aquinas even had a strong following in the Faculty of Arts from 1270 onwards. After the anti-mendicant controversy, Latin Averroist and opposition from Augustinist had subsided, Aquinas was recalled back to Italy by the master general John of Vercelli for the purpose of erecting a Dominican 'Studium General' in Naples. So Aquinas relinquished his professorial chair and returned to Italy in 1274. He continued his professorial activity there until the end of 1273. Aquinas stopped writing and dictating while he was celebrating Mass in the chapel of Nicholas on 6th December 1273. He said, "I can do no more, such things have been revealed to me that everything I have written seems to me rubbish."⁹⁶

Briefly, Aquinas devoted nearly half of his life in the academic field as a dedicated theologian as well as a philosopher,

writing and commenting on many aspects of theology and philosophy. In a short time he produced a large number of works,⁹⁷ but two of them, The Summa Contra Gentiles and The Summa Theologiae, are the most important of his works.

When Pope Gregory X summoned him to attend the Second Council at Lyons in 1274, he did not complete his journey because his health did not permit it. On the way he stopped at the court of Countess Francesca. He stayed there for four days, and at the end he was transferred to the neighbouring monastery of St. Maria at Fossanova. He died there on the 7th of March 1274. He was forty nine years of age at the time of his death, having behind him a life devoted to study and teaching. Aquinas was canonized as a saint on the 18th of July, 1323 by Pope John XXII as a model not only in sanctity but also in doctrine.

Although he did not have a long life, he made many contributions to Christian doctrine, and many of his writings were a source of reference for Christians. His influence, which was considerable in the centuries following his death, reached a new peak in 1878 when Pope Leo XIII recommended the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as a model for Catholic thought.⁹⁸

D. AQUINAS' RECONCILIATION OF ARISTOTELIANISM
AND CHRISTIANITY

In the 13th. century, the University of Paris, espicially the Faculty of Theology, was the centre of higher studies in Christendom. The important texts for students in the Faculty of Theology were the "Bible" and the "Sentences of Peter Lombard". They were trained as theologians who would defend the authority of Orthodox Christianity. For the function of a medieval master in theology was threefold; to lecture on some of the books of the Bible, to resolve questions up for discussion in the schools, and to preach the Word of God to the clergy and the laity.⁹⁹

Until about the 12th. century the ideology of Christianity had been without any serious rival. But the introduction of Aristotle's thought into the west created a wholly new situation. Christians were shaken in the 13th century by the massive importation of non-Christian philosophical literature.

The rise of Aristotelianism could not be controlled in the west. The work of Aristotle, dealing with natural philosophy together with his books on metaphysics, ethics and psychology, become known in the west at once upon its importation.¹⁰⁰ Soon, Aristotelianism began to be established in the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris. In 1252 a new statuet of the Faculty of Arts placed all the known writings of Aristotle on the lecture programme, and this Faculty, which traditionally taught the seven liberal arts, become a practicing school of Aristotelian philosophy. Soon after 1260 a number of Masters of the Faculty of Arts began to expound Aristotle, whom they regarded as the embodiment of philosophical

wisdom.

A group of young masters, led by Siger Braban (ca.1235 - 1282), taught the philosophy of Aristotle without concerning themselves with the opposition which existed between philosophy and Christian doctrine. From the 13th. century onwards the Faculty of Arts had become a Faculty of Philosophy, where Aristotle's philosophy was taught in its entirety.¹⁰¹ The Masters in the Faculty of Arts tended to develop their own teaching independently of the theological faculty. They wished their commentaries also to be philosophical, critical, and in this way different from the clerical commentaries of theologians. They claimed an authority of Aristotle's teaching, not on Holy Writ but based solely on reason.

During Aquinas' time the trouble was that some theologians wanted to theologize in philosophy, whereas some philosophers wanted to philosophize in theology.¹⁰² Consequently, the only way to resolve that conflict was, for Aquinas to handle philosophical problems as a philosopher and theological problem as a theologian.

Not only Aquinas, but also all the great theologians of the 13th century were aware on the danger of Aristotle's doctrine.¹⁰³ They had been careful either to reject and argue against Aristotelian theories which they considered incompatible with Christian doctrine, or to interpret Aristotle's thought in such a way that it appeared to entail conflicting theories.

In order to prevent an extension of the influence of Aristotle's teaching, some proscription¹⁰⁴ had been undertaken by

the council of Paris beginning in 1210 and continuing until its ultimate condemnation in 1270 and 1277.¹⁰⁵ The prohibition, however, was not effective. Aristotelianism continued to develop and spread to other places. In 1229, for example, the Professors of Toulouse, in order to attract students, issued a notice saying that lectures could be allowed there on the work of Aristotle.

Aristotelian thought was not a new thing for Aquinas, because by the time that he began his teaching career at the University of Paris the Aristotelian philosophy had been known to the medieval Christian world. But during his second Parisian (1269 - 1272) the conflict between the Aristotelians and theologians was reaching a climax. He could not close his eyes to, nor have a negative attitude toward the development of Aristotelianism. The desirability of attempting reconciliation between the Aristotelian system with Christian theology was clear to Aquinas. He, at the height of his theological career, devoted a decade to the interpretation of Aristotle.¹⁰⁶ For him to reject the Aristotelian system could mean rejecting the most powerful and comprehensive intellectual synthesis known to the medieval world, and to accept it totally would mean accepting ideas which contradicted Christian doctrine. In order to solve this problem he had to make his own commentary upon Aristotle, because the philosophy of Aristotle was not the product of a Christian thinker, nor had it sprung from Christian culture.¹⁰⁷

The immediate danger to Aquinas' thought arose from the Faculty of Arts. The Masters in that faculty were not friars or priests and had no theological training. Theoretically they had no authority to teach any part of philosophy that impinged upon divi-

nity.¹⁰³ For this reason Aquinas was not confident that the commentary on Aristotle made by Masters of the Faculty of Arts was not in contradiction with traditional Christianity. For Christian thinkers to learn philosophy from Aristotle was a dangerous procedure. To learn it from commentaries done by Arab philosophers, such as Averroes, was to suppose that this philosophy was exactly what Aristotle had taught in the 4th century before Christ.¹⁰⁹

Aquinas feared that the Aristotelian current which had been established in the Faculty of Arts would spread at least to the Faculty of Theology, because the professors of that faculty were all former students and often former professors of the Faculty of Arts. Everybody had to pass through the Faculty of Arts before starting the higher studies of theology.¹¹⁰ Aquinas was well aware that he would have to attack the Masters from the Faculty of Arts on their own ground - that of philosophy. How, then, could Christianity assimilate the philosophy of Aristotle without destroying either itself or philosophy?

Aquinas was primarily a theologian and was committed to Christian doctrine, but he also tried to be a good Aristotelian at the same time. Aquinas, whom the church had proclaimed Doctor par excellence, was not content with transferring the entire philosophy of Aristotle to the domain of Christian thought, but he adopted it so far as adaptation was consistent with theological orthodoxy. This required him to transform Aristotelian philosophy in a radical way, because as a theologian he could receive the historical Aristotle into Christianity only through some such mediating step.

Aquinas' task in his commentary on Aristotle was to show that there was in peripateticism a philosophy which was truly autonomous and independent of dogma but which could nevertheless be reconciled with dogma. Thus, he has to explain some of Aristotle's doctrines which are unacceptable in Christianity. For example, according to Aristotle God does not know anything other than Himself,¹¹¹ while in Christianity, as Aquinas says, God, in addition to knowing Himself, also knows other things.¹¹²

Aquinas interpreted Aristotle's thought carefully. He used it more creatively, systematically, and with a more specific recognition of the harmony between what Aristotle said and the Christian faith. When Aristotle's thought conflicts with Christian doctrine or seems to lead to conclusions which are incompatible with Christianity, Aquinas tends to interpret him in the most favourable light from the Christian point of view. He brought together into a formidable synthesis the insight of classical philosophy and Christian theology. Referring to the role of Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle, Jacques Maritain¹¹³ concludes aptly:

"He welded it into a powerful and harmonious system he explored its principles, cleared its conclusions, enlarged its horizon; if he rejected nothing, he added much, enriching it with the immense wealth of Latin Christian tradition, restoring in their proper places many of Plato's doctrines, on certain fundamental points opening up entirely new perspectives, and thus giving proof of a philosophic genius as mighty as that of Aristotle himself".¹¹⁴

As a matter of fact, Aquinas recognized the significance of philosophy and science as a basis for the Christian faith and for developing the capacities of human intellect. He believed that there is a true philosophy and a false philosophy. Philosophy is

true only insofar as the reason that has developed it was strengthened by some supernatural aid; but if reason is left to itself without any supernatural help, it leads inevitably to error.

Thomas strongly believed that both Plato and Aristotle had demonstrated the existence of one true God, however much they may have erred in describing His nature and providence. For Aquinas, demonstration of the existence of God was reached by "only a few men and even so after a long time and mixed with many mistakes."¹¹⁵

Notes to Chapter One

1. See Ibn Idhari al-Marrākushi, Al-Bayān al-Mughrib Fī Akhbār al-Andalus Wa al-Maghrib, Vol. 1, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1975. pp. 241 - 242; Abd Allah ibn Abd al-Mun'im al-himyāri, Sifat Jazīrat al-Andalus, ed. by E. Levi Provencal, Cairo, Matba'at Lunjnat al-Ta'līf Wa al-Turjumat Wa al-Nashr, 1937, pp. 153 - 158; Abd al-Wahid al-Marrākushi, Al-Mujib Fī Talkhīs Akhbār al-Maghrib, ed. by Muḥammad Sa'id al-Uryān, Cairo, Matba'at al-Liḥānat al-Sharqiyyat, 1963, pp. 456 - 458; Muḥammad Kurdi, Ali, Gharā'ib al-Gharb, Vol. 2, 2nd Edition, Cairo, Matba'at al-Rahmaniyyat, 1923, pp. 175 - 180.
2. See Al-Dhahabiy, Al-Ibr Fī Khabar Man Ghabar, Vol. 4, ed. by Ṣalāhuddīn al-Mumajjid, Kuwait, Matba'at al-Hukumat Kuwait, 1963 p. 47; Aḥmad Ibn Umayrat al-Dabbīy, Bughyat al-Multamis, ed. by F. Codera & J. Ribera, Madrid, Matba'at Rukhs, 1884, p. 40; Abū Ḥasan al-Nubahī, Tarīkh Qudāt al-Andalus, ed. by E. Levi Provencal Cairo, Dār al-Kitāb al-Misriy, 1948, pp. 98 - 99.
3. See Muḥammad ibn Abd Allah ibn Abī Bakr al-Qudā'iy, Ibn al-Abbār, Al-Muḥjam, Madrid, Matba'at Rukhs, 1885, p. 44.
4. This is because at the time of Ibn Bajjā's death, Averroes was around 12 or 13 years old. See Muḥammad Luṭfī Jumāt, Tarīkh Falāsifat al-Islam Fī al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib, Cairo Matba'at al-Ma'ārii, 1927, pp. 118 - 119.

5. 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrākushi, Al-Mu'jib Fī Talkhīs Akhbār al-Maghrib, op. cit., pp. 314 - 315.
6. 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrākushi, *ibid.*, p. 315.
7. Muḥammad Lutfi Jum'at, op. cit., p. 153.
8. For further details of his commentaries see H.A. Wolfson, "Revised Plan for the Publication of Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem", *Speculum*, Vol. XXXVIII, Jan (1963) pp. 90 - 104.
9. Its full title is al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillat Fī Aqā'id al-Millat Wa Ta'arīf Mā Waqa'a Fihā bi Hasb al-Ta'wīl Min al-Shubah al-Muzaiyyifat Wa al-Bid' al-Mudillat.
10. Its full title is Kitāb Faṣl al-Maqāl wa Taqrīr Mā Bajn al-Sharī'at Wa al-Hikmat Min al-Ittisāl. In English translation it is known as *on the Harmony of Philosophy and Religion*.
11. Averroes, Al-Kashf 'an Manāhij al-Adillat, ed. by Mahmud Qasim, 2nd edition, Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyyat, 1964. Hereafter reference to this work will be abbreviated as al-Kashf.
12. Averroes, Kitāb Faṣl al-Maqāl wa Taqrīr Mā Bayn al-Sharī'at wa al-Hikmat Min al-Ittisāl, ed. by Albir Naṣri Nadir, Beirut, Al-Maṭba'at al-Kathulikiyyat, 1961. Hereafter reference to this work will be abbreviated as Faṣl al-Maqāl.
13. Among philosopher attacked by al-Ghazali in his *Tahāfut al-*

Falāsifat are Alfarabi and Avicenna.

14. Fuqahā', plural of faqīh, are those who are experts in Islamic Law (Sharḥ).
15. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 55.
16. Ibid., p. 34.
17. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 48.
18. Muḥammad Luṭfi Jum'at, op. cit., p. 123.
19. 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrākushi, op. cit., pp. 354 - 355.
20. 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrākushi, op. cit., p. 385.
21. See Maḥmūd Qāsim, Al-Faylasūf al-Muftarā 'Alayh Ibn Rushd, Cairo, Matba'at Mukhaimar, (no date), pp. 19 - 20; Muḥammad Luṭfi Jum'at, op. cit., pp. 135 - 136.
22. Ulama' are those who have an abroad knowledge of Islam.
23. Muḥammad Luṭfi Jum'at, op. cit., p. 117.
24. See G. Hourani, in his introduction to Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 12; Maḥmūd Qāsim, in his introduction to Al-Kashf 'an Manāhij, p. 4 ff.
25. Maḥmūd Qāsim, op. cit., p. 26.
26. Muḥammad Luṭfi Jum'at, op. cit., p. 126.
27. 'Abd al-Wahid al-Marrākushi, op. cit., p. 385.

28. H.A. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 88.
29. Ibid., p. 89.
30. For further details about his works, see Leon Gauthier, Ibn Rushd, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1948, p. 13; E. Renan, Averroes et l'Averroisme, 2nd Edition, Paris, 1861, pp. 67 - 79. Muḥammad Luṭfi Jum'at, op. cit., pp. 147 - 151; Muḥammad 'Ummarat, Al-Madiyyat Wa al-Mithāliyyat Fī Falsafat Ibn Rushd, Cairo, Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1971, pp. 99 - 106; Muḥammad 'Atif al-'Irāqi, Al-Naz'at al-'Aqliyyat Fī Falsafat Ibn Rushd, Cairo, Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1968, pp. 328 - 332; Yuḥana Qamyar, Ibn Rushd, Beirut, Dār al-Mashriq, 1983, pp. 16 - 20.
31. See Charles E. Ermatinger, "Averroism in Early Fourteenth century Bologna", Mediaeval Studies, Vol. 16, 1953, p. 35 ff.
32. See Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance thought and the Arts, New Jersey, Princeton, 1980, pp. 111 - 118.
33. See Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsa, Bayn al-Dīn Wa al-Falsafat, Cairo, Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1968, pp. 49 - 82.
34. See Averroes, Kitāb al-Samā'i al-Tabī'i, in Rasā'il Ibn Rushd 1st Edition, Hyderabad, 1947, p. 2; Muḥammad 'Atif Al-'Irāqi, Al-Naz'at al-'Aqliyyat Fī Falsafat Ibn Rushd, Cairo Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1968, p. 44; E. Gilson, History of the Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, London, Sheed and Ward, 1980, p. 642.
35. Muḥammad Ummarat, Al-Madiyyat Wa al-Mithāliyyat Fī Falsafat

- Ibn Rushd, Cairo, Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1971, p. 20.
36. For further details see Muḥammad Yūsuf Mūsā, op. cit., pp. 89 - 102; Muḥammad 'Atif al- 'Irāqi, op. cit., pp. 268 - 291; Majid Fakhry, Ibn Rushd, Beirut, al-Maṭba'at al-Kathulikiyyat, 1960, pp. 26 - 37.
 37. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 27.
 38. Ibid., p. 27.
 39. Kamal al-Yāziji, Al-Mūjiz Fī Masā'il al-Falsafat al-Islāmiyyat Fī Asr al-Wasīṭ, Beirut, al-Dār al-Muttaḥidat, 1970, p. 111.
 40. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 35
 41. Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ed. by Maurice Bouyges, Beyrouth, 1930, p. 255. Hereafter, reference to this work will be abbreviated as Tahāfut al-Tahāfut.
 42. Quran, 59:2, translated by A.J. Arberry, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980.
 43. Quran, 7:185.
 44. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 30
 45. Ibid., p. 45; Al-Kashf, pp. 132 - 133
 46. Ibid., p. 36.
 47. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 409; cf. Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'at, Vol. 2, ed. by Maurice Bouyges, Beyrouth, 1942, p. 702.

Hereafter reference to this work will be abbreviated as Tafsīr.

48. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 50
49. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 334
50. Al-Kashf, p. 133; cf. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 39 and 52
51. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 356 and 582; Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 51
52. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 256; Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 50
53. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 52; Al-Kashf, p. 133
54. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 53.
55. Kamal al-Yāziji, op. cit., p. 111
56. For further details see Averroes "Qanūn al-Ta'wīl" in Al-Kashf an-Manāhij, pp. 248 - 251.
57. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 43 and 44
58. Ibid., p. 35
59. Ibid., p. 37
60. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 46; cf. Al-Kashf, p. 190
61. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 58.
62. De Maurice Wulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy, London, Longmans Green and Co., 1909, p. 310.

63. Benedictine is a monastic community based by St. Benedict of Nursia at Monte Cassino in the 6th century. Its members who consisted of laymen devoted themselves under vows of stability to monastic behaviour and obedience to the service of God. For details see M.D. Knowles, 'Benedictine Rule, 'New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, 1967, pp. 283 - 285.
64. James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1975, p. 11.
65. M.B. Crowe, 'Peter of Ireland,' Studies, Vo. XLV, 1956, Dublin, The Talbot Press, p. 451.
66. Ibid., p. 451.
67. Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10th ed., Macmillan Press Ltd., 1970, p. 612.
68. C.H. Haskins, 'Science in the Court of the Emperor Frederick II,' American Historical Review, 27 (1922), p. 684. See also H.A. Wolfson, 'The Twice-Revealed Averroes,' Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy, ed. by James F. Ross, Connecticut, Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971, p. 212 ff.
69. H.A. Wolfson, 'Revised Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averroes in Aristotelem,' Speculum, Vol. XXXVIII, Jan. (1963), p. 89.
70. It was the Order of Friars Preaches founded by St. Dominic c. 1217. It comprised of the First Order; Fathers and Brothers, Second Order, contemplative nuns, and the Third

Order included the convential third order and lay tertiaries. For details see W.A. Hinnebusch, "Dominicans", New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, 1967, pp. 974 - 982.

71. F.C. Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy, London, Methew & Co. Ltd., 1972, p. 153; D.A. Callus, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure and of St. Thomas", Blackfriars, Vol. XXI, March (1940), p. 154.
72. Ibid., p. 155
73. Robert C.S.B. Miller, "An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert," Mediaeval Studies, Vol. XVI, 1954, p. 59.
74. Ibid., p. 59.
75. C.W. Previte Orton, The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. 1, London, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 626.
76. For further details of his commentaries on the Sentences see Battista Mondin S.X., St. Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy, The Hague, Martinus Nijhaff, 1975, pp. 1 - 4; M.B. Crowe, "The date of St. Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences," Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. No. 24, 1957, pp. 314 - 319.
77. Ibid., p. 1.
78. James A. Weisheipl, op. cit., pp. 126 - 127.
79. A. Kenny, Aquinas, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 5.
80. One of the leaders who propogated the campaign was William of

Saint-Amour. He attacked primarily the office of teaching and preaching, hearing confessions and mendicancy. He and his followers aroused the clerical students so much that the Dominicans were afraid to go outside the priory to beg. At the end, he was exiled in 1257.

81. James A. Wisheipl, op. cit., p. 86.
82. For details of the plan of the Summa Contra Gentiles see A.C. Pegis, in 'General Introduction in Summa Contra Gentiles,' Book 1, pp. 15 - 51.
83. M.C. D'arcy, Thomas Aquinas, London, Oxford University Press 1944, p. 41.
84. A.C. Pegis, op, cit., p. 26.
85. F. Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement in The Thirteenth Century, Edinburgh, Nelson, 1955, p. 78.
86. For further details of Latin Averroism see F.C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, London, Search Press, 1976 pp. 435 - 441; E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, London, Sheed and Ward, 1980, pp. 387 - 402; F. Van Steenberghen, op. cit., pp. 75 - 92.
87. Among the Averroistic doctrine which were the most controversial at that time were unicity of the intellect, the double truth theory, and eternity of the world.
88. Knut Trany, "Thomas Aquinas", A Critical History of Western

- Philosophy, ed. by D.J. O'Connor, New York, The Free Press, 1964, p. 104.
89. De Lacy O'Leary, Arabic Thought and its place in History, London, Kegan Paul, 1922, p. 287.
90. F.E. Petters, Aristotle and the Arabs, New York, New York University Press, 1968, p. 222.
91. SCG, 1, 2.
92. For further details about writing of Summa Theologiae See Thomas Gilby's 'appendix' 1, 2 and 3 in Summa Theologiae Vol. 1, Cambridge, Blackfriars, 1964.
93. A. Kenny, op. cit., p. 15.
94. A. Kenny, op. cit., p. 16.
95. A. Hayman and James J. Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1980, p. 464.
96. J. Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas, trn. by J.F. Scanlan, London, Sheed & Ward, 1942, p. 51.
97. For further details of his works see W.A. Wallace & James A. Weisheipl, 'Thomas Aquinas, St.' New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, 1967, pp. 111 - 115; James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Quino, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 358 - 404; An Aquinas Reader, ed. by Mary T. Clark, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972, pp. 555 - 561; I.T. Eschmann, O.P., A Catalogue of St. Thomas's works, in E. Gilson, The

- Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1957, pp. 381 - 430.
98. Knut Trany, op. cit., p. 98.
99. James A. Weisheipl, "Johannine Commentary of Friar Thomas", Church History, Vol. 45 (1976), p. 186.
100. Josef, Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trn. by Richard and Clara Winston, New York, Pantheon Books, 1962, p. 41.
101. F. Van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism, Washington D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1980, p. 76.
102. E. Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938, p. 72
103. F. Van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism, p. 77.
104. For further details see F.C. Copleston; A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 209 - 210; Bernard G. Dod, "Aristotles Latinus," Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 1982, p. 71.
105. See John F. Wippel, "The Condemnation of 1270 and 1277 at Paris", Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Vol. No. 7, (1977), pp. 169 - 201; A. Hayman and James S. Walsh, op. cit., pp. 540 - 542.
106. J. Owen, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," St. Thomas

Aquinas 1274 - 1974 Commemorative Studies, Vol. 1, Toronto,
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1974, p. 238.

107. Knut Trany, op. cit., p. 104.
108. D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, London, Longman,
1962, p. 272.
109. A.C. Pegis, "General Introduction," in SCG, 1, p. 22.
110. F. Van Steenberghen, Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth
Century, p. 49.
111. Aristotle, Met. XII, 9 (1074b25).
112. SCG, 1, 70 & 1, 65.
113. One of the committed Thomist members born in Paris in 1882.
He is regarded as a pre-eminent interpreter of the thought of
Thomas Aquinas. See Joseph W. Evans, "Maritain, Jacques,"
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. V, 1972, pp. 160 - 164.
114. J. Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, trans. by. E.I.
Watkin, London, Sheed & Ward, 1956, pp. 73 - 74.
115. STIa, q.1, a.1.

CHAPTER TWO

DOCTRINE AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

A. GENERAL DOCTRINE OF GOD IN AVERROES AND AQUINAS

In his theological discussion concerning God, Averroes gave more consideration to the masses than to the intellectuals. All proofs in which he discusses God are acceptable by both. However, we find also many intellectual arguments in his *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, which are not easily understood by the common people. This is because *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* is written to refute an attack given by an intellectual, namely Al-Ghazali.

The reason why Averroes gave more consideration to the masses in his theological arguments, is that they are the majority of people and the teaching of divine law (*sharʿ*) concerns them.¹ They have no high intellectual capacity to understand complicated things. Their intellectual reach does not extend beyond their imagination, and when they cannot imagine something it is non-existent for them.² For this reason Averroes stressed repeatedly³ that they should accept the exterior meaning of the Quran, and intellectuals are unable to expose any of its allegorical meanings to them.

As we have seen, Averroes stated that philosophy is not opposed to revelation, since philosophy examines everything which is contained in scripture. If it is found to agree with reason, then it is more perfect knowledge, and if reason does not perceive its truth, its cause is the defective human intellect.⁴

Averroes did not explain in detail how human intellect is able to know God, but he stressed that the first knowledge which someone should have is the knowledge of the Creator's existence,⁵ and the nature of observing the universe which leads to the know-

ledge (ma'rifat) of God has been implanted in human intellect.⁶ Human intellect, according to him, can perceive the forms of existence whether they are sensible existence (wujūd mahsus) or intelligible existence (wujūd ma'qūl).⁷

The nature of the recognition of the existence of God in the human mind is mentioned in the Quran, "Am I not your Lord? They said, Yes, we testify."⁸ The purpose of scripture, he said, is to teach true science and right practices. True science is the knowledge of God, and of other things as they are, and the knowledge of happiness and misery in the next life.⁹

In his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'at, Averroes referred to God as the First Principle, the First Mover, the Pure Intellect and the First Intellect. This is because he discussed God from a philosophical point of view, as Aristotle did, while in Faṣl al-Maqāl and Al-Kashf he only referred to God's one name, Allah, in order that it should not confuse the masses. In his commentary on Aristotle, Averroes deduced the nature of God from the fact that He is the Unmoved Mover, and as such He is free from potency and in no wise existing in matter. He is eternal, a substance and actuality, absolutely simple and indivisible. In other words, He is Pure Act, without any admixture of potency, unable to in any respect other than He is, and necessarily existing. He is also the final cause of all things, moving them as the desired object of their love.

The meaning of Pure Intellect, according to Averroes, is the system which exists in this universe, its cause and its source.¹⁰ So God bestows on the existent, the order and system in their acts.¹¹

God a Pure Intellect has all the perfect qualities. Averroes affirmed these qualities which are also mentioned in the Quran: knowledge, life, power, will, hearing, sight and speech.¹² The problem in Islamic theology is whether these attributes are identical with essence or additional (zā'id) to it. The Ash'arites¹³ said that the essence and attributes are two different things, that is, attributes are superadded to essence;¹⁴ while the Mu'tazilites¹⁵ hold that essence and attributes are one thing.¹⁶ As for Averroes, his opinion tends to the Mu'tazilites. This is because he believed that the method of the philosophers regarding the First Principle is nearer to that of the Mu'tazilites.¹⁷

Averroes argued that if these attributes are of a necessary existence (wājib al-wujūd), and the essence also is a necessary existence, then necessary existence would be more than one. This is impossible for God's uniqueness would be denied. The discussion of the relation between essence and attributes is one not easily understood by the common people. So Averroes stressed that they should recognize the existence of those attributes without going into detail.¹⁸

Averroes said that we do not know the attributes of God except by two means: by the way of likeness, and by the way of transcendence.¹⁹ By the former we affirm that God has positive attributes (ṣifat ijbābiyyat) as human beings have, and by the latter, we deny all deficiencies in God.

The likeness between God and creature, according to Averroes, is understandable in two senses. First, the Creator (God) does not

have attributes which belong to the creature. Secondly, the Creator also has attributes which belong to the creature, but in a more perfect and superior way.²⁰ In other words, the attributes which exist in the Creator are of another mode than that which is in the creature. Averroes referred to a Quranic verse which clearly states the transcendence of God, "Like Him there is naught."²¹ What is predicated of God and creature is analogical, not in a univocal or pure equivocal sense.

When we say that God and man share the same kind of attributes, this does not mean that God's attributes and man's are exactly the same, and it also does not mean that they are totally different. For man is said to be perfect when he has attributes such as knowledge, life, will, power and the like. This perfection belonging to man is related to God, but that which is in God is more perfect and superior. What is predicated to God and man is the same in name²² (ishtirāk al-ism) but not in reality. This is the significance of a tradition of the prophet Muhammad, according to Averroes, that God created Adam according to His form.

In his commentary on Aristotle's view that God is simple, Averroes interpreted this to mean that God is not composed of something. That which is composed is changeable. This is impossible with God for He does not undergo any change.²³ Since God is not a composite thing, He is not a body. In other words we should deny all anthropomorphism in speaking of God. Yet there are many verses in the Quran which use anthropomorphism in speaking of God. For example, "He sat Himself upon the throne,"²⁴ "yet still abide the

Face of the Lord, majestic, splendid."²⁵ Averroes tried to solve this problem.

According to Averroes Quranic texts do not deny firmly the corporeality of God. They make no mention of it, but what is clear for us is that affirmation of corporeality of God is nearer than their negation.²⁶ Averroes' general approach was to follow the pattern of divine law (shar') which does not affirm or deny the anthropomorphism of God is its declaration to the masses. If asked we should answer that there is nothing like unto Him.²⁷ This is the same as what had happened to Malik ibn Anas when he spoke about God's sitting upon the throne. He said, "The sitting is known, its manner is unknown. the belief in it is necessary and asking questions about it is innovation (bid'at)."²⁸

Averroes gave three reasons²⁹ why it is forbidden to describe the anthropomorphism of God to the masses:

- (1) It is difficult to understand it.
- (2) The masses cannot imagine something which has no body; so when they are told that there exists one who has no body, their imagination cannot comprehend it.
- (3) If the scripture denies anthropomorphism altogether there would arise many doubts about what has been said concerning the Day of Judgement.

Averroes also said that God is eternal and infinite. For everything that has an end must have begun and what does not begin

does not end. This can also be understood from the fact that beginning and end are correlatives. Therefore, one who affirms that what has no end has no beginning.³⁰

If God does not have these two qualities, eternal and infinite, it means He is not the Pure Act or the First Principle which is the cause of source of all beings, that will be proved later.

Like Averroes, Aquinas also recognized that philosophy and revelation are not opposed to one another. Some knowledge of the nature of God is attainable through philosophy. Man, by using intellect, is able to know God. On this depends the ultimate felicity of man. Man's ultimate beatitude is to know God.³¹ The divine substance, according to Aquinas, is not beyond the capacity of the created intellect in such a way that it is altogether foreign to it. In fact the divine substance is the first intelligible object and the principle of all intellectual cognition.³² Aquinas said that the fact that we are able to know something of God from creation is based on the fact that creation, as an effect of God, must manifest God, though it can do this only imperfectly. Aquinas remained convinced of the fact that the divine essence in itself transcends the grasp of the human mind, and therefore, transcends all human representation of figurative description. "If we imagine what something is, then God is beyond it; if we can grasp the definition of a certain thing, then that thing is not yet God".³³

According to Aquinas there are two fundamental ways by which we can know God's nature. Both move from our understanding of things in the natural world to a description of God, and though neither

gives an exact and exhaustive comprehension of God's nature, each gives us trustworthy insights.

The first is known as the negative way. It, according to Aquinas, is a mode of expressing the transcendence of God's perfection, which is recognized to be beyond any concept man may form either from material or spiritual beings.³⁴ We are unable to apprehend the divine essence by knowing what it is, yet we are able to have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.³⁵ For example, if we say that God is incorporeal, we can distinguish Him from many other beings. By denying His corporeality we form some notion of His nature, since on this basis we know He is not body. Furthermore, this concept gives us a positive idea of what the divine substance is in itself, and the more predicates we deny of God, the more we approximate to a knowledge of Him.³⁶ The second is the affirmative way. Some predicates such as goodness or wisdom function more affirmatively and directly in our description of God. Though Aquinas insisted on the negative aspect of some of God's attributes, he did not mean to disregard positive attributes predicated of God. In fact, the negative and the positive attributes virtually go together. There can be no validity in theology if the negative and positive are not used together. "The positive way alone leads to anthropomorphism, to idolatry, to blasphemy. The negative way alone leads to agnosticism and atheism."³⁷

To avoid confusion in describing God's nature through the affirmative way Aquinas said that some predicates attributed to God are not univocal,³⁸ nor equivocal,³⁹ but analogical.⁴⁰ For Example,

when we say that a man is wise, and that God is wise, the predicate "wise" is not to be understood in a univocal sense, that is in precisely the same sense. Our concept of wisdom is drawn from creatures, and if we apply precisely this concept to God, we should be saying something false about God, since God is not, and cannot be wise in precisely the same sense in which a man is wise. On the other hand, the names we apply to God are not purely equivocal, they are not entirely and completely different in meaning from the meaning they bear when applied to creatures. So the way we can reach the knowledge is analogical in character. Analogy is a principle which must be properly interpreted and proportionately adapted to each particular order of knowledge.

The foundation of all analogies employed by Aquinas is the likeness of creatures to God. When an attribute is predicated analogically of two different things, this means that it is predicated according to the relation of the one to another, and Aquinas said that creatures have a real relation to God.⁴¹ The example given by Aquinas is the word "health". An animal is said to be healthy because it is a subject of health, while medicine is said to be healthy as being the cause of health, and a complexion is said to be healthy as being the sign of health.⁴² Moreover, Aquinas said that "We cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use of creatures, and so whatever is said both of God and creatures is said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God as to their source and cause in which all the perfection of things pre-exist transcendentally."⁴³ So, in analogical predication, the predicate is applied to God and to creatures neither in precisely the same

sense nor in a totally different sense. According to Aquinas' interpretation of the relationship between God and creature, finite reality points to God, since it is caused by God. Being caused by God, it bears some similarities to Him because every effect resembles its cause. Aquinas, however, insists that while we admit that in some way the creature resembles God, we must in no way say that God resembles the creature, such as we would call a portrait a likeness of man, but not vice-versa.⁴⁴ This is because the creature manifests God only imperfectly. This is Aquinas' interpretation of a phrase in the scripture, "let us make man in our image, after our likeness."⁴⁵

We do not find dissimilarity between Averroes' and Aquinas' discussion in relation to the knowledge of God and relationship between God and creature. Both agreed that the attributes of God and creature are in an analogical way. But Aquinas' explanation about the concept of analogy between God and creature is more complete and more detailed than Averroes. Averroes did not describe at length as Aquinas how the analogical relationship between God and creature arose. He just said that God's attributes and man's such as knowledge, power, will and the like are the same in the name, and God's attributes are superior than man's.

In philosophic-theological discussions, Aquinas called God Pure Act, First Principle, First Mover, Final Cause and First Cause as Averroes did. This can be seen in his treatment about the proof of the existence of God which will be discussed later. The similarity in the name of God given by both Averroes and Aquinas is due to the commentaries they made on Aristotle's concept of God. Aquinas however, when he referred to the scriptures,⁴⁶ just called God one

and His attributes are the same.⁵⁴ This is parallel to Averroes' statement, but the reasons each gave are different. Aquinas held that if God's attributes were not His essence, there should be something outside of His essence. This would mean that there is composition in God's essence, but composition in God's essence is impossible.⁵⁵ Moreover, Aquinas said that each of God's qualities such as wisdom, goodness, and the like is the divine essence itself and so all are one in reality.⁵⁶

Aquinas concluded his discussion of the concept of the simplicity of God by saying that He is not composed of extended parts, since He is not a body, nor of form and matter, nor does He differ from His own nature, nor His nature from His existence, nor can one distinguish in Him genus and difference, nor substance accidents. It is clear, then, that there is no way in which God is composite, and He must be altogether simple.⁵⁷ In supporting his discussion of God's simpleness Aquinas quoted Augustine who said "God is the most truly simple thing there is." If God is Pure Act and the source of all beings, He must be perfect. Everything that is imperfect must be preceded by something perfect. Something is perfect according as it is in act, and God as the First Cause is always in act, as Aquinas had shown. So God must be perfect.⁵⁸ Aquinas' argument that God is perfect does not depend merely on the logic of the philosophical conception. He also referred to the verse in the scripture "You, therefore, must be perfect as your heavenly father is perfect."⁵⁹

B. PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

i. God's Existence is demonstrable

Averroes, in his Fasl al-Ma'āl,⁶⁰ was concerned with a wider problem; whether the philosophical method tallies with the teaching of revelation or not. In this matter Averroes replied in the affirmative. For philosophy, according to him, as has been mentioned in the previous chapter, was nothing other than consideration of existents and their examination, insofar as they manifest the Creator. From this it can be seen that he recognized that God's existence is demonstrable by reference to the observable world.

In his 'an-Kashf, he distinguished between four theological schools on the specific problem of God's existence. They were the Hashawites, the Ash'arites, the Sufis and the Mu'tazilites. Each had different theories concerning the divinity, and each believed its views had been handed down from primitive Islam.

The existence of God according to the Hashawites (Hashawiyat), remarked Averroes, must not be subjected to rational investigation; it is only known by revelation (al-sam').⁶² In other words they denied that the existence of God could be demonstrated by human intellect. This view, Averroes said, can be easily refuted, since the Quran⁶³ itself enjoins the speculative consideration of His existence.

The Ash'arites' view, according to Averroes, maintained that the existence of God lies between proper fields of reason, but in their proof they made use of non-Quranic methods.⁶⁴ They started with proposition that the world was created which was based on the

premise that bodies are composed of indivisible created atoms (ajzā' lā tatajazza') and that the atoms which are indivisible are temporal (ḥuduth). The method, according to Averroes, is not easily understood, and does not lead to a belief in the existence of God.⁶⁵

The Sufis' method, as Averroes observed, was not a philosophical method, that is to say, it did not consist of a number of premises and syllogisms. They maintained that knowledge is found in our own hearts after its detachment from all physical desire, and after concentrating the mind upon the desired object. This method, from Averroes' view, though we can accept it, is not common to all people.⁶⁶

As to the Mu'tazilites, Averroes did not make many commentaries because in many circumstances especially concerning the First Principle, the opinion of the philosophers was nearer to their view.⁶⁷ The Mu'tazilites were well known as people who give more consideration to the intellectual.⁶⁸ In the case of God's existence however, their methods, according to Averroes, were like those of the Asharites.⁶⁹

After an analysis and criticism of those theories Averroes gave his own solution. He did so as a follower of, and commentator on, Aristotle. He stated that the existence of God can be demonstrated through physics not metaphysics as held by Avicenna.⁷⁰ Thus Avicenna's proof of the existence of God, according to Averroes, was invalid.⁷¹ According to him, Avicenna's proof was invalid because he followed Alexander on this point. In Alexander's view, the physicist could not prove the existence of the principle of

natural beings; the physicist could assume the principle of sensible beings that are posited by the metaphysician. This is wrong, Averroes said, because the external substance is proved to be the first principle of natural beings in the final book of the physics.⁷² Averroes said that physics establishes the existence of the subject matter of metaphysics. Thus metaphysics must accept the result of physics. That is, metaphysics must begin with the fact of matter and form as the composing principle of natural beings.⁷³ Thus the existence of God is properly and exclusively proved in the science of physics. The task of the metaphysician is to demonstrate that the prime mover, whose existence had already been proven in physics, is the principle of sensible substance in the orders of formal and final causality. On this basis Averroes firmly proclaimed that metaphysics does not prove the existence of a first substance, rather it proves only that the first mover, a pure form, must be a substance, since form is the constitutive cause of substance.⁷⁴ Thus metaphysics begins after the physical proof of an immaterial first mover. This means that metaphysical proof does not able to prove the existence of God.

Aquinas responds to these two proofs given by Avicenna and Averroes. He prefers Avicenna to Averroes.⁷⁵ He, however did not accept totally what had been argued by Avicenna.⁷⁶ Aquinas' discussion of the demonstration of God's existence is found in his Summa Theologiae in question 2, article 1, in Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, Chapter 10 and 11, in Commentary on Sentence distinction 3, question 1, article 2, and in De Veritate question 10, article 12.

The main question put by Aquinas is whether the existence of

God is demonstrable or not. Like Averroes, he also answered in the affirmative. Aquinas argued that the proposition "God exists" is not self evident to us. He says a thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: first, self-evident in itself not to us; secondly, self-evident in itself and to us. Aquinas explained that such a proposition becomes self-evident when the predicate of the proposition is included in the meaning of the subject. For example, man is an animal, since being an animal is part of the meaning of man.⁷⁷ If, therefore, the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself but not to all or some of us. Therefore, the proposition "God exists" is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence.⁷⁸ Now because we do not know what God is, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are better known to us. This is done by means of God's effects.

It is clear for us that Aquinas' view about the proposition "God exists" is self-evident in itself but not to us, and we need evidence to prove the existence of God. According to Aquinas, there are two kinds of demonstrations; firstly, by means of cause, and secondly by means of effect.⁷⁹ Only the second is available to us in the case of a knowledge of God. This is because the effect is better known to us than its cause, and so we proceed from the effect to the knowledge of its cause. If the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist, since every effect depends on its cause. The existence

of God, insofar as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us. The foundation of this demonstration are laid in the Five Ways.

If Averroes held that the valid proof of the existence of God is only through physics, Aquinas also agreed with him, though in many circumstances he preferred Avicenna to Averroes. This is because physics, according to Aquinas, studies mobile being as mobile, while metaphysics studies whatever falls under the common notion of substantial being.⁸⁰

In fact, Aquinas, as a commentator on Aristotle, like Averroes, used both concepts of physics and metaphysics in proving that God exists. This becomes clear when we refer to his Five Ways where he plainly mentions in his Summa Contra Gentiles that he based the argument of the existence of God on the physic and metaphysic of Aristotle.

If Averroes referred to the Quran in his claim that God's existence can be demonstrated through philosophical observation which is comprehended from its many verses, Aquinas also did the same thing. He, in supporting his statement that God's existence is demonstrable, referred to the scripture of St. Paul which stated that "Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible nature, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that had been made."⁸¹ Aquinas' reference to the scripture, however, differs from Averroes' reference to the Quran. Averroes analysed his argument from the Quranic texts, while Aquinas did not base his argument on a scripture but used it as an authoritative

source.

According to Aquinas' view, one is able to demonstrate that God exists from the things that He has made, His effects, though they are not proportionate to Him. Aquinas pointed out that because every effect must have a cause, the existence of an effect is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of its cause. Therefore, he argues that the existence of God can be demonstrated from His effects.

ii. Averroes' proof

Averroes in the commentary on Aristotle laid down a theory of motion as one of the proofs of the existence of God. In many place in his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut⁸² and Tafsir Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'at⁸³ he discussed this theory, and explained it for the purpose of defending the view of the philosophers who had been attacked by Al-Ghazali. As a peripatetic philosopher, he recognized that this theory was valid as proof of the existence of God. What kind of God Who has been proven through this theory is not our concern. Since the theory of motion is drawn from Aristotle, it might only prove to be God as understood by Aristotle. God in Aristotle's system, according to modern commentators, is only the first cause of motion. For Averroes as a Muslim, God is the Creator, drawing forth the universe from non-existence ('adam) to existence (wujūd) and conserving it.⁸⁴

According to the theory of motion, as Averroes observed, every movement has a mover,⁸⁵ because it is impossible, for example, for a saw to move itself; it has to be moved by, for example, a carpenter. The causes which move each other cannot go to infinity, but must stop at a first cause which is absolutely unmoved.⁸⁶ These are

some principles discussed by Aquinas in one of his proofs of the existence of God which will be discussed later. This theory, however, will not be discussed here because the argument of motion was not recommended by Averroes as a proof which is acceptable by the masses.

The proof of motion, according to Averroes, is only suitable for intellectuals ('ulamā'). This proof is too complicated and too difficult for the masses to grasp it adequately. Averroes, as mentioned on his previous chapter, gave more attention to the masses than to the intellectuals in his discussion of God, because they don't have a deep intellectual ability to conceive complicated things. Averroes explained theological methods and teachings in such a way that the masses were able to understand it.

In the proof of the existence of God, Averroes referred directly to the Quran, because he believed that Quranic teaching is acceptable for all levels of human understanding whether they belong to demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical groups. When referred to the Quran he did not base his argument of the existence of God on logical premises which sometimes are not certain and cannot be understood by the laity. Thus he rejected proofs given by the theologians (mutakallimūn) such as those given by the Ash'arites who based their arguments on temporal and contingent matters.

Averroes criticized the Ash'arites' proof of the existence of God which was based on the proposition that the universe is created (hadīth).⁸⁷ If we assume, according to Averroes, that the universe is created, it becomes necessary, as they say, that its

creator must have another creator, so we can take this creator to be neither eternal nor created. For if we take it as created, then it must require another creator, and then another, and so on to infinity. This is impossible. On the other hand if we take it as eternal, then it is necessary that its action, universe, must likewise be eternal, because created things might be dependent on the action of the agent. This is because their principle in this case is that whatever is connected with created things (hawādith) is itself created.⁸⁸ But they did not except this.

For Averros, the proof of the existence of God by the Ash'arites was not satisfactory, their principles contained many dubious matters. So for benefit of both intellectuals and the masses he presented two proofs⁸⁹ of the existence of God which he really believed are beneficial for all people. The two are called providence or God's design (al-'inayat), and invention or creation (al-ikhtirā')

(1) Proof by providence

This proof is based on two principles; first that all existents (al-mawjūdāt) are created adaptively to man's existence. Secondly, the harmony of adaptation in the universe must necessarily be brought about by an agent, it cannot be merely the result of chance. The first principle, Averroes says, is self-evident. Furthermore, he says, when a man has examined some sensible objects such as the sun, the moon, and all the stars (which are the cause of the four seasons of day

and night, of rain, water and wind) and the earth fitted for the habitation of man and all animals, then he knows positively that it is impossible that this harmony for man, animals and plants in all parts of the universe should arise by chance, but that it must proceed from someone who arranged it and made it by his attention, and that is God.⁹⁰ For example, if man sees a stone on the ground in its shape fit for sitting on, and finds its proportion and fashion of the same kind, then he would come to know that it was made by a maker who put it there.⁹¹ Again, if we see from the harmoniousness of every part of the universe, said Averroes, that if a single one of the heavenly bodies (al-ajrām al-samāwiyyat) was to stop for a single moment whatever is on the earth would perish.⁹²

According to Averroes, this proof is positive (qat'iy) and simple (basīṭ)⁹³ and acceptable by all. The ground of this proof is also found in the Quran which can be understood from many verses. For example Allah says, "Have We not made the earth as a cradle and the mountains as pegs? and we appointed your sleep for a rest; and we appointed night for a garment, and we appointed day for a livelihood. And we have built above you seven strong ones, and we appointed a blazing lamp and have sent down out of the rainclouds water cascading, that we may bring forth thereby grain and plants and gardens luxuriant."⁹⁴ Through these verses, Averroes said, we are able to recognize the adaptation of the parts of the universe to

man's existence.⁹⁵ For example, the sending down of rain in a certain quantity and at certain seasons, for the cultivation of the field, cannot be by chance, rather its cause is providence. Evidence for this concept of providence does not only manifest itself in the universe but also in human and animal organs where each organ has its certain function to maintain their life and existence.⁹⁶

Averroes' proof in relation to intellectuals can be systematised as follow:

- (a) The universe in all its parts is fit for the existence of man and all other beings here (minor premise).
- (b) All existing beings in all parts which are adapted to the existence of man and all other beings are necessarily created (major premise).
- (c) The universe is created and has a maker (result)

(2) Proof of invention or creation

This proof is also based on two principles which are found potentially in all humans by their nature.⁹⁷ The first principle is that all existents are created, and secondly, that every created things has an inventor (mukhtari'). The first principle is quite clear in itself in the case of animals and plants as God mentions, "surely those upon whom you call, apart from God shall never create a fly, though they banded together to do

it."⁹⁸ Based on this verse Averroes said that if we see organic substances and then we find life in them, we know certainly that there is a creator and bestower of life, that is God.⁹⁹ As to the skies, we know from their movements which never become slackened, that they work for our benefit by divine providence, and they are subordinate to our welfare. For this point Averroes come to a conclusion that such an appointed and subordinate object which is created by someone else is necessary.¹⁰⁰

When the first and the second principle are combined together. we can reach a conclusion that every existent must have an inventor. These two principles, according to Averroes, are valid to prove that every existent has a maker.¹⁰¹ To support the validity of this principle he referred to a verse of the Quran, "Have they not considered the dominion of the heaven and of the earth and what things God has created?"¹⁰²

The proof of invention has not many differences compared to the first proof. The second proof mostly depends on the first,¹⁰³ and there is overlapping. For example, the proposition "every created thing has a creator" in the second proof, is partly already discussed in the first proof. In Averroes' second proof, though he said that it was drawn from the Quranic verses, we find analogical element. Such as the proposition "every created thing has a creator." This logical premise is not so easy to be understood by the masses.

Averroes stated plainly that these two proofs are religious proofs (shar')¹⁰⁴ which, according to him, are suitable both for intellectuals and the masses,¹⁰⁵ the only difference being in details. For the masses cannot understand the two above mentioned arguments but only what they can grasp by their senses, while, for the intellectuals, they can go further, and learn by reasoning as well as learning by sense.¹⁰⁶ In other words, whereas the masses' knowledge is based on observable and sensible things, the intellectuals' knowledge is based on reasoning and certitude. For example, when the masses look at existents, they only know that those existents are created and have a maker. On the other hand, when the intellectuals look at the universe, as men of arts, they try to understand the real purpose of it. So it is quite clear that their knowledge about the Maker, as the Maker of the universe, is better than that of men who only know it as made.¹⁰⁷

Averroes suggested that these two methods are the correct way by which God invites men to a knowledge of His existence. Therefore, he insisted that the Quranic verses leading to a knowledge of the existence of God are dependent only on the two foregoing arguments.¹⁰⁸ Some show to the argument of providence,¹⁰⁹ some refer to the argument of invention,¹¹⁰ and some comprise both arguments.¹¹¹

The conclusion of the two proofs relates to the

universe where the first proof concerns the harmoniousness of the movement of all parts of the universe, and the utility of its harmoniousness to human beings and other existents; the second proof shows that the universe is not created by itself, but by someone else - God.

Of these two proofs Averroes explained in more detail the proof of providence than the proof of invention. So the proof of providence, according to him, is the best proof of the existence of God.¹¹²

Perhaps Averroes' two proofs can be related to the cosmological argument, but not as the cosmological argument discussed by Aquinas which will be dealt with later. Averroes' proof was a result of observation of the universe derived from many verses of the Quran, while Aquinas' proof, as will be seen, consists of philosophical conception.

iii. Aquinas' proof

Aquinas presented his famous Five Ways in proving God's existence in his two Summas. He claims that his proofs are the same as those used by both philosophers and Catholic teachers.¹¹³

The first three of the Five Ways are best included under the well-known cosmological arguments,¹¹⁴ and the background of these arguments is Aristotle's philosophy. The fourth argument points back to plato's idea of the eternal forms and also points forward to the moral argument. The fifth argument points to theo-

logical argument.

It is not our purpose to criticize Aquinas' argument of the existence of God nor is it to analyse them in detail by comparing his thought with that of other Christian philosophers whether his contemporaries or successors in recent times. The main purpose is to lay down Aquinas' argument and then try to point out if there are any similarities between Averroes' and Aquinas' proofs. Aquinas' proofs are as follows:

i. The first way: Argument from motion or change.

This proof is based on change.

"Some things in the world are certainly in process of change: this we plainly see. Now anything in process of change is being changed by something else. This is so because it is characteristic of things in process of change that they do not yet have the perfection towards which they move, though able to have it; whereas it is characteristic of something causing change to have that perfection already. For to cause change is to bring into being what was previously only able to be, and this can only be done something that already is: thus fire, which is actually hot, causes wood which is able to be hot, to become actually hot, and in this way causes change in the wood. Now the same thing cannot at the same time be both actually X and potentially X, though it can be actually X and potentially Y; the actually hot cannot at the same time be potentially hot, though it can be potentially cold. Consequently, a thing in process of change cannot itself cause that same change; it cannot change itself. Of necessity therefore anything in process of change is being changed by something else. Moreover, this something else, if in process of change, is itself being changed by yet another thing; and this last by another. Now we must stop somewhere, otherwise there will be no first cause of the change, and, as a result, no subsequent causes. For it is only when acted upon by the first cause that intermediate causes will produce the change: if the hand does not move the stick, the stick will not move anything else. Hence one is bound to arrive at some first cause of change not itself being changed by anything, and this is what everybody understands by God." 115

This argument is the longest of the five ways presented by

Aquinas in his two Summas. So we are not surprised that he says that it is the most manifest way. This is because nothing catches the eye and holds it more effectively than the sight of some change taking place.¹¹⁶

This proof is also called the Kinetological Argument or argument from motion.¹¹⁷ In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas there is given no indication of the sources of this proof, but in the Summa Contra Gentiles he mentioned that this proof stems from Aristotle's physics.

The term 'motion' used by Aquinas in this proof is not merely change of position in space but any kind of change,¹¹⁸ including change of quality, such as white becoming black, and change of quantity, such as increase or decrease in size.¹¹⁹ Aquinas' argument from motion is founded on his conceptions of actuality and potentiality and the relation of the one to the other. The potential, according to him, is that which does not yet exist, but which is existing as the result of the action of an efficient cause. For potency does not raise itself to act. The actuality is that which exists itself. For example, water is actually water, but it possesses the power or potentiality of becoming steam. For potentiality to become actuality requires an act which is extended to it.

Aquinas' first way can be systematised as follows:¹²⁰

- (a) Something is in process of change
- (b) Whatever is in process of change is being changed by something else.
- (c) An infinite regress of changes, each changed by another

is impossible.

Therefore,

- (d) There is a first cause of change, itself not in process of change.

From these premises there are two important proposition "that everything moved or changed is moved by another," and, "that it is impossible to go back to infinity in a series of things moving and moved." To establish the first proposition, "that whatever moves is moved by something else" Aquinas brought forward three reasons derived from Aristotle's physics.¹²¹ First, that if anything moves itself, it must possess within itself the principle of its own motion, for otherwise it would be moved by something else. Secondly, whatever is moved by accident it is not moved by itself since it is moved by the motion of another. So too, what is moved by force is not moved by itself. Now whatever is moved, is moved through itself or by accident. Therefore, everything that is moved, is moved by another. Thirdly, Aquinas refered again to the concept of motion, that is the same thing cannot be at once in act and potency with respect to the same time. But everything that is moved is, as such, in potency. For in motion potentiality becomes actuality by the operation of something already in action. There is, therefore, a being who moves and changes all things, yet he himself is unmoved, because he is the actuality of all things.

The second proposition, "that it is impossible to go back to infinity in a series of things moving and moved" is an extremely important point,¹²² because many have criticized this proposition.¹²³

In establishing this second proposition Aquinas referred to the proofs given by Aristotle which are three in number.¹²⁴ The first, "if among movers and things moved we proceed to infinity, all these finite beings must be bodies. For whatever is moved is divisible and a body. But every body that moves something moved is itself moved while moving it. For example, when A moves B, B moves C, then A itself is moving while B and C are moving. Therefore, all these infinities (A, B, C ect.,) are moved together while one of them moves. But one of them is moved in a finite time. This, however, is impossible that among movers and things moved, one can proceed to infinity. Secondly, in an ordered series of movers and thing moved, when the first mover is removed, no other mover will move or be moved. For the first mover is the cause of motion for all the others. But if there are movers and things moved following an order to infinity, there will be no first mover, but all would be intermediate movers. There none of the others will be able to be moved and thus nothing in the world will be moved. This is evidently false from our observation. Thirdly, that which moves as an instrument cause cannot move there being a principle moving cause. But if we proceed to infinity among movers and things moved, all movers will be as instrumental cause, because they will be moved movers and there will be nothing as a principle mover. Therefore, nothing will be moved. This is also clearly false, as we know from our experience.

Aquinas employed six reasons drawn from Aristotle to validate two important propositions in his first way. If the two propositions are valid, then the conclusion, that "there is a first unmoved mover" is also valid. During the Middle Ages the first way was regarded as

the strongest of the five,¹²⁵ however, in this way a weakness still exist especially when it faces new theories, for example Newton's first law.¹²⁶ This is perhaps why the first way is said to have failed to solve some problem.¹²⁷ Aquinas' first way, in fact, is an intellectual argument which is not easily understood by the masses, because it passes many logical premises. This perhaps is the reason why Averroes did not accept the theory of motion as one of the proofs of God's existence. It can only be understood by a minority of people, that is the learned. This, however, does not mean he rejected totally the concept of motion. He, as a dedicated follower of Aristotle, gave much to a discussion of motion and accepted that some of the premises in the theory of motion are valid. For example, like Aquinas, he agreed that the infinite regress of causes according to philosophical doctrine is impossible.¹²⁸ Furthermore, Averroes said no philosopher allows the existence of an infinite number of causes. For this would imply the existence of an effect without cause and a thing moved without a mover.¹²⁹

Averroes' rejection of the theory of motion as a proof of the existence of God is not because it is invalid, but because it is very difficult for the majority of people to conceive it and there is certain confusion in the theory itself. And Averroes, as far as possible, tried to avoid any difficulty and confusion in the human mind regarding its knowledge of God.

ii. The second way: The argument from efficient cause

This argument runs as follows:

"This way is based on the nature of causation. In the

observable world causes are found to be ordered in series; we never observe, nor ever could observe something causing itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is not possible. Such a series of causes must, however, stop somewhere: for in it an earlier member causes an intermediate and the intermediate a last. Now if you eliminate a cause you also eliminate its effect, so that you cannot have a last cause, nor an intermediate one, unless you have a first. Given therefore no stop in the series of causes, and hence no first cause, there would be no intermediate cause either, and no last effect, and this would be an open mistake. One is therefore forced to suppose some first cause, to which everyone gives the name God." 130

Aquinas' second way is also called the Aetiological argument,¹³¹ which is based on efficient causality. A thing cannot be its own efficient cause, that is to bring itself into existence. Aquinas used the word "cause" in a sense which suggests that a cause precedes its effect in time. An effect could not cause itself, he says, for this would mean it preceded itself, and so he argued that a present effect must have had a prior cause which must in turn have had a prior cause, and so go on either in an infinite regress or to the point at which the temporal series was launched by an uncaused cause.

It is worth noticing the close resemblance of this argument to the first way. Both seek to establish a first cause or mover on the basis of the impossibility of going back to infinity in an ordered series of causes and effects.¹³² The first way starts from the fact of motion to a prime mover; the second from causation to a first cause. Aquinas focused the first way by attributing it to the order of the moving cause, whereas he specified the second way by attributing it to the order of the efficient cause. Although they have different points of departure, beginning as they do with different

series of effects and causes, the conclusion in each case is similar. Both postulate a first mover (in the first way) or a first cause (in the second way), which is called God.

The arguments are to be seen as complementary, each demonstration disclosing a different aspect of divine causality. Thus we find that there is an overlapping between the first and the second proofs,¹³³ where in the first proof Aquinas considered things as being change, and in the second he considered them as active agents. He then proceeded, after excluding the hypothesis of an infinite regress, to draw the conclusion that there must be a first cause which we call God. It is, however, impossible to discuss these arguments profitably unless they are first understood.¹³⁴

In Summa Contra Gentile¹³⁵ Aquinas mentioned that the second way was also adopted from Aristotle's metaphysics, but in addition, it is said to be drawn from the Avicennian notion of efficient cause.¹³⁶ According to Avicenna there is a series of causes but all causes are caused by the final cause.¹³⁷ This is exactly the same with Aquinas' concept of causality as we have seen in his second proof of the existence of God. Avicenna's proof is so much closer to the proof of Aquinas. This is probably the reason, why his second way is said not to be a physical concept but metaphysical one.¹³⁸ This is because, as mentioned before, Avicenna proclaims that the proof of the existence of God is only through metaphysics. If Aquinas' theory of efficient causality is really a metaphysical concept, then Averroes clearly rejected it as a valid proof of God's existence, because he plainly denied that the concept of metaphysics

held by Avicenna was valid.

iii. The third way: Argument from necessary being.

This proof was based on what need not be and on what must be.

"Some of the things we come across can be, but need not be, for we find them springing up and dying away, thus sometimes in being and sometimes not. Now everything cannot be like this, for a thing that need not be, once was not; and if everything need not be, once upon a time there was nothing. But if that were true, there would be nothing even now, because something that does not exist can only be brought into being by something already existing. So that if nothing was in being could be brought into being, and nothing would be in being now, which contradicts observation. Not everything, therefore, is the sort of thing that need not be; there has got to be something that must be. Now a thing that must be, may or may not owe this necessity to something else. But just as we must stop somewhere in a series of causes, so also in the series of things which must be and owe this to other things. One is forced therefore to suppose something which must be, and owes this to no other thing than itself; indeed itself is the cause that other things must be." 139

This proof is called the Cosmological argument, though it may quite reasonably be applied to the first three, because they all start from an observation of the universe. Aquinas discussed this argument in Summa Contra Gentiles separately, that is, it is not under the title of God's existence but under God's eternity.¹⁴⁰ The source of this proof, as the second, was derived from Aristotle, but it is even closer to Avicenna's concept of necessary being. A necessary being, according to Avicenna, is a being which cannot be caused and it is not united with any cause. Its being does not consist in elements nor parts because elements and parts are due to material causes.¹⁴¹ This concept of necessary being is also utilised by Maimonides and then developed by Aquinas in his own

disposition. Thus, though the concept of necessary being is related closely to Avicenna, it is not exactly as explained by him, even in many cases. So this concept is said to be identical with Averroes' revision of Avicenna's proof. This is confirmed by Aquinas himself in his remarks on the power of God where he sided with Averroes against Avicenna on the nature of possible necessary beings.¹⁴² For example, according to Avicenna, God alone has necessary existence. The celestial spheres have only possible existence by their own nature;¹⁴³ while Averroes said that the spheres by their own nature are called necessary.¹⁴⁴ In this case Aquinas stood beside Averroes when he said that there are many necessary beings in existence,¹⁴⁵ and not all beings are contingent.¹⁴⁷ But the difference between the necessity of God and the necessity of an angel or the soul or celestial bodies is simply that the latter are all created by God who is defined as uncreated creator.

Aquinas' third way starts from the notion of the concept of contingent and necessary. The contingent being for Aquinas is a being subject to the natural process of generation and corruption; a being that is susceptible to substantial change, while a necessary being is in no way subject to generation and corruption.

If we systematise Aquinas' third way, it runs as follows:¹⁴⁷

i. Some beings are necessary

A. There are things whose nature is such that it is possible for them to be and not to be, since they are under the influence of generation and corruption.

- B. Such things cannot always exist.
 - C. If all reality were composed of such things, then at some time there would be nothing in existence.
 - D. If at any time there was nothing in existence, even now nothing would exist.
 - E. It is clearly false to maintain that nothing exists now.
 - F. Therefore some being is necessary.
- ii. Some necessary being is uncaused.
- A. There are two kinds of necessary being:
 - (1) Necessary by another; being is necessary as long as its cause makes it to be.
 - (2) Necessary by itself (per se); self-necessitated being is one in which its essence is existence.
 - B. The first sort depends on the second
 - C. Therefore some necessary being is itself uncaused and is the cause of all beings.

From the scheme above, we find that two propositions must be established. Firstly, some necessary being is necessary, and secondly, some necessary being is uncaused. In addition to these two propositions, Aquinas also established another, namely, that it is impossible to go to infinity in necessary beings.¹⁴⁸ To prove this proposition he used the same structure as in the first and the second proof.

Turning to Averroes, he sharply criticized the Ash'arites in employing the concept of necessary and possible being to prove

that the universe is created and simultaneously to prove the existence of God. According to Averroes the Ash'arites popularised three premises¹⁴⁹ related to this concept. The premises are as follows:

- (1) Essences (Jawhar) are inseparable from accidents
- (2) Accidents (ʿard) are created.
- (3) Anything connected with creation is itself created (hudūth).

The first premise, according to Averroes, is correct when applied to ordinary bodies, but when used with reference to the atom (al-juz' al-ladhī lā yanqasim), various questions arise. For example, the existence of the atom is not known per se, and philosophers are not agreed as to its nature.¹⁵⁰ The second premise, Averroes said, is doubtful and questionable since we observe that some bodies are created, and likewise with some accidents. For example, time is one of the accidents, but it is difficult to form a concept of its being created.¹⁵¹ The third premise, in Averroes' view, is equivocal, because it could be understood in two ways; firstly, that which is not independent of the category of created things, secondly, that which is not independent of this particular created thing.¹⁵² According to Averroes' view, all three premises proceed to infinity. This is impossible. This is the reason why Averroes denied the concept of possible and necessary beings as a valid proof of the existence of God.

When we refer to Aquinas' discussion of possible and necessary beings in the third way, we find that he did not deal with

them as the Ash'arites did. He wished simply to show that there is in the world necessary beings and possible beings and that the existence of the latter depends on the former. He also says that we can be sure a being is possible when we see that it is generated and corrupted. The sign of possible being is temporal and finitude.¹⁵³ So Averroes accepted the concept of necessary being which was latter developed by Aquinas. For example, when Aquinas said there are many necessary things in existence, Averroes stated that a thing may have a cause and still be necessary.¹⁵⁴ This means that there is not merely one necessary being, but many. However, a difficulty still exists in this concept and many criticism have been raised by many writers. For example, one question that has arisen is, how do we know that the universe is not mere unintelligible brute fact. The argument still depends on a view of causality that can be and has been questioned.¹⁵⁵

What is clear for us in Aquinas' first, second and third ways is their similarity,¹⁵⁶ and parallel structure. The first way argues from the fact of motion or change to a Prime Mover; the second from causation to a First Cause; the third from contingent beings to a Necessary Being. Each of these three arguments establishes its case by denying the possibility of an infinite regress, but, however similar, they are not identical, because their points of departure are different elements.

iv. The fourth way: Argument of degrees of being

This argument is based on the gradation observed in things. It runs as follows:

"Some things are found to be more good, more true, more noble, and so on, and the other things less. But such comparative terms describe varying degrees of approximation to a superlative, for example, things are hotter and hotter the nearer they approach what is hottest. Something, therefore, is the truest and best and must be noble of things, and hence the most fully is being; for Aristotle says that the truest things are the things most fully in being. There is something therefore which causes in all other things their being, their goodness, and whatever other perfection they have. And this we call God." 157

This argument is also called the Henological argument,¹⁵⁸ which is based on the fact that a gradation is found among things. Some things are better than others, some truer, and so on. Every good thing is the result of what is best, insofar as what is best provides the basis for assessing the goodness of everything else. From degrees of things Aquinas argued that there are not only the different grades of perfection in beings but also all imperfect beings are caused by the supreme good.

In establishing this proof Aquinas cited Aristotle's metaphysics in Book II and Book IV which states that things possessing the supreme degree of truth possesses also the supreme degree of being. This proof is also said to come closest to Platonism¹⁵⁹ which was developed by St. Augustine and St. Anselm. From Aquinas' text we find that this proof is related to the theory of casualty, where the example given shows that the noblest being, the being which is absolutely perfect, is the cause of all other beings which are imperfect.

Aquinas did not explain in detail this argument in either The Summa Theologiae or The Summa Contra Gentiles. The basic proof is the doctrine of participation and exemplification. Aquinas

argued that the different kinds of finite things possess different perfection in diverse limited degrees, and all limited degree of goodness are caused by the supreme good.

Some questions arise regarding this proof. For example, does this argument prove the existence of God, of an absolute good or only a relative one.¹⁶⁰ Perhaps for this reason, the proof from degrees of being, is the most difficult for the modern mind to grasp.¹⁶¹ There are many controversies¹⁶² and many difficulties¹⁶³ in this proof. So there are varieties of critique of this proof.¹⁶⁴

v. The fifth way: Argument of final cause.

This argument is based on the guidance of nature

"An orderedness of actions to an end is observed in all bodies obeying natural laws, even when they lack awareness. For their behaviour hardly ever varies, and will practically always turn out well; which shows that they truly tend to a goal, and do not merely hit by accident. Nothing however that lacks awareness except under the direction of someone with awareness and with understanding; the arrow, for example, requires an archer. Everything in nature, therefore, is created to its goal by someone with understanding, and this we call God,"¹⁶⁵

This proof is also called the Teleological argument or argument from design.¹⁶⁶ It is based on the purposefulness which we can observe in the world and moves to existence of an intelligent being from whom all other beings have received their end purpose.

In Summa Contra Gentiles¹⁶⁷ Aquinas clearly mentioned that this proof was referred to Damascene and Averroes. Aquinas argued that we see inorganic objects operating for an end, and this can-

not proceed from chance, but must be the result of intention. This proof is derived from the idea of providence which governs the universe, by which he meant, God. In fact, the idea of God giving orders to the universe is the common property of Christian theology.¹⁶⁸ So the proof is more familiar to theologians than philosophers, because the Bible is the authoritative source for theologians and they, of course, know that the creation of the universe is described in the Bible.

The proof from design is nearly the same as the proof of efficient cause where both refer to the ultimate being who causes all movements of all beings and conducts the world; however, their target point is different. To the former it focuses on the harmoniousness of all activities of natural bodies in the universe, and to the latter on the cause of activities of all things, either intelligent or non-intelligent. Thus the scope of the latter is wider than the former. Aquinas also did not discuss at length this proof. What is clear for this proof is that it is not based on philosophical argument as the first three of his Five Ways.

Each of Aquinas' proof of God's existence starts from an obvious and indisputable fact of human experience. The examination and understanding of the facts leads by different paths to the conclusion that a certain kind of being exists, whom men call God. Arguments employed by Aquinas are a posteriori, because they attempt to demonstrate the existence of God by reasoning from the effect of which God is the cause, and, of course, it is evident that every effect exists later than cause.

Aquinas' proofs were not new.¹⁶⁹ They were taken from his predecessors,¹⁷⁰ Aristotle and Muslim philosophers. However, the five ways are still regarded as Aquinas' proof, because he did not merely take them from his predecessors, but he also analysed them in a new and more systematic way than his predecessors. He described the five ways in order they do not contradict Christian teaching. When we refer to Averroes' two arguments, there is a probability that they were original with him, that is to say they were not adopted from any Muslim theologians. This is suggested by the fact that he criticized any type of proof given by either the Mu tazilite, the Hashawites, the Ash arites and the Sufis.

When we examine closely Aquinas' Five Ways, we shall find they are not five separate arguments for theism, but five aspects or form of a single argument.¹⁷¹ There are various critiques among modern writers who claim, for example, that Aquinas' proof of the existence of God fail to convince contemporary thinkers,¹⁷² Aquinas proofs are puzzling,¹⁷³ and so on. It would not be fair to blame Aquinas for all the weaknesses in his arguments for God's existence, even if it is probably safe to say that nobody at this time had such a profound understanding. His high intellectual capacity to analyse and modify the proof of the existence of God taken from various sources is indisputable. We also should realize that his analysis to solve the problem of God's existence was based on intellectual development in the Middle Ages not in the twentieth century.

On analysing Aquinas' five proofs of the existence of God,

we find that only one of them has some similarity with Averroes' proof and that is Aquinas' fifth proof and Averroes' argument of providence. Both proofs are called argument from design. Averroes' scope of discussion is wider than Aquinas'. Averroes explained his proof at length, while Aquinas described his proof briefly. In fact the proof of Aquinas' fifth way is found in Averroes' second principle of the proof of providence, where Averroes and Aquinas are in agreement that the existence of all things are under the control of an intelligence and they do not happen by chance. However, their focus is different. Averroes was concerned with the harmony which exists in the activity of natural bodies, and the harmoniousness of their activities is beneficial for human life. Aquinas simply concentrated on the goal or end of the activities of natural bodies which are guided and directed by some intelligence.

In comparing the arguments for the existence of God given by Averroes and Aquinas, it is clear to us that Aquinas' argument, though they depend on the facts of experience and the observable world, rely upon philosophical analyses such as appear in The Summa Contra Gontiles. Consequently, deep intellectual capacity is needed to comprehend them, and so his proofs, perhaps, are not so easy to understand. The difficulty with Aquinas' proofs can be seen in his first three, which are well-known forms of the cosmological argument. Aquinas elaborated his proof at length in The Summa Contra Gentiles by employing many philosophical assumptions, but on the contrary, in The Summa Theologiae, he "begins from the seminal idea of God given in Christian revelation, and then draw from this contemplation of God implication for the world."¹⁷⁴ This does not mean, however, that

there are no philosophical elements in The Summa Theologiae, for "theological judgements are sometimes passed on philosophical conceptions".¹⁷⁵ The difference in approach is because The Summa Contra Gentiles was intended to be primarily a philosophical work, and was written to refute the teaching of the Muslim philosophers Avicenna and Averroes and, hence, he naturally met them on their own Aristotelian ground; while The Summa Theologiae is primarily theological, and is aimed at the ordinary believer.

Averroes' proof of providence and creation were also based on observable facts which exist in the world. Averroes tried to avoid using any philosophical conceptions in his proof, he referred directly to the Quran. This is because he firmly believed that Quranic proof is more suitable for all levels of human intellect whether they are learned or belong to the laity. For this he did not hesitate to reject all proofs especially those given by the Ash'arites who based their reasoning on many philosophical premises.

For Aquinas the proof of the existence of God is not only limited to his five proofs, but also he recognized that any proof given by other thinkers is valid only if it can be understood in the framework that starts with accidentally possessed existence and reasons to subsistent existence. Arguments that cannot be read in that way were not looked upon as valid.¹⁷⁶

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 356, 582
2. Al-Kashf, p. 171, 190
3. Al-Kashf, p. 133; Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 326, 482.
4. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 503.
5. Al-Kashf, p. 134.
6. Ibid., p. 153.
7. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 215.
8. Quran. 7:172
9. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 49
10. Muḥammad Umḡarāt, Al-Mādiyyat Wa al-Mithāliyyat Fī al-Falsafat
Ibn Rushd, Egypt, Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1971, p. 55.
11. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 435.
12. Al-Kashf, p. 160
13. Ash‘arites is a theological school based by Abū al-Ḥassan
‘Alī al-Ash‘ari. Sometimes it is called Ashā‘irat. The
followers of this school have been known as the Ash‘arites.
For details see W.W. Watt, "Ash‘ariyya," Encyclopedia of
Islam, Vol. 1, (new edition), 1960. pp. 696 - 697; W.W. Watt,
Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam, London, Luzac
& Company Ltd., 1948, p. 135 ff.

26. Al-Kashf, p. 170
27. Ibid., p. 171
28. Al-Milal, p. 125
29. Al-Kashf, pp. 171 - 172
30. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 22.
31. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae 1a, p. 12, a.1, English translation, Blackfriars. Hereafter reference to this work will be abbreviated as S.T.
32. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1, 54, English translation, University of Notre Dame Press edition 1975 Hereafter reference to this work will be abbreviated as S.C.G.
33. E. Gilson, The Element of Christian Philosophy, New York, Doubleday & Company Inc., 1963, p. 120.
34. B. Mondin, The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p. 59.
35. S.C.G., 1, 14; 1,30.
36. S.C.G., 1,14.
37. Ibid., pp. 98 - 99.
38. S.C.G., 1,32.
39. S.C.G., 1,33

40. S.C.G., 1,34.
41. ST1a, q.13, a.7.
42. S.C.G., 1,34.
43. ST1a, q.13, a.5.
44. ST1a, q.4, a.3.
45. Genesis, 1:26.
46. Exodus, 3:14.
47. E. Gilson, The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 156.
48. S.C.G., 1,16.
49. S.C.G., 1,21.
50. St1a, q.3, a.1-7.
51. Burton Z. Cooper, The Idea of God, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 73.
52. Ibid., p. 73.
53. S.C.G., 1,16.
54. S.C.G., 1,22.
55. S.C.G., 1,18.
56. I sent., d2, q.1, a. 2-3, cited by J.G. Flynn "St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of God," Abr Nahrain, Vol. XIV

1973 - 74, p. 61.

57. St1a, q.3, a.7.
58. S.C.G., 1,28.
59. Matthew, 5:48.
60. Fasl al-Maqāl, p. 27
61. Al-Kashf, p. 134 ff.
62. Al-Kashf, p. 134.
63. For example, see Quran, 7:185; 86:6-7; 88:17-20.
64. Al-Kashf, p. 135
65. Al-Kashf, p. 135; Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 22.
66. Al-Kashf, p. 149
67. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 225
68. Al-Milal, pp. 58 - 59.
69. Al-Kashf, p. 149.
70. James C. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p. 35; A. Hyman & J. Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 1980, p. 234; William Dunphy, "The Quinque Viae and Some Parisian Professors of Philosophy" St. Thomas Aquinas 1274 - 1974 Commemorative Studies, Vol. II, Toronto, Pontifical Institute

of Mediaeval Studies, 1974, p. 76.

71. A. Hyman & J. Walsh, op. cit., p. 284.
72. Averroes, in XII Meta., C. 5, fol. 292V, K-fol. 293r. B. cited by James C. Doig, in Aquinas on Metaphysics, p. 35
73. James C. Doig, Ibid., p. 206.
74. Ibid., pp. 42 - 43.
75. A. Hayman & J. Walsh, op. cit., p. 77
76. For example, existence according to Avicenna is superadded to essence, while according to Aquinas the existence and essence are the same. For details of this discussion see F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina. The Myth and the Reality" Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1981, pp. 3 - 14; Beatrice H. Zedler, "St. Thomas, Interpreter of Avicenna" Modern Schoolman, Vol. XXXIII, 1955, pp. 1 - 18.
77. ST1a, q.2, a.1.
78. ST1a, q.3, a.4.
79. ST1a, q.2, a.2; S.C.G., 1.12.
80. James C. Doig, op. cit., p. 245.
81. Romans, 1:20.
82. For example, see pages: 59, 66, 75, 79 act.
83. For example see pages: Vol. 1,20; Vol. 3, 1565, 1588,1599 act.

84. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 151.
85. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 66; Tafsīr, Vol. 3, ed. by Maurice Bouyges, Beyrouth, 1948, p. 1565.
86. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 66.
87. Al-Kashf, p. 135.
88. Ibid., p. 136.
89. Al-Kashf, p. 150.
90. Al-Kashf, p. 150.
91. Ibid., p. 194.
92. Ibid., p. 197.
93. Al-Kashf, p. 195.
94. Quran, 78:6-16.
95. Al-Kashf, p. 195.
96. Al-Kashf, p. 150.
97. Ibid., p. 151.
98. Quran, 22:72.
99. Al-Kashf, p. 151
100. Ibid., p. 151
101. Al-Kashf, p. 151

102. Quran, 7:185. There are many other verses which show the proof of invention. For example, 86:6-7; 88:17-20.
103. Muhammad 'Atif al-'Irāqi, Al-Naz'at al-'Aqliyyat Fī Falsafat Ibn Rushd, Egypt, Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1968, p. 230
104. Al-Kashf, p. 151.
105. Ibid., p. 153.
106. Ibid., p. 153.
107. Al-Kashf, p. 154
108. Ibid., p. 152
109. Quran, 78: 6-16; 2:22 act.
110. Quran, 88:17-20; 86:6-7 act.
111. Quran, 3:191; 36:23 act.
112. Al-Kashf, p. 195.
113. S.C.G., 1, 13.
114. W.L. Craig, The Cosmological Argument From Plato to Leibniz London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, p. 160.
115. ST1a, q.2, a.3.
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118. See R.L. Patterson, The Concept of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933, p. 57;
E.L. Mascall, op. cit., p.41; A. Kenny, The Five Ways, London
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119. A. Kenny, Ibid., p. 7.
120. W.L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument, Princeton, Princeton
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p. 161 -62.
121. S.C.G., 1, 13.
122. R.L. Patterson, op. cit., p. 60.
123. Ibid., p. 60 ff.
124. S.C.G., 1, 13.
125. E.L. Mascall, op. cit., p. 42.
126. For discussion of Aquinas' theory of motion in view of some
modern theories see V. Burwood Evans, "The Aquinate Proofs
of the existence of God," Philosophy, Vol. VII, No. 27,
July 1932, p. 307; George A. Blair, "Another look at St.
Thomas' First Way," International Philosophical Quarterly,
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& Todd Ltd., 1949, p. 75.
128. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 267

129. Ibid., p. 20.
130. STla, q.2, a.3.
131. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 45
132. See E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trns. by L.K. Shook, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1957, p. 67; W.L. Rowe, op. cit., p. 21; E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 45
133. A. Kenny, op. cit., pp. 35 - 36.
134. F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, Penguin Books, 1979, p. 122
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138. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 45
139. STla, q.2, a.3.
140. S.C.G., 1. 15.
141. For details see Avicenna, Met., T. 18.
142. W.L. Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, n. 106, p. 201.
143. H.A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, Cambridge,

Harvard University Press, 1929. p. 680.

144. Ibid., p. 111.
145. ST1a, q.44, a.1.
146. S.C.G., 2, 30.
147. cf. W.L. Craig, op. cit., pp. 193-4; W.L. Rowe, op. cit., p. 41.
148. S.C.G., 1, 15.
149. Al-Kashf, p. 137
150. Al-Kashf, p. 138.
151. Ibid., p. 140.
152. Al-Kashf, p. 141.
153. W.L. Craig, op. cit., p. 183.
154. H.A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p. 111.
155. J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973, p. 21; cf. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 50; R.L. Patterson, op. cit., p. 80 ff.
156. See E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 49; R.L. Patterson, op. cit., p. 72; A. Kenny, The Five Ways, p. 44.
157. ST1a, q.2, a.3.
158. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 47

159. See A. Kenny, The Five Ways, pp. 71 - 80; E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 74.
160. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 53.
161. F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, Penguin Book, p. 126.
162. E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 71.
163. Ibid., p. 72
164. R.L. Patterson, op. cit., p. 81 ff.
165. ST1a, q.2, a.3.
166. E.L. Mascall, He Who Is, p. 54
167. S.C.G., 1, 13.
168. E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 75.
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170. J. Owens, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God, ed by John R. Catan. Albany, State University of New York Press, p. 137.
171. E.L. Mascall, Existence of Analogy, p. 79.
172. V. Burwood Evans, op. cit., p. 299
173. J. Owens, op. cit., p. 132.

174. Timothy McDermott, in "Introduction" of Summa Theologiae,
Vol. 2, Blackfriars, 1964, p. XXIV.
175. Ibid., p. XXV.
176. J. Owens, op. cit., pp. 139 - 40.

CHAPTER THREE

GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

A. GOD IS INTELLIGENT

In the preceding chapter we have seen how Averroes laid down briefly the attributes of God especially those which are mentioned in the Quran. He said firmly that God has knowledge because it is one of God's attributes of perfection, and he also stated that life and knowledge are the most proper of God's qualities,¹ and the condition of knowledge is life.² God's essence is eternal, and as we have seen, there is no difference, according to Averroes, between the essence and the attributes of God. Thus he said clearly that God's knowledge is eternal.³

Averroes gave two reasons in support of the view that God has knowledge. First, the attributes of knowledge are mentioned in many verses of the Quran. For example, "With Him are the keys of the unseen, none knows them but He. He knows what is in the land and in the sea, not a leaf falls but He knows it. Not a grain in the earth's shadows, but a thing fresh or withered, but it is in a Book Manifest,"⁴ and the like. Secondly, Averroes based his view on the observable facts in the world. These observable facts are comprehended from a verses of the Quran, that is, "Shall He not know, who created? And He is the All-Subtle, the All-Aware."⁵ Averroes tried to analyse this verse by relating it to our experience in observing the universe, and used it as proof that God has knowledge. He said created things, which we could see from arrangement and co-ordination which exist in all their parts, show that they do not occur by nature or accidentally, but there is one who arranges them, and one who arranges all those things

must be intelligent.⁶ Accordingly, God as the director of all things must have knowledge, and His knowledge must be in the most perfect as His essence is. It is evident for us because how can one make something in accordance with perfect laws if he has no knowledge of it. This is clearly impossible. Averroes gave one example of this. When a man looks at a house, he perceives that the foundations have been made for the walls, and the walls have been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the house must have been built by one knowing the art of building.⁷

Though Averroes' second reason is based on observation of practical life, it is not merely a product of his own thought, his reason is still a result of his analysis of Quranic verse. Accordingly, he believed that his reasons can be understood and acceptable by intellectuals and the masses.

Aquinas is in full agreement with Averroes on the proposition that God has knowledge.⁸ Like Averroes, he also referred to some verses of Biblical scripture in affirming that God has knowledge. For example, "He is wise of heart and might in strength."⁹

In addition to the scripture, Aquinas gave many other reasons to prove that God has knowledge. One of those reasons is that he regarded God as the First Mover¹⁰ as we have seen in his proof of the existence of God. He said there are many movers¹¹ in the world which are endowed with intelligence, and they as instruments are dependent on the First Mover. If the second mover has knowledge, then it is impossible that God as the First Mover should move without intellect. Therefore, God must be intelligent.

Aquinas also argued from the point of view of perfection. Among the greatest perfection of things is that something be intelligent, and all the perfection of creatures, as he has proved them, are found in God.¹² Therefore, God is intelligent. Furthermore, he said that natural bodies tend toward an end not by chance as he proved in his fifth proof of the existence of God. They are directed by one who has understanding to direct something to attain an end, and the director of all natural bodies is God.¹³ Therefore, God has knowledge. From this point of view it is similar to that of Averroes in which he analysed a verse of the Quran.

It is clear for us that there is no controversy between Averroes and Aquinas in their account of God's knowledge. The content of their proofs is the same where both referred to verse of each one's scripture, but what is different is their manner of expression. Averroes' observation on the harmoniousness of the universe is based on the Quranic text, Aquinas' argument is based on a philosophical point of view. Aquinas, however, also referred to scripture as an authoritative source in faith. This is because Aquinas himself emphasized that certain truths about God surpasses human reason, and so it should be helped by revelation.¹⁴ As we have seen Aquinas' main task in writing the Summa Contra Gentile was to oppose individual errors made during his time, when the development of the intellect in Paris had reached a peak. Therefore, Aquinas preferred reason to scripture in his proof relating to God. This is very clear from his statement:

"Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue by means of the Old Testament, while against heretics we are able to

argue by means of the New Testament. But the Muhammadan and the pagans accept neither the one nor the other. We must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to which all men are forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matter the natural reason has its failing." 15

B. THE NATURE OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE.

The nature of God's knowledge has been widely discussed and it was given serious attention by Muslim philosophers. The views were sufficiently diverse, that Al-Ghazali had accused some of these views of heresy.¹⁶ Our discussion of this matter, however, is limited to a certain area that both Averroes and Aquinas discussed.

i. God's knowledge of contingent events.

Averroes devoted much space in his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and Tafsīr Mā Ba'd al-Tabī'at to discuss the problem of whether God knows or does not know other things than himself. He did not hesitate to support the idea of the philosophers who say God does not know other things than Himself.¹⁷ For this support Averroes gave some reasons. One is based on the perfection of the divine essence. If God were to know objects other than Himself, this would mean that the divine essence, according to Averroes, was not itself an act of thinking, but that it was in potency to the performance of this act, while, as we have seen, there is no potency in God. Furthermore, if God understands other things outside of Himself it necessarily would be that His essence is changeable to something inferior or less perfect.¹⁸ This, however, is not possible, for divine intellect necessarily possesses the highest degree of excellence and perfection.¹⁹ Again since knowledge of something other than oneself supposes a transition from potency to act, God's knowledge of anything other than Himself would imply not only movement in God but also a mover other than Himself, for every movement presupposes a mover. This, however, is repugnant, as God is the

Unmoved Mover.²⁰ These reasons given by Averroes show us that God knows nothing except His own essence. This problem creates a dilemma in our mind. According to Averroes if it is assumed that God thinks of something outside of His essence this would imply that He is perfected by something else, but to assume that God does not think of something outside of His essence would imply that He is ignorant of existences in the universe. To solve this dilemma Averroes described carefully the meaning of the proposition "the First Principle (God) does not know other things than Himself." He said that God, by knowing Himself, knows the nature of all things as existence, and in this way He knows all, because His knowledge is the cause of all beings.²¹ For example, one who knows only the heat of fire is not said to be ignorant of the nature of heat in other hot objects, because he knows the nature of heat inasmuch as it is heat; so in the same way the First Being knows the nature of an existent by that simple existent which is Himself.²² Moreover, Averroes explained the meaning of this proposition by the fact that God does not think of existents in the way in which thinking existents can think of them, for if they think as God thinks it would participate in God's knowledge.²³

From the explanation given by Averroes above about the proposition, "God does not know other things than Himself," it does not follow from this that He is ignorant of them since for God, knowing only His essence is sufficient for Him to know other things. This is because all forms and all order and all arrangement which are potentially present in prime matter exist actually in the First Mover, in a manner like artifacts in the mind of an artisan.²⁴ In

other words, God, as the cause of existence of all things, contains in Himself as exemplar all that He brings into existence in actualizing the potentialities of matter: and God also as Exemplar contains all in Himself in an eminent way. God essence, according to philosopher, contains all intellect, all existence, in a nobler and more perfect way than they all possess in reality.²⁵ This is what Averroes meant by the proposition that God does not know other things than Himself.

Aquinas apparently departed from Averroes in this cases. He clearly stated that God also knows, in addition to knowing himself, things other than Himself.²⁶ His statement is supported by Dionysius who said "The divine wisdom, knowing itself, knows other things."²⁷ To make his proof stronger, Aquinas refers to Biblical scripture "And before Him no creature is hidden, but all are open and laid bare to the eyes of Him with whom we have to do."²⁸ Aquinas gave some reasons why God knows things other than Himself. He said God's power extends to other things by being the first cause which produces all beings. The power of a thing cannot be known perfectly unless the objects to which the power extends are known. Thus God must know things other than Himself.²⁹ Another reason is God as the first cause is His act of knowing. Whatever effects pre-exist in God must be in His knowledge in an intelligible way. Therefore, God knows things other than Himself.

Aquinas expounded two ways by which God understands things other than Himself.³⁰ First, by itself, and secondly, by another. In the former way, God knows Himself as a perfect being through His

essence, and in the latter way God knows things other than Himself. In this way God knows other things through the likeness of what they contain, because God's essence contains their likeness. Hence Aquinas concluded that God knows other things than Himself not in themselves but in Himself.³¹

What is clear for us in Averroes' and Aquinas' discussions in this case is the difference in their arguments; the former is negative and the latter is positive. Averroes' argument apparently denies that God knows things other than Himself, but in reality (ḥaqīqat) that is not the case. When we look at the reason given by both we find they refer to the essence of God. This, as we have seen, is clear with Averroes and as well as with Aquinas. If Averroes said that God by knowing His essence knows also other things, then Aquinas follows in the same way. For Aquinas, the way God knows other things is also by knowing His own essence. This means by knowing Himself He knows other things. His argument is clear when he commented on Augustine who said "that God does not behold anything external to Him", that is "not to be understood as meaning that He does not behold anything that is external to Himself, but as meaning that what is external to Himself He beholds only in Himself."³² On this matter probably both are correct.

Aquinas, in fact, recognized clearly that God primarily and essentially knows only Himself.³³ His argument is if God understands something other than Himself as the primary and essential object of His understanding His intellect must change from a consideration of Himself to the consideration of something else. This

something else is less noble than God. Thus the divine intellect is changed for the worse, which is impossible. This statement by Aquinas is the same as that of Averroes who said that God does not know other things than Himself. But Aquinas stressed the distinction between the primary and essential. In other words that God knows things other than Himself is not primary and essential to Him. If He knows them as He knows Himself, His intellect is changable to the lower things. This reason is the same as given by Averroes.

When God knows things outside of Himself, the question arises whether His knowledge is increased or not through the plurality of His object known. Averroes replied that it is possible according to philosophers that there should exist plurality in God's knowledge.³⁴ They, however, deny the plurality by which He knows things through a knowledge which is additional to His essence. A confusion occurs again in our mind, Averroes said, because we relate this problem to human knowledge. In fact there is no plurality of things known in God's knowledge like their numerical plurality in human knowledge.³⁵ Thus we must deny all forms of plurality which exists in our mind of God's knowledge; just as any change through change of objects known must be denied to Him.³⁶

From Averroes' account of this matter, it seems to us that he did not deny absolutely that there is plurality in God's knowledge. He recognized a plurality in God's knowledge but we as human beings cannot know the form of plurality that exists in God's knowledge. And he, of course, confirmed that God's knowledge cannot be understood by analogy to human knowledge.³⁷

In this matter Aquinas departed from Averroes. For Aquinas, the multitude of intellectual objects cannot be taken to mean that they have a distinct being in God.³⁸ God does not have knowledge of multitude by the fact that many intelligibles are found outside Him.³⁹ This means that His knowledge is not increased through many intelligible objects known, because His knowledge is not derived from physical objects, rather it is the cause of them.

Aquinas gave many reasons for refuting Averroes' view. Aquinas said the divine intellect understands all things by His own essence.⁴⁰ Nevertheless the divine essence is the likeness of all things.⁴¹ Thereby it follows that the conception of the divine intellect as understanding itself is the likeness not only of God Himself understood, but also of all those things of which the divine essence is the likeness. In this way, through one intelligible species which is the divine essence, and through one understood intention, which is the divine word, God can understand many things. Again, Aquinas argued that God understands all things together,⁴² for He understands a continuous whole all at once, not part after part. So, too, He understands propositions all at once, not first the subject and then the predicate. For every intellect that understands one thing after the other is inevitably involved with potency, while there is no potency in God. From this Aquinas concluded that whenever several things are known through one species, they can be known together. God, therefore, knows them together. Furthermore, Aquinas said, if God has knowledge of multitude by knowing many things, this means His knowledge is accumulative, but His knowledge is not discursive.⁴³ He does not consider one thing

after the other as it were a succession, but all together. Moreover, there is no composition and division in the divine intellect. If, then, God considers things by means of composing and dividing, it will follow that His understanding is not solely one but many, and thus His essence, as well, will not be solely one. Since His intellectual operation is His essence.⁴⁴ To support this view Aquinas quoted Dionysius' statement, "Therefore in knowing itself, the devine wisdom knows all things - the material immaterially, the visible invisibly, and the many unitedly."⁴⁵

When we analyse Aquinas' denial of plurality in God's knowledge he based his argument on the proposition that God knows all things by knowing His own essence. Since His essence is one and simple, and since His essence is the cause of all things, then by knowing His essence alone He knows all things at once. By this way there is no plurality in God's knowledge though there are many intelligible objects known by Him.

In consequence of this discussion we are led to another crucial point, that is, whether God knows future contingent events or not. Averroes did not state explicitly that God knows other things than Himself as Aquinas did, but he intrinsically recognised that God knows them as has been discussed. Averroes' focus here, however, is not on the question of whether God knows or does not know future event, but on the relationship between God's knowledge and events whose existence involves time and space, act and potency.

The question is how can God be aware of a change in reality without a corresponding change occurring in His eternal knowledge?

If all beings were in God's knowledge before they exist, are they in their state of existence the same in His knowledge as they were before their existence, or are they in their state of existence, different in His knowledge than they were before they existed? Averroes made two assumptions before answering this question. First, if we say that God's knowledge about things at the time they exist is different before they existed, it follows that God's knowledge is subject to change, and thus there is an additional knowledge ('ilm zā'id) to God's knowledge, but this is not possible for eternal knowledge ('ilm al-qadīm).⁴⁶ Secondly, if we say that God's knowledge of them in both states is one and the same, are they in themselves, the beings which come to existence, the same before they existed as when they existed? The answer to this question, according to Averroes, is no. In themselves they are not the same before they existed as when they existed, otherwise the existent and non-existent is one.⁴⁷

To solve this problem, according to Averroes, we should recognize and distinguish that the position of God's knowledge with respect to beings, which will be discussed later, is different from the position of originated knowledge (al-'ilm al-muḥdath) with respect to beings. God's knowledge is the cause of being, while the existence of beings is the cause of our knowledge.⁴⁸ The confusion arises from the mistake of speaking of an analogy between the eternal knowledge and originated knowledge. This analogy, according to Averroes, is false.⁴⁹ Again, Averroes said we do not have to admit that if there occurs no change in God's knowledge He does not know beings at the time they come to existence just as

they are. However have to admit that He knows them with eternal knowledge, for the occurrence of change in knowledge when beings change is a condition only in originated knowledge not in God's knowledge.⁵⁰

When we recognize that God's knowledge is not the same as ours, we can say, according to Averroes, that God knows of a thing before it exists that it will come into existence; knows it as when it exists; knows it when it has been destroyed at the time of its destruction.⁵¹ This is the method or way of the revealed law (shar') which is intelligible to the masses. For this reason we cannot say that God knows any event in this universe either by created or eternal knowledge, because this is an innovation (bid'at) in Islam.⁵² Islam forbids discussion of God's knowledge in a dialectical way. We especially the masses, should accept what has been mentioned in the Quran. Averroes made an example that the discussion of this problem with the masses is like "bringing poisons to the bodies of animals, poisons, however, are relative, namely, what is poison for one animal is nourishment for another."⁵³

Turning to Aquinas, we do not find this problem of understanding his position in relation to the question of whether God knows or does not know future contingent events. We can even say that God knows them because Aquinas has already mentioned that God knows things other than Himself, and these things are contingents. For this, however, he still made a clear statement that God knows future events.⁵⁴ How does He know future events? Aquinas' answer is that God knows them together,⁵⁵ though contingent events come into existence successively, because His knowledge is measured by

eternity, and since His knowledge is His own essence, He understands Himself completely.⁵⁶ Thus His knowledge, as a source of all beings, comprehends them together. This was a controversial point with Averroes', because for Averroes if God knows all things at once, as we have seen before, this means that God's knowledge about past, present and future events is the same. This is, according to Averroes, impossible, for knowledge is said to be dependent on the existent thing. When as existent things sometimes exists in act and sometimes in potential, it is necessary that the knowledge of the two existents to be different, because the time of being in potency is quite different from the time of being in act.⁵⁷ But Aquinas viewed this from another point, namely, God's act of knowing is no other than His own essence. In God, he said, intellect and that which is known and that knowledge of species, and the act of knowing are entirely one and the same.⁵⁸ though contingent events are changeable, and in this are involved potency and act, time and space, God's knowledge of them is unchanged, rather they change in themselves.⁵⁹ Aquinas' statement is quite clear about this.

"There is no change in the divine knowledge through His knowing that one and the same thing at one time exists and at another time does not; and in the way there is no change in the divine knowledge through His knowing that a certain proposition is at one time true, and at another time false." 60

Averroes' discussion of this matter appears to us as though he compared God's knowledge with human knowledge. Of course, if we refer to his treatment in relation to human knowledge, it is correct, but as we have seen, he clearly mentioned that God's

knowledge and human knowledge are totally different, and His knowledge and other attributes are incomparable with the attributes of creatures.⁶¹

Averroes' reason for why it is impossible that God knows all things together is because the existence of an event in a state or potency is different from its existence in a state of actuality. When the existence of events is different in both states, then the knowledge of a known event also must be different. This cannot be applied to God. Here again, it seems to us that Averroes's discussion is brought within the context of human knowledge, while he himself confirmed that there is no comparison between God's knowledge and human knowledge.

The controversy between Averroes and Aquinas on this matter arises because of different emphasis. Averroes' view stressed the aspect of creation which viewed in terms of the existence of creation involves the problem of temporal change, that is, before or after. As for Aquinas, his view emphasized the unity of the essence of God. God's essence and His act of knowing is the same. Thus by knowing Himself He knows all things simultaneously without involving time.

ii. God's knowledge in universal and particular

In the previous discussion we have seen from Averroes' statement that God knows only Himself. In order to avoid the consequence that He is ignorant of existents, some philosopher, for example, Avicenna, said that God knows them universally. This solution, however, was rejected by Averroes. Averroes held firmly

that God's knowledge is neither universal nor particular,⁶² because if we predicate both of them to God we raise many problems which distort our knowledge of God. If we say on the one hand that God's knowledge is universal, as suggested by Avicenna,⁶³ this means God's knowledge is not completely perfect, for in this way He just knows something in a general way as very often occurs in human knowledge. On the other hand if we say that God's knowledge is particular, this means God's knowledge is changeable, for particular is a quantitative number derived from the universal, and yet we recognize that God transcends passivity and change.⁶⁴

Averroes' denial that God's knowledge is either universal or particular is based on certain reasons. He said one whose knowledge is universal knows actually existing particulars only in potency, while there is no potency in God's knowledge.⁶⁵ Again, knowledge in potency is less perfect than knowledge in act,⁶⁶ for knowledge in potency is knowledge in matter. Therefore, the First knowledge (al-'ilm al-awwal) should be a knowledge in act, and there should be no universal at all, and no plurality which arises out of potency, like the plurality of species which results from the genus.⁶⁷ God's knowledge is not particular, added Averroes, because particular is one infinite in number⁶⁸ and cannot be grasped in their totality by knowledge. Furthermore, knowledge of individuals or particulars is derived from sensation or imagination. This is impossible for God. For the reasons given above Averroes concluded that God's knowledge of existence cannot be described as universal or particular, for both universal and particular are effects of existents, and knowledge of both also is transitory.⁶⁹

Moreover, Averroes said that knowledge which implies the concept of universal and particular is passive intellect and an effect, whereas the First Intellect is pure act and a cause.⁷⁰ The terms universal and particular, according to Averroes, are terms used in human knowledge and are incompatible with God's knowledge.

Aquinas also refuted those who said that God's knowledge is universal.⁷¹ He, however, argued somewhat differently from Averroes. God's knowledge is not universal; not, however, for the reason given by Averroes, that universal knowledge is knowledge of particular in potency, but because God's essence is as it were a medium by which He knows things.

Aquinas, however, departed from Averroes on the question of God's knowledge of particulars. Aquinas plainly stated that God has knowledge of particular things, because to know something generally and not specifically is to know it imperfectly.⁷² Again, if God does not know particular things which even men know, it would follow that God is the most foolish of beings.⁷³ Aquinas gave many reasons to establish his argument. Among his reason are as follows: God is His being, so, He is His knowing. All perfections of beings must be found in Him as their cause. Therefore, there must be found in Him knowledge of perfection of all knowledge. But this would not be so if the knowledge of particular things were lacking to Him. Therefore, God must have a knowledge of singulars.⁷⁴ Again, if God did not know a particular thing His power would not operate on it, so He must know particular things. Moreover, Aquinas argued that the distinction of a thing cannot be from chance, because it has a fixed order. The distinction in things must, therefore, derive

from the intention of a being which is its cause. It cannot be from intention of a cause acting through a necessity of nature, for nature is determined by one cause of action. It remains then, that the distinction in things comes from the intention of knowing cause. It seems to be proper to the intellect to consider the distinction of things. Now, the universal distinction of things cannot be from the intention of some secondary cause, because all such causes belong to the world of distinct effects. It belongs to the First Cause to aim at the distinction of all things. Therefore, God must have a knowledge of particular things.⁷⁵ Aquinas also referred to scripture as a source of authority in doctrine, "And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good."⁷⁶

To show the omniscience of God, Aquinas described the concept of God's knowledge in a wider scope than the aforementioned. God's knowledge, he said, extends not only to the things that are, whether these are universals or particulars, but also to the things that are not, for these things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were, are known by God as possible to His power.⁷⁷ As an artisan knows through his art even those things that have not yet been fashioned, since the forms of his art flow from his knowledge of external matter for the constitution of the artifacts, even so God knows of things not yet existent. Aquinas also referred to scripture as witness to God's omniscience, "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you."⁷⁸ Furthermore, Aquinas said that God knows infinite things if there are infinite things, because He does not only know that which is actual,

but also that which is potential, and among natural things there is infinity in potency.⁷⁹ God's understanding is infinite. If, then, we are able to grasp finite things according to our understanding which is finite, so God according to His understanding can grasp infinite things. This agrees with a verse in the Psalm, "And of His wisdom there is no number."⁸⁰

What we have seen in the discussion of the universal and the particular in God's knowledge, is that Averroes explicitly said that God's knowledge is neither universal nor particular, and he gave his own reason, while Aquinas, on the one hand, agreed with Averroes that God's knowledge is not universal, but, on the other hand, he disagreed on God's knowledge of the particular, and Aquinas also gave many reasons for this. Averroes' proof is probably acceptable when we relate his discussion to human knowledge, but we have some difficulties in accepting his proof if his discussion as related to God's knowledge, because God's knowledge and human knowledge are different, and he himself mentioned that no one can imagine how God's knowledge is except He himself.⁸¹ Averroes also warned us in order not to discuss at length God's knowledge, especially with the masses, for it is not the purpose of revealed law.⁸² Aquinas centralised his discussion: God's act of knowing is His essence. God knows Himself perfectly, and His knowledge is the source of all existing beings. Consequently God knows everything whether it is in general or in particular, whether it is existent or non-existent, whether it is finite or infinite. Aquinas' proof was intended to show God's omniscience, especially in his discussion of particular things in God's knowledge.

C. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

To avoid confusion in the discussion of God's knowledge regarding whether God knows in general or in particular, whether He knows or does not know other things than Himself, Averroes gave this solution: God's knowledge and ours are not univocal. In other words the term knowledge which is used of God's knowledge does not have the same meaning as when it is used in ours. Averroes, however, said that the term knowledge used in relation to God and to human beings is equivocal.⁸³ There is no one definition embracing both kinds of knowledge.

Averroes gave some reasons for the distinction between God's knowledge and human knowledge. One is that God's knowledge is the cause of the existents, while ours is the effect of them.⁸⁴ A consequence of this is that human knowledge is relative, because it is attained in many stages. It begins through the senses and then moves to the imagination. It moves from the general to the particular. All human sciences are passivities (infi'ālāt) and impressions (ta'thīrāt) from existents, and existents operate on them. But God's knowledge operates on existents and existents receive the activities of God's knowledge.⁸⁵ Again, our knowledge is imperfect and subsequent to things known. This is clear from our daily practical life in which the knowledge we get from the senses brings experience which operates on existents. As for God, His knowledge is perfect because His act of knowing is no other than His own essence. His knowledge is not involved with time;⁸⁶ neither before nor after. Furthermore, Averroes explained that human intellect is knowledge of the existents in potency, not

knowledge in act, and knowledge in potency is less perfect than knowledge in act,⁸⁷ because knowledge in potency is knowledge in matter.⁸⁸ But God's knowledge is always in act, for His knowledge is His own essence, and His essence is pure act which means no potency at all.

Aquinas agreed with Averroes that God's knowledge and human knowledge are not univocal.⁸⁹ In fact, not only the attribute of knowledge but also all other attributes of the creature cannot be predicted univocally with God.⁹⁰ Aquinas, however, did not give the same argument as Averroes gave. He recognized Averroes' proposition as true, that is, that things are the cause of our knowledge and the divine knowledge is the cause of things,⁹¹ but did not make that proposition as his reason to show that God's knowledge and ours are not univocal. The reason given by Averroes, according to Aquinas is insufficient because it still does not remove univocity of predication.⁹² Divine knowledge, according to Aquinas is not univocal with ours, not because it is the cause of things and ours is caused, but because it is knowledge which is divine.⁹³ In other words God's knowledge is His essence Himself which causes the existence of all beings. Accordingly, God's knowledge cannot be predicated in an univocal sense with creatures' knowledge.

Aquinas disagreed with Averroes when Averroes said that the term knowledge is used as equivocal in God and creatures, because nothing can be predicated of God and creature in a purely equivocal way, but what can be said of the relationship between God and creature is in an analogical way, as has been discussed in the preceding chapter.

In fact, Averroes did not say as Aquinas did that the term knowledge used of God and creatures is used in a purely equivocal sense, but simply said in equivocal name (ishtrāk al-ism). The using of an "equivocal name" between God and creature is because God has knowledge, and He knows something, and man has knowledge and he also knows something. Thus the term knowledge from this point of view, according to Averroes, can be predicated of both as a literal meaning, but not in reality, because it is not true, Averroes said, that eternal knowledge is the same as temporal knowledge, and one who believes this makes God an eternal man, and man a mortal God.⁹⁴

Aquinas denied the use of pure equivocation, because if there is pure equivocation then there is no likeness in things themselves. It is clear, however, from what he has said that there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God.⁹⁵ On this matter, if we refer to Aquinas' text,⁹⁶ what he denied clearly is "Pure equivocation" and Averroes, in fact, did not say this, rather he just said "equivocation." Thus Averroes' proposition probably is not completely wrong, because he also recognized that it is impossible to predicate some attributes of God and creatures purely and precisely in an equivocal sense, for, as has previously been shown, God's knowledge stands in opposition to man's - His knowledge is the cause of existents, and man's is derived from and caused by physical objects which affect the mind through the senses.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1620.
2. Al-Kashf, p. 161; Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 522.
3. Al-Kashf, p. 160.
4. Quran, 6:59.
5. Quran, 67:14.
6. Al-Kashf, p. 160.
7. Ibid., p. 160.
8. STla, q.14, a.1.
9. Job, 9:4.
10. S.C.G., 1.44.
11. Movers which are meant by Aquinas here are secondary agents.
12. STla, q.4, a.3.
13. S.C.G., 1.44.
14. S.C.G., 1.3.
15. S.C.G., 1.2.
16. Muḥammad, Al-Ghazali, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, ed. by Maurice Bouyges, Beyrouth, 1927, p. 376.
17. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 218; Averroes, Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p.1705.

18. Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1697
19. Ibid., pp. 1965 - 1966.
20. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 59.
21. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 340; Tafsīr, Vol. 3, pp. 1707 - 8.
22. Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1707
23. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 227.
24. Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1505.
25. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 217.
26. ST1a, q.14, a.5; S.C.G., 1.49.
27. S.C.G., 1.49.
28. Hebrews, 4:13
29. ST1a, q.14, a.5.
30. ST1a, q.14, a.5.
31. ST1a, q.14, a.5.
32. ST1a, q.14, a.5
33. S.C.G., 1.48.
34. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 343.
35. Ibid., p. 344

36. Ibid., p. 352.
37. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 462.
38. S.C.G., 1,51-52.
39. S.C.G., 1,51-52
40. S.C.G., 1,46.
41. S.C.G., 1,29.
42. S.C.G., 1,55.
43. S.C.G., 1,57.
44. S.C.G., 1,58.
45. S.C.G., 1,58.
46. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 59.
47. Faṣl al-Maqāl, pp. 59 - 60
48. Ibid., p. 61.
49. Ibid., p. 61.
50. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 61.
51. Al-Kashf, p. 161.
52. Ibid., p. 161.
53. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 357.

54. STla, q.14, a.13.
55. STla, q.14, a.17; S.C.G., 1,55.
56. STla, q.14, a.8.
57. Al-Kashf, pp. 160 - 161.
58. STla, q.14, a.4.
59. STla, q.14, a.4
60. STla, q.14, a.15.
61. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 354.
62. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 227; Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 40; Tafsīr
Vol. 3, p. 1708.
63. Muḥammad, Al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 223; S.C.G., 1,63,
note 1.
64. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 148.
65. Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1708.
66. Ibid., p. 1708.
67. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 345.
68. Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1708.
69. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 227
70. Ibid., p. 462.

71. I Sent., d. 35, q.1, a.5, cited by J.G. Flynn, "St. Thomas and Averroes on the Knowledge of God," Abr-Nahrain, Vol. XVIII, 1980, p. 22.
72. STla, q.14, a.6.
73. S.C.G., 1,50; S.C.G., 1,65.
74. S.C.G., 1,65.
75. S.C.G., 1,50.
76. Genesis, 1:31.
77. S.C.G., 1,66; STla, q.14, a.9.
78. Jeremiah, 1:5.
79. S.C.G., 1,69; STla, q.14, a.12.
80. Psalm, 146:5.
81. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 446; cf. Faṣl al-Maqāl, p.62.
82. Al-Kashf, p. 160; cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 356.
83. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 439; Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 39; Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1708.
84. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 468; Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 61; Tafsīr, Vol. 3, p. 1708.
85. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 446
86. Al-Kashf, p. 160.
87. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 345

88. *Ibid.*, p. 345.
89. *I Sent.*, d. 35, q.1, a.4, cited by J.G. Flynn, "St. Thomas and Averroes on the Knowledge of God," Abr-Nahrain, Vol. XVIII, 1980, p. 27.
90. S.C.G., 1,32.
91. S.C.G., 1,67.
92. *I Sent.*, d.35, q.1, a.4, obj.4, cited by J.G. Flynn, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
93. *I sent.*, d. 35, q.1,a.4, cited by Flynn, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
94. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 468
95. For detailed discussion see S.C.G., 1,29.
96. S.C.G., 1,33.

CHAPTER FOUR

PREDESTINATION

A. PRELIMINARY PROBLEM

Predistination is a crucial problem not only in Islam but also in Christianity. There has been a long and continuing discussion by theologians on both sides. Moreover, it is clear that there is no satisfaction to all thinkers. In relation to this Averroes said that predistination is one of the most intricate problems in Islam (shar'iiyyat).¹

The main question in predistination in Islamic theory is whether man has the power to act or the free will to choose his action. If he has no power to act or free will, it means his action is caused by another power outside of his will. If he has the power of free will, it means God's omnipotence is challenged. Averroes quoted many different Quranic verses which apparently show both that man has power to do something and that he does not possess this power. In addition to Quranic verses Averroes also referred to the traditions of the prophet Muhammad and rational arguments. The Quranic verses which show that man has free will and acquisition (kasb)² over his action are, for example, "whatever affliction may visit you is for what your own hands have earned,"³ "as for Thamūd We guided them, but they preferred blindness above guidance,"⁴ and others. The Quranic verses which show that man is compelled in his work are, for example, "surely We have created everything in measure,"⁵ "no affliction befalls in the earth or in yourselves but it is in a Book, before We create it."⁶ Sometimes in a single verse we find this controversy. For example, "Whatever good visits thee, it is of God (Allah), and whatever evil visits thee is of yourself."⁷ Two traditions of the prophet Muhammad referred to by

Averroes are first, "Every child is born according to nature (fitrah) and his parents make him a Jew or a Christian," and second, "These were created for paradise and will do the work for the people of paradise; and these were created for hell and they do work for the people of hell."⁸ The first tradition shows that the cause of disbelief (kufr) is one's own environment, and the second points out that the wickedness and disbelief are both caused by God and that man is compelled to follow them.⁹

The controversy concerning the rational proof arises from, according to Averroes, if, on the one hand, we say that man is the creator of his own action it would be necessary to admit that there are things which are not done according to the will of God. So there would be another creator beside God, while all Muslims agreed that there is no creator but Allah. If, on the other hand, we were to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he is compelled to do certain acts, and when a man is under compulsion in his acts, then moral obligation (taklīf) belongs to the category of imposition beyond capacity to bear (mā la yutāq). And if a man has duty laid on him beyond his capacity, there is no difference between his work and the work of inorganic matter.¹⁰

For the phenomena mentioned above, Muslims, according to Averroes, are divided into two major groups:¹¹ the Mu'tazilites who held that man's acquisition is the cause of wickedness and goodness. Thus they are responsible for their acts, and consequently they cannot blame God if they will be punished. Another group was called the Jabarites who held that man is under compulsion in his

acts. In other words the Mu'tazilites are called libertarians¹² and Jabarites predistinarrians.¹³ In addition to these groups there is another group called the Ash'arites. Their view on predestination, according to Averroes, lies between the two extreme views - the Mu'tazilites and the Jabarites. They say that man has acquisition, but the deed done (al-muktasab) and the power of doing (kasb) it are both created by God.¹⁴ Averroes, in his efforts to harmonize the doctrine of revelation (Quran) and philosophy, criticized the view of the three groups and gave his own solution which will be discussed below.

In Christianity, as in Islam, there is also a controversy about the concept of predestination. Some verses of Biblical scripture mention that man is predestined by God. For example, "Who can produce someone clean out of someone unclean? There is not one,"¹⁵ and, "those whom He fore-ordained He also called; and those whom He called He also justified; and those whom He justified He also glorified,"¹⁶ Besides, there are some verses which point out that man is not subject to the predestination of God. For example, "They shall go after the Lord, He will roar like a lion, yea, He will roar,"¹⁷ and, "so that they may indeed see but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not understand; least they should turn again, and be forgiven."¹⁸ These verses, however, may be differently interpreted,¹⁹ just as the Quranic verses in relation to predestination are interpreted differently by different sects.

The controversy over predestination in Christianity can be seen also in the development of theological doctrine during the

mediaeval times. It was regarded as the most animated controversy of the ninth century.²⁰ St. Augustine, a great theologian in the ancient world, and the most influential Christian Neoplatonist had a great influence upon the history of dogma and upon religious thought in western Christendom. His teaching dominated Christian thought until the rise of Aristotelianism in the early part of the thirteenth century.²¹ His doctrine of predestination was influential, though not always accepted, in subsequent Christian thought as an authoritative source during his time and onward.

The general conception of predestination held by Augustine is that man has free will and responsibility, in the sense that his acts are his own personal deeds, expressing his own nature in its response to the various situations in which he finds himself.²² Augustine's scope of predestination was, "that all things before they happen, and that which we do by our free will, everything that we feel and know would not happen without our volition,"²³ some aspects of Augustine's doctrine of predestination, however, were opposed by some theologians such as Gottschalk (b.805) who held that no one is able to use free will to do good, but only to do evil.²⁴ A controversy also occurred between Gottschalk and Hincmar (d.882), and between Hincmar and Gregory IV (d.844). We also find disputation about predestination between the Augustinians who held that we ought to believe both the grace of God and the free will of man,²⁵ and the Pelagians who held a theory of free choice of will which leaves little place for the grace of God.²⁶ In consequence of the controversy²⁷ about predestination some conferences were held to solve it. For example, at the council of Mayence in 848,

Gottschalk's doctrine of predestination was condemned, and at the council of Toucy in 860 there was an effort to harmonize Gregory's view and Hincmar's. The controversy, however, went on without any final decision having been reached. The struggle between the doctrine of Augustine and that of the semipelagians continued for a long time.

Though there were many theologians who opposed Augustine's doctrine, he was, in fact, recognized without doubt as the most authentic doctor among all the expositors of sacred scripture.²⁸ Aquinas, who was more Aristotelian than Platonist, did not reject Augustine's doctrine, but rather he carried out his criticism of Augustine and appealed to the Biblical scripture and proceeded to re-establish the truth by rescuing Augustine's doctrine as one of the authoritative sources in the formation of Christian thought.

It is worth noticing here that the dispute over predestination in Christianity was not the same as in Islam. In Christianity theologians did not dispute the verses of scripture, rather their disagreement concerned the proper concept of predestination, while in Islam theologians disagreed about the proper sense of the Quranic texts for this was the key to the proper interpretation of the concept of predestination.

B. GOD'S ATTRIBUTES IN RELATION TO PREDESTINATION

To understand the concept of the predestination of God we should discuss three of His attributes; the will, the power and the justice of God, and their relation to human free will. The discussion of these three attributes, however, does not cover all aspects. being more concerned with the relation of human power and free will to God's power and will.

i. The will and the power of God

Averroes affirmed that God has will and power since they are two of the attributes of God's perfection mentioned in the Quran. There are many verses which show this. For example, "God, performer of what He desires,"²⁹ and, "Truly God is powerful over everything,"³⁰ and the like. In addition to the Quranic proof, Averroes provided a rational argument (dalil 'aqliy) for them. We recognize that God has knowledge, as discussed before, consequently God must have power and will.³¹ Moreover, Averroes said, God knows opposites, and when only one of the opposites proceeds from Him, it shows that there is another attribute besides knowledge, namely, will, and it is in this way that the affirmation of will in the first must be understood according to philosophers.³² Again, since it is established that the world exist through the First Agent who preferred its existence to its non-existence, accordingly, it is necessary that this agent should be a willer (murīd).³³ Similarly, Averroes said that God has power because He is Pure Act and Real Agent, who brings potency into act.³⁴ Furthermore, God is, as an agent of all causes, drawing forth the universe from a state of non-existence to existence and conserving

it; and such an act is a more perfect and glorious one than any performed by empirical agents (fā'ilāt al-mushāhadat).³⁵ This means that all existents are created by God who has absolute power.

In many circumstances Averroes defended the ideas of the philosophers in relation to the will and power of God. When philosophers say that God has no will,³⁶ it does not mean they deny absolutely the will of God, but they say that He does not will in the way that man wills.³⁷ Thus the will of God as understood by philosophers is nothing more than the claim that every act proceeds from Him through knowledge, together with which He also knows opposites.³⁸ Averroes, who agreed with this idea of the philosophers, explained the difference between God's will and human will. In the human will, Averroes said, one whose will has reached its object, no longer wills,³⁹ while the eternal (God's) will does not cease through the presence of the object willed.⁴⁰ Furthermore, one who will lacks the things which he wills, while God does not lack anything He wills.⁴¹ Averroes also said that will is a desire of the agent towards action, which rouses movement to perfect its essence. Desire and movement are only found in an animate body.⁴² Again, the empirical will is a faculty which possesses the possibility of doing equally one of two contraries.⁴³ So the will in this manner is passive and changing⁴⁴ as shown in the discussion of the existence of God. Averroes concluded that all these kinds of will belong to human beings and cannot be attributed to God, because the kind of will in human beings is imperfect, while God is absolutely perfect and transcendent. Averroes, however, stated that the will of God, as well as His knowledge, is spoken of in an equivocal

name,⁴⁵ that is, will in human beings is, as mentioned before, a faculty to choose one of two possibilities, and God's will also differentiates one of two contraries. For example, God chooses existence, not non-existence. So in this case the will of God and ours is said to be spoken of in an equivocal name. The concept and scope of these two wills are different. We cannot explain sufficiently, Averroes said, the will of God, as we do our own, because the manner of His will is inconceivable,⁴⁶ and that because there is no counterpart to His will in the empirical world (al-shāhid).⁴⁷ Based on Averroes' reasoning mentioned above, we cannot say that God is acting intentionally by created or eternal will⁴⁸ in His creation, and to say that He intended to create a thing by eternal intention (irādat qadīmat) is an innovation in Islam, which is not rationally apprehended by the learned.⁴⁹

Likewise, Averroes distinguished the power of God and human power. First he divided agents into two kinds; natural agents (fā'il bi al-ṭab') and voluntary agents (fā'il bi al-ikhtiyār)⁵⁰ Natural agents, according to Averroes, act without knowledge,⁵¹ and its act is constant (dā'im).⁵² It also performs actions of only one kind, for example, warmth causes heat and coldness causes cold.⁵³ Voluntary agents act differently from natural agents. Voluntary agents act through knowledge and deliberation and perform certain action at one time and its opposite at another.⁵⁴ God as First Agent and Pure Act is different from those two kinds of agent. In other words, God acts neither by nature nor election, because if He acts by nature it means all existents are the same kind as noted above. This is impossible by our experience. He also does not act

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by election (ikhtiyār) because one who chooses, chooses for himself the better condition of two things, but God is not in need of a better condition.⁵⁵ Averroes agreed with the idea of philosophers who said that all existents proceed from God in a way superior to nature and to human will, for both these ways are subject to an imperfection.⁵⁶ When Averroes said that God does not act by election, this does not mean He is forced by another power in His action, but it means He does not act by will and election as human will and election. In fact, Averroes mentioned that God performs one of the two contraries (mutaqābilayn) through choice,⁵⁷ but the manner of choice is not known by us. Averroes stated the scope of the power of God, "that God never ceases to have power for action, and that it is impossible that anything should prevent His act ... we cannot say that He should have no power at one time but power at another, and that He could be called powerful only at definite limited times."⁵⁸

Aquinas, like Averroes, confirmed that God has will⁵⁹ and power.⁶⁰ Aquinas' confirmation that God has these two qualities was the same as that used by Averroes, that is, it was based on his understanding of divine intelligence and knowledge. Aquinas said that, "God is intelligent, He must be endowed with will."⁶¹ He went on to show at length that God has will. For example he said,

"The more perfect understanding is, the more delightful it is to the one understanding. But God understands and His understanding is most perfect. Therefore, His understanding is most full of delight. But intelligible delight is through the will, as sensible delight is through the appetite of concupiscence. There is, therefore, will in God." ⁶²

Though Aquinas' argument, as listed by Robert Leet Patterson are eight in number,⁶³ their source is only one - God has knowledge. What is clear for us is that Averroes and Aquinas agreed that there is one basic source, but Aquinas provided a more elaborate and detailed argument than Averroes. As Averroes referred to the Quran, Aquinas also referred to Biblical scriptures which affirms the will of God, "Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect."⁶⁴ Similarly Aquinas proved that God has power because He is pure act, as he had shown in his discussion of the existence of God. As pure act God has power. Furthermore, Aquinas also referred to scriptures as his authoritative source, "I am God Almighty; walk before Me and be blameless."⁶⁵

In our case, Aquinas said, the will is a desire to seek things not yet possessed and delighting in what is.⁶⁶ This is precisely the same as Averroes' statement in his discussion of human will. Aquinas added that God's will is only in the last sense, that is delighting in what is, because the principle of His will is His own essence.⁶⁷ If the principle object of divine will be other than the divine essence, it would follow that there is something higher than the divine will moving it, while as we have known God's essence is the highest good. Therefore, the principle object of His will is His own essence. Aquinas said, however, that God, in addition to willing Himself, also wills other things which are ordered by Him as to their end.⁶⁸ God's moral integrity is affirmed by holding that God wills the good of things other than

Himself. Relativity of deity is avoided by arguing that what moves God is not the will to the good of the other, but God's own goodness.⁶⁹ The paradigm of the divine will here is the same as that of God's knowledge of things other than Himself: as God understands things, other than Himself, in understanding His own being, so likewise He wills them in willing His own goodness.⁷⁰ In other words, God does not only will nothing necessarily other than Himself, but, also, whatever He wills, He wills with respect to His own end.

In discussing the power of God, Aquinas spoke of two kinds of power; active power and passive power. The first concerns power in relation to God.⁷¹ Aquinas defined active power as, "a principle of acting on another," and passive power as "a principle of being acted on by another,"⁷² Moreover, Aquinas explained that power in God should be conceived as a principle of a thing made, not as a principle in action,⁷³ as our own, because if we understand God's power as a source of action it means His activity depends on another. This is impossible, since God's power is identical with God's essence.⁷⁴

The scope of God's power as described by Aquinas is that God is omnipotent⁷⁵ which means He can do whatever He wishes to do. Aquinas, however, reminded us what is meant by "God is omnipotent." He said though God can do all, He cannot make something logical contradictory, because anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under God's omnipotence.⁷⁶ He is almighty because He can do everything that is absolutely possible. "Something is judged to be possible or impossible from the implication of the terms:

possible when the predicate is compatible with the subject, for instance, that Socrates is seated; impossible when it is not compatible, for instance, that man is a donkey,"⁷⁷ The notion of omnipotence implies that there is no possible power lacking in God. Under the concept of omnipotence of God all activities in the world should be referred to God as their cause.⁷⁸ His power is not limited to some particular effect,⁷⁹ because if God's power were limited to some particular effect, He would not be through Himself the cause of being as such, but of this particular being.⁸⁰ This is repugnant to God as the source of all beings. To show the scope of omnipotence of God, Aquinas clarified three characteristics of God's power: its universality, its uniqueness, and its absoluteness.⁸¹ It is universal in that it extends to all things with which the notion of being is not incompatible.⁸² It is unique in that it is creative; God alone has the power to create being, as such, out of nothing.⁸³ It is absolute in that no effect lies beyond God's power.⁸⁴ "God is able to do everything whatsoever that lies within the potency of the created thing."⁸⁵

From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that both Averroes and Aquinas recognized that God is omnipotent, His power is unlimited. There is no great difference in the way in which this matter was discussed by Averroes and Aquinas. However, we find a little difference in their approach. For example, Aquinas clearly stated that God makes something by will not by necessity of His nature.⁸⁶ Aquinas gave three reasons for this: first, in acts by nature, both the end and the means necessary to it have to be determined by some superior intelligence, for example an

arrow's target is set by an archer. Now since God is the first of the order of efficient cause, therefore, that which acts from intelligence and will follow strictly. Second, God's being is not a determinate kind, but contains in itself the whole perfection of being, and consequently does not act by the determinism of nature. Therefore, God acts by the resolution of His intelligence and will. Third, effects proceed from an efficient cause, and they pre-exist in a cause according to its mode of being. God's being is His actual understanding, creatures pre-exist there as held in His mind, and so, as being comprehended, they proceed from Him. So also as God's being wills, He, therefore, acts according to His will. Aquinas' argument is reasonable, because if God acts not by His will it means He has no choice in His action, while God wills things other than Himself without necessity.⁸⁷ Also, if God acts not by His will it means there is a super power over His power, and in consequence of that His activity is under compulsion. This is impossible. Here we seem to detect a point of difference with Averroes who said that God acts not by will and election. In fact, this Averroes' statement does not mean that God acts without will, but God's willing as we have seen⁸⁸ is not the same as human willing. Thus Averroes' denial is the denial that God acts by a will such as ours.

a. Human power and free will

Averroes in his discussion of human power and free will, or in philosophical terms, secondary agent, criticized the Ash'arites who said that man has no power or acquisition (kasb) in his action. So the Ash'arites' statement, that a acquisition and the deed done are both created by God, is meaningless,⁸⁹ because that statement

still shows that man is under a compulsion in his actions. For Averroes, if man is not free to choose what he wills, the problem of human obligation (taklif) arises as we have seen earlier.⁹⁰

To avoid this problem Averroes said that man has power, but the power is not created by himself, it is given by God.⁹¹ Man's power is not absolute, it is under the power of God. This power is limited, it depends on a condition supplied by God which enables it to act. Averroes gave two conditions⁹² where man can act by the power given by God; first, by our intention and second, by the 'cause' with which God has furnished us from without. If one of them is omitted, our power is not complete and our actions do not come actually into existence. The causes which God set to work from without are not solely the complete cause of what we wish to do or prevent being done, but are rather the causes of our deciding to do one of two contraries.⁹³ The will in us, Averroes said, is the urge to do something from our imagination (takhayyul) or the judgement of the truth of something, and this judgement is not our choice, but is something which happens to us from events outside ourselves.⁹⁴ The example given by Averroes is that when something desirable is presented to us from outside we desire it involuntarily, and move towards it, and similarly when there happens to us something repellent from outside, we leave it violently. By this way, according to Averroes, our will is preserved and bound up by the events from without. This illustration is based on Averroes' reading of a Quranic verse, "he has attendant angels before him and behind him, watching over him by God's command."⁹⁵ Averroes believed that by this explanation, of how we can acquire our deeds

and how far they are governed by predestination, one solves all doubts⁹⁶ which arise from the apparent contradiction in the Quranic verses and also from rational arguments.

Averroes' answer, however, still raises problems, because all Muslims are completely in agreement that there is no agent (fā'il) except Allah. To clarify the statement "there is no agent except Allah" Averroes gave two answers. First, this statement can be taken to mean that there is no agent but Allah, and that causes other than Him cannot be called agent except only metaphorically.⁹⁷ This is because the existence of those causes depends on Him. He has made them to be causes and has preserved their existence as creative agents, and has protected their effects after their actions. God also creates their substances at the time when causes come together.⁹⁸ The second answer is that Averroes distinguished between two terms "creator" and "agent". All existents, according to Averroes, consist of two elements: substances or essences, and accidents.⁹⁹ The substances or essences are only created by God. The causes only have their effect on accidents, not on the substances or essences. For example, the sperm gains heat from woman, but the creation of the foetus and the soul, which is its life, is only from God alone.¹⁰⁰ In other words, man and woman are only the agents which can change what has already been created by God, while God is the real creator of the foetus and the life in it. Therefore, Averroes stated that "an agent in the empirical world (al-shāhid) does not create anything, but his action is only to change one quality into another; it does not change non-existence into existence."¹⁰¹ For this reason Averroes said that there is no creator

but God, because the real created things (makhlūq) are substances.¹⁰² Therefore, Averroes' answer is not contradicted by that which is held by all Muslims, namely, there is no agent except Allah. This concept was derived by Averroes from a Quranic verse, "O men, a similitude is struck; so give your ear to it. Surely those upon whom you call apart from God, shall never create a fly, though they blended together to do it; and if a fly should rob them of aught, they would never rescue it from him. Feeble indeed alike are the seeker and the sought."¹⁰³

Of the difference between creator and agent as described by Averroes, or in other words between creation and action, we can say that all human activities are not included in the term creation, but are included in the term action. Therefore, there is no controversy, according to Averroes' view, between God's power and human power. Human power is only to process that which is already created by God.

In discussing the difference between "creator" and "agent" Averroes reached the conclusion that the name of creator (Khāliq) is more properly to be applied to God than the name of agent (fā'il), because the word "creator" is not shared by any creature, and the meaning of the creator is the inventor (mukhtari⁴) of the substances,¹⁰⁴ as mentioned in the Quran, "God created you and that which you do."¹⁰⁵

In Christianity, as well as in Islam, the problem of human power and free will is not easily solved. It raises many controversial ideas among theologians. Since Augustine's day, theologians

have faced this problem which "Anselm himself calls a very famous question, that of the relation between human freewill and divine grace, foreknowledge and predestination. This, too, was a topic of renewed interest in the twelfth century."¹⁰⁶ Free will, in fact, is a problem for man not for angels because they were created in the state of beatitude, and also not for creatures below man, such as animals, because they are not endowed with intellect and will. For man it is evident that he has been endowed with free will, a property inseparable from a rational and free agent.

Augustine plainly said that man has will and free choice in his action.¹⁰⁷ We are free to do or not to do something. So "our will is ours and it is our will that affects all that we do by willing."¹⁰⁸ This means that whatever happens to man against his will is not really his will but the will of God who gives the power of realization. Aquinas, as well as Augustine, recognized that man is free to make decisions in his action.¹⁰⁹ If man was not free, councils, exhortation, percept, prohibition, reward and punishment would be pointless.¹¹⁰ Man's free will, however, is not beyond God's will. The will of every rational creature ought to be subject to the will of God. Thus, Aquinas said creaturely freedom involves only the category of assent; the category of real choice or real alternative belongs within the mystery of God's eternity.¹¹¹

There is a linguistic difficulty in the freedom of choice. Philosophers in the mediaeval times discussed freedom, the will under the "Librium arbitrium." Albert the Great regarded "Librium

arbitrium" as a power distinct from reason and will which arbitrates between the dictates of reason and the aim of will in cases where there is a conflict of the two. Aquinas rejected Albert's view,¹¹² because free will according to him, is the power by which a man can judge freely.¹¹³ Furthermore, Aquinas said that free will is the power of intelligence which makes man master of his own acts, and presupposes a providence of his own, whereby he can provide for himself and for others.¹¹⁴ To understand adequately the concept of human free will, we should understand three terms together; choice, deliberation and reason or intellect. Choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Every act of free choice is proceeded by a judgement of the reason, and Aquinas spoke of choice as being formally an act of the reason, and the mind or reason can regard any particular good under different aspects or from different points of view. In regard to the choice of a particular good, the will is free.¹¹⁵ The power of choice is essentially voluntary, and where there is no choice there is no will. Thus Aquinas said that "choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another."¹¹⁶ Deliberation brings us to a point where we observe that several means are capable of bringing us to the end toward which we are tending. Each of these means pleases us, and to the extent that it does so, we cleave to it. But of all these means which please us, we at least choose one, and such choice belongs properly to an act of election.. In deliberation, reason and understanding are required to make a judgement.

The will tends to an end (good); the will moves all faculties toward their end. When intellect shows the will that a number of

ways of acting are possible, there is a corresponding movement of complacency in the will by which it tends toward what is good in each of the proposed possibilities. Though Aquinas distinguished three terms in relation to free will, sometimes he said free will is simply choice.¹¹⁷ Thus he said reasoning properly refers to our arriving at knowledge of one thing from knowledge of another. Willing indicates the simple appetite for something, since it is desired for its own sake. Choosing means to seek something for the sake of something else, hence it is used most strictly in relating means to an end. Clearly, then, will and free will are related in the way that understanding and reasoning are related. So willing and choosing pertain to the same power but they are different acts; willing concerns to the goal and choosing focuses on the means to obtain the goal.

As touched on briefly at the beginning of this chapter, free will in man does not mean that its decision should be put into effect. It, however, is a power to choose one of several possibilities of obtaining a goal, because no free decision can reach the goal unless God initiates and helps it.¹¹⁸ This is the concept of human free will in Aquinas' thought.

When Aquinas said that a secondary agent can act, this does not mean any action performed by a secondary agent happens independently of God's power. Rather it is still under the control of God, because if creatures have the power to create or to add to being, then divine power would be qualified, and God would not be absolute in power.¹¹⁹ God having made man what He is also provides

the end, means, motive and power whereby man can realize the full potentialities of what he can be.

Now man is master of his acts through his reason and will. Therefore, free will is said to be a faculty of will and reason. Thus those acts are properly called "human" which proceed from deliberate choice. This means that stretching done without attention, according to Aquinas, is not properly speaking a human act, it lies outside the sphere of freedom. Aquinas' analysis of freedom is markedly intellectualist in character, in the sense that a strong emphasis is laid on the reason's function in free choice. Every act of free choice is preceded by a judgement of the reason. The mind or reason can regard any particular good under different aspects. Walking, for example, is regarded as something good, as the fulfilment of a need for exercise. Or it is regarded under another aspect as something bad, as likely to be a hot and dirty business.

Aquinas, then held that man is free in choosing this or that particular good. The choice of some particular good may be necessary as a means to the attainment of the final end, but when we know theoretically that this is the case, it is not so evident to us that we are unable to regard them from another point of view. It may be objected, however, that our choice of this or that particular end is determined by our character, which in turn is determined by psychological factors.

Aquinas conceived of freedom as the harmony of will and act, and thereby sought to reconcile to each other the idea of

divine absolute power and human freedom. By conceiving the power of the secondary cause as the power to effect, rather than to create a new being, Aquinas had sought to affirm real creaturely power without compromising the absolute quality of God's power. Furthermore, Aquinas added that the power of God does not only serve to change or to move something. Changing and moving is a kind of quality proper to human beings.¹²⁰ Thus Aquinas' description parallels Averroes' statement that a secondary agent just changes a quality of existents, as we have discussed before.

Aquinas also discussed the concept of creation by saying that "creation is an action proper to God, and that He alone can create."¹²¹ Here there is no contradiction between the power of secondary agent and God's absolute power. This is clear because the right to create is only for God. The concept of creation, according to Aquinas, does not mean that God brings things into being from pre-existing matter.¹²² God creates something ex-nihilo. Thus once again we find a similarity between Averroes, who distinguishes the concept of "creator" and "agent," and Aquinas.

ii. God's justice.

In the foregoing discussion we have dealt with the scope of God's power and will and human freedom in his action. We turn now to a discussion of God's power and human freedom in relation of God's justice.

The justice of God is a crucial controversy which had occurred between the Ash'arites, the Mu'tazilites and the philo-

sophers. Hence we will see that Averroes as a philosopher had directed his criticism at the Ash'arites without giving any to the Mu'tazilites.¹²³ This problem is based on the concept of good (al-ḥasan) and bad (al-Qabḥ) in action in which the criterion by which they are measured is either reason as held by the Mu'tazilites and philosophers, or divine law (shar') as held by the Ash'arites.

The controversy between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites in relation to God's justice arises from certain Quranic verse; some of which show that God is just, and others apparently that God is unjust. An example for the former is, "surely God wrongs not men anything, but themselves men wrong."¹²⁴ An example for the latter is, "God leads astray whomsoever He wills, and guides whomsoever He wills, and He is the All-mighty, the All-wise."¹²⁵

The Mu'tazilites who are well-known as a party of justice (ahl al-ʿadl) said clearly that God is just and wise,¹²⁶ so God wills good and must enact what is advantageous to man, and therefore, He does not will evil for this would be harmful to man. If God wills evil, He is unjust. This contradicts the Quranic verse, "Thy Lord wrongs not His servants."¹²⁷

The justice of God is the first of the Mu'tazilites' principles in theology. An important consequence of God's justice to action, as understood by the Mu'tazilites, is that the rewards and punishments of man in the next life must be deserved by man, and this implies that man must be free in his present life to choose between right and wrong conduct. Furthermore, the Mu'tazilites' concept of God's justice was that one cannot ascribe

to God evil and injustice or any act of unbelief and sin, because if He created injustice He would be unjust, just as He would be just if He created justice.¹²⁸ They also agreed that God does only what is right and good, and being wise He must do what is good for man. This is the Mu'tazilites' theory of ethics which is called rationalistic objectivism.¹²⁹

The Ash'arites said, according to Averroes, that we cannot describe God as just or unjust,¹³⁰ because He is not under the obligation (taklīf) which is placed on His servants. And any action of someone who is not subject to this condition cannot be predicated as either just or unjust.¹³¹ This view was criticized by Averroes as being unreasonable and it describes what is not described by the Quran. The Ash'arites also held, according to Averroes, that good and evil are relative things (amr al-i'tibārīy), for the criterion by which something is considered good or bad is revealed law (shar'). The intellect cannot play any role in measuring something as good or bad. This, according to the Ash'arites' view, is because something good at one time can be changed into bad at another time. For example, killing someone is bad for it is prohibited by revealed law, but it can be changed to good when God requires the reprisal carried out by a killer. Thus the Ash'arites' view, according to Averroes, contradicts the revealed law and reason.¹³² Justice, according to him, is not a relative thing, but it is evident that justice is good (khayr) and injustice is wicked (sharr). On the other hand, God has repudiated injustice Himself, saying, "Thy Lord wrongs not His servants."¹³³

Averroes firmly stated that God is just¹³⁴ as did the Mu'tazilites. This is because God has described Himself as righteous (qist) and has denied that He is a wrongdoer. There are many Quranic verses which support Averroes' view, for example, the verse already mentioned above. Besides, Averroes said, if we assume that God is not just, then we falsify what is rationally perceived of things which are just and unjust in themselves.¹³⁵ So we cannot predicate injustice of God, because injustice is applied to those who conduct or administer something which does not belong to them. But God dominates the heavens and the earth and anything between them.¹³⁶ Everything in this universe belongs to God, He can do whatever He wishes. If this is so, we cannot attribute injustice to God. On this point Averroes' view is similar to the Mu'tazilites'. If so, in this context Averroes' ethics can be also described as rationalistic objectivism.

Averroes, however, reminded us not to confuse God's justice and human justice. Man acts justly, according to him, in order that he may gain some good by justice in itself which would not exist for himself if he were not to act justly. When we act justly we feel happiness and satisfaction, since we have fulfilled a good by our act towards another, But God acts justly not because His essence is perfected by justice or because He feels happiness or satisfaction, but because His perfection itself requires that He acts justly. If we assume that God's justice is of the same kind as man's, it becomes necessary to admit there is some defect in Him. This imperfection, as we have already seen, is impossible for God.

Though Averroes referred to the many Quranic verses to prove that God is just, he also realized that there are some verses in the Quran itself which apparently show that God is unjust. For example, "God leads astray whomsoever He wills, and guides whosoever He wills, and He is the All-mighty, the All-wise,"¹³⁷ and the like. The question arising from this verse is, is the misleading of a servant just or unjust? The apparent meaning of this verse is, of course, that God is unjust because He brings man to error and then punishes him. But Averroes said that such a verse cannot be understood in its literal meaning; it should be interpreted allegorically, for there are many other verses which contradict it.¹³⁸ For example, "He approves not unthankfulness in His servant."¹³⁹ This verse, Averroes said, shows that since God would not approve the infidelity of His servants, He does not mislead them.¹⁴⁰ Thus Averroes' view is quite apposed to the Ash'arites' view who hold that it is possible for God to do something which He does not want.¹⁴¹ This view, according to Averroes, is infidelity.¹⁴²

Averroes tried to reconcile the apparent contradictions in the Quranic verses by interpreting allegorically those verses that show God is the cause of error. Those verses, in fact, according to him, refer to the pre-arranged divine will (mashī'at) that some existents tend to err by their nature and are prompted to it by inner and external causes. Therefore, Averroes said that those verses are misleading concerning the evil nature, in the same way that beneficial foods can be harmful to sick bodies.¹⁴³ Any Quranic verse which apparently shows that God misleads man, according to Averroes, does not mean that God wills evil for him, rather it shows that God

creates men, and they have the ability to choose between good and evil.¹⁴⁴ The ability is guided by intellect in choosing good or bad conduct. The interpretation of the Quranic verses allegorically in this matter is necessary so as to avoid imputing a dualism in God. Thus causing confusion in the human mind (Muslims) by speaking of God as the creator of good and the creator of evil, as happened in Zoroastrianism.¹⁴⁵ In Islam, good and evil are created by God, and God's creation of evil, according to Averroes, is for the sake of good. In this way His creation of evil would be quite just.¹⁴⁶ The example given by Averroes is that the punishments which are ordained by governors of cities are evils, but they are instituted for the sake of the good - for the peace of the whole cities. Therefore, the punishment ordained by the governors cannot be regarded as evil. In the same way this is applied to God. The existence of evil is inevitable for the existence of good. So Averroes said that there exists among good things some that can only exist with an admixture of evil. Therefore, the divine wisdom ordained, according to the philosophers, that a great quantity of good should exist although it had to be mixed with a small quantity of evil.¹⁴⁷

The Quranic verses quoted by Averroes in this matter, at least show that God has classified two kinds of man; one good, and the other evil. This raises in our minds the question - what is God's purpose in distinguishing some men who, by their nature, are prepared to err which is the worst kind of injustice? Averroes' answer was that it is the wisdom of God (hikmat ilahiyyat) to do so,¹⁴⁸ and the nature of men composed of a rational and animal soul,¹⁴⁹ requires that a small quantity of them err by their

nature.¹⁵⁰ As human beings they have been given guidance, they also have been exposed to the misleading, that is, they have been led away from God, or to evil in a small number.¹⁵¹ We, as servants of God, have no right to ask why God does this and that as is mentioned in the Quran, "He shall not be questioned as to what He does, but they shall be questioned." According to Averroes, though evil exists, its existence is much less than good. Thus when good is much greater than evil in proportion, then the wisdom of God requires to do evil. It is well known, Averroes said, that the existence of much good with a little evil is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of a little evil.¹⁵² For example, fire has been made because of its necessity for the existence of certain things, and without it they could not have existed at all. It, of course, destroys some existent things. If we, however, think of the destruction caused by that fire and then compare this destruction to the advantages which we derive from it, we find that its existence is better than its non-existence. Thus the existence of fire is good though it contains evil.¹⁵³

In the case of evil, sometimes our intellect cannot explore the mystery of its reality. Our intellect cannot describe for what purpose God has created it. Just as it was with angels when God informed them that He was going to create on the earth a man (Adam), and they questioned God; "What wilt thou set therein one who will do corruption, and shed blood, while we proclaim Thy praise and call Thee Holy? He said, Assuredly I know that you know not."¹⁵⁴ From this, Averroes reached a conclusion that since good and evil are found mixed in the world and the good predominates over the

evil, then the divine wisdom requires that evil should be so and thus its existence is not negated.¹⁵⁵

Aquinas also insisted, as did Averroes, that God is just.¹⁵⁶ He also shared with Averroes the idea that God's justice is different from man's justice. Thus to distinguish the justice of God from the justice of man, Aquinas spoke of two kinds of justice; commutative and distributive.¹⁵⁷ The former justice occurs in all activities of human beings which cover the whole range of present property relations, and Aquinas gave an exhaustive list of such relations: buying, selling, trade, commerce and the like. This justice, according to Aquinas, cannot be attributed to God, because no one gives to Him that it should be rendered to Him again. The latter kind of justice, distributive justice, is the righteousness of a ruler, displayed in a well-ordered community through its head and manifests itself in both natural and moral beings which set forth God's justice. This justice belongs to God for He gives to every creature according to its nature and dignity.

Aquinas, like Averroes, faced the fact that contradictory ideas occur in scripture and he too tried to reconcile them. There are some verses in scripture which attest the justice of God. For example, "The Lord is just and loves justice,"¹⁵⁸ "Let no one say when he is tempted, I am tempted by God, for God cannot be tempted with evil."¹⁵⁹ But there are other verses which show that God is unjust. For example, "Go in to Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, that I may show these signs of mine among them,"¹⁶⁰ "O Lord, why dost thou make us err from thy

ways and harden our heart, so that we fear thee not?"¹⁶¹ According to Aquinas the two latter verses, and other verses which are similar to them, do not show that God is unjust, rather they should be understood as meaning that "God does not grant to some people His help in avoiding sin while to others He does grant it."¹⁶² Aquinas stressed that we cannot say at all that God does lead men to sinful action. Men sin because they turn away from God who is their ultimate end.¹⁶³ This means, according to Aquinas, that God does not direct men to do evil, but they themselves by their own nature turn from God who is their ultimate felicity. Aquinas' explanation of those texts, which suggest that God is unjust, parallels Averroes' in as much both interpret those verses in relation to the idea that God is the highest good and He does not will evil. Men do evil because their nature urges them to do it, not because God ordains it.

Averroes and Aquinas, in interpreting any verses implying the injustice of God in their different scriptures, tried to avoid attributing injustice to God. Their answer, however, cannot completely satisfy our intellect. Their answers are a justification to the positive verses which attest that God is just and merciful. The question might arise, why did they only interpret allegorically or symbolically the negative verses without giving a similar interpretation to the positive verses? Aquinas stated firmly that "in every one of God's works justice and mercy are found,"¹⁶⁴ and then he referred to scripture, "all the paths of Lord are mercy and truth."¹⁶⁵

Aquinas, like Averroes, recognized that God separates men into two divisions, namely, to some God gives grace and guides them to His path, and the others He leaves in error. It is evident from our experience that God gives sight to the blind, or life to the dead, but He does not enlighten all the blind, or heal all who are infirm. ' Though these things are apparently unjust according to our judgement, we still cannot say that God is unjust, because there is a purpose in His action. God's purpose in this matter, according to Aquinas, is that:

"the working of His power may be evident in the case of those whom He heals, and in the case of the others the order of nature may be observed, so also He does not assist with His help all who impede grace so that they may be turned away from evil and toward the good, but only some, in whom He desires His mercy to appear, so that the order of justice may be manifested in the other cases." 166

The Aquinas' answer is roughly similar to that of Averroes, who said that the division of men into two kinds - some God guides and others He misleads. Thus is required by divine wisdom which is beyond our intellect.

There is, then, some similarity between Averroes and Aquinas in answering the question of why God helps some and not others. Aquinas said there is no reason to ask why He converts certain sinners to His guidance and leaves the others. For all things in this world depend upon His will alone.¹⁶⁷ He can do whatever He wishes. Aquinas' answer is strengthened by scripture, "Does not the potter have authority over the clay to make from the same lump one vessel for an honorable use, another for a dish-

onourable use?"¹⁶⁸

In the case of moral evil, Aquinas tried to avoid saying that it is from God; rather it is from man. To show that the evil deed is not from God, Aquinas said that every sin stems from a defect in the proximate agent, not from the influence of the primary agent. For example, some defect may occur in the product of a skilled artisan because of some defect in his instrument, not in his skill.¹⁶⁹

There is, however, a dissimilarity between Averroes and Aquinas in relation to evil. Averroes clearly stated that evil¹⁷⁰ is created by God, while Aquinas stated it is not caused by God. Evil, according to Aquinas, is only a privation of good,¹⁷¹ and God, the highest good, cannot bear any mingling with evil.¹⁷² They, however, agreed that God does not will evil.¹⁷³

Aquinas, as well as Averroes, answered the question, what is the purpose of the existence of evil in this world? He said that the nature of law is that some things are good and some bad, or that something is good and the other better. So to maintain the perfection of the universe it requires inevitably good and evil, because many goods are present in things which would not occur unless there were evil.¹⁷⁴ For example there would not be a place for the justice of vindication if there were no offences. Therefore the existence of offences is necessary to establish justice, because the benefit of justice for society is more than destruction of offences. Aquinas' answer in relation to the existence of good and evil is precisely the same to Averroes'. Moreover, Aquinas added, "if evil were totally excluded from the

whole of things by divine providence, a multitude of good things would to be sacrificed,"¹⁷⁵ because good depends on evil.¹⁷⁶ Again if evil were removed from some part of the universe, much perfection would perish from the universe.¹⁷⁷ whose beauty arise from an ordered unification of evil and good things. Thus, the existence of 'evil in Aquinas' view is beneficial to the stability of the universe as a whole. For instance, an artisan hides the foundation beneath the earth, so that the whole house may have stability. It is by such argument that Aquinas showed that we cannot say that God is unjust because of the existence of some evils, since beyond its existence there is a benefit. In answering that in things there are good and evil, Aquinas' view once again was similar to Averroes' view where Aquinas said that "the good is better known from its comparison with evil,"¹⁷⁸ as the good which exists in fire is greater than its potential for evil. So, also, the divine regime, which governs the whole universe especially human beings, provides for them things governed according to their modes. Their actions, to attain goodness as their end, unavoidably causes some defect which is regarded as evil, and while we continue to suffer certain evil our desire for good grows more ardent. Thus, Aquinas said that it is not the function of God's providence totally to abolish evil.¹⁷⁹ To support his view, that evil also exists beside the existence of goodness, Aquinas quoted two verses from scripture; "I form light and create darkness, I make meal and create woe, I am the Lord, who do all these things,"¹⁸⁰ and, "Does evil befall a city, unless the Lord has done it."¹⁸¹

The conclusion, from the point of view given by Averroes

and Aquinas, is that we cannot say that God is unjust simply because evil exists in this life since "while evil things which are small in number originate from good things that are defective, still certain good things also result from them."¹⁸² Briefly, we find many similarities of ideas in Averroes' and Aquinas' discussion of this matter.

C. THE CONCEPT OF PREDESTINATION

This is the climax of the discussion of this chapter. Once we understand God's will, power and justice, and human freedom, it is probably not too difficult to understand the concept of predestination by God.

At the beginning of this chapter the problem of predestination was touched on both in Christian teaching and in Islam. In Islamic theology the problem of predestination is centered in the Quranic texts which have been already discussed before. The discussion covers three major theological schools:¹⁸³ the Mu'tazilites the Jabarites and the Ash'arites. The general view of the Mu'tazilites is that man is as though not subject to predestination, because they hold that man is the creator of his action whether good or evil.¹⁸⁴ The Jabarites hold that man is really subject to the predestination by God because they deny that actions originate from man attributing them to God.¹⁸⁵

In Islamic theology the term predestination is well-known as "qadā'" and "qadar". The former is God's knowledge of things in relation to their circumstances, and the latter is His creation for them when their causes exist.¹⁸⁶ Predestination must be believed by every Muslim because it is one of the pillars of faith.

The source of controversy in predestination, whether in Christianity or in Islam, is based on two factors: human responsibility and God's omnipotence. We have already discussed both of these in our treatment of the concept of God's omnipotence and of human free will.

Averroes realized the controversy relating to the predestination of God among theological schools, and also he realized what is apparently contradictory in the Quranic texts. In some circumstances he criticized the Mu'tazilites view because their view appears to challenge God's absolute power. He criticized the Jabarites' view because they deny human free will and of course, this means they deny human responsibility. He also criticized the Ash'arites' view because their view, according to him, is not rational and contradicts revealed law. The general concept of predestination in Islamic theology is that whatever happens in this world is under the providence of God. This is clear from a verse in the Quran, 'With Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them but He. He knows what is in land and sea; not a leaf falls, but He knows it. Not a grain in the earth's shadow, not a thing fresh or withered, but it is in a Book Manifest,'¹⁸⁷ When God knows all things then those things must happen.

In addition to the Quranic verses mentioned earlier in relation to predestination, there are two other verse, one which shows that man is predestined and the other shows that man is not. For the former, is the verse, "God has set a seal on their heart and on their hearing, and on their eyes is a covering."¹⁸³ For the latter is the verse, "Say: the truth is from your Lord; so let whosoever will believe, and let whosoever will disbelieve."¹⁸⁹ The first verse shows that man is absolutely predestined, because he cannot do more activities than that which is fixed by God. The second verse shows that man is free to choose whatever he wishes because God offers him a choice of ways to follow. In the light of this apparent

contradiction in the Quran, Averroes tried to explain the concept of predestination by God. His method in this case is nearer to the Mu'tazilites though he disagreed with certain of their view, than to the Jabarites or the Ash'arites. Averroes, as we have seen, recognized that human power and free will given by God can be put into practice. Thus man should be responsible for his actions. For Averroes, free will was the basis of human obligation in their conduct. Averroes, however, did not say that human power and free will are absolute. In other words they cannot do whatever they wish without any relationship with God. Their power is still under the power of God. Averroes said that human power is effective under two conditions as we noted earlier. Our power should be consistent and should correspond with external causes, and these external causes, according to Averroes are called "qadar" of God.¹⁹⁰ These external causes assist us or help us to complete our action. This human actions are not completely voluntary, because they are still tied by external causes, and also not completely involuntary because the external causes can effect an action when the will of the agent responds to them.¹⁹¹ According to Averroes' view, the external and internal cause cannot be separated. They can be distinguished, but must always be held together. The internal cause, which we call "will", and the external causes follow general rules which are not mutually contradictory. These general rules have been characterized recently by Dr. Mahmūd Qāsim as determinism in natural science.¹⁹²

Averroes, of course, did not describe at length the concept of the predestination, because the reality of predestination cannot

be explored adequately by our intellect. However, he gave a brief summary of his view of predestination. He stated, "the limited arrangement in the external and internal causes is called fate and predestination (qadā' and qadar) which God has prescribed for His servant. This is known as "The Preserved Table" (Lawh Mahfūz)¹⁹³ Therefore the concept of "qadā'" and "qadar" according to Averroes is:

"the limited system which God has established in internal and external cause. Our will is preserved and bound up by what happens from outside." 194

The concept which is described by Averroes was derived from a Quranic verse, namely "he has attendant angels, before him and behind him, watching over him by God's command."¹⁹⁵ The external causes, according to Averroes, are not a human role, rather they are set out by God in a limited arrangement (nizām mahdūd) which does not interfere with what the Maker had ordained. Furthermore, Averroes stated that our will and our acts are not completed unless there is harmony and agreement with the external cause. Even with this harmony and agreement our acts are exercised in a limited arrangement,¹⁹⁶ namely, they are found at fixed times and in fixed quantity. This is necessary because acts are the effects of those causes which are external to us; and all effects which result from limited cause are themselves necessarily limited and are found in a given quantity only. God's knowledge of these causes and that which pertains to them is the cause of their existence. But no one has full knowledge of these causes except God alone who is the knower of the reality of unseen things (al-ghayb). Averroes once again referred to the Quran, "say: None knows the unseen in the heavens

and earth except God."¹⁹⁷

Since the order and the arrangement of causes is what requires the existence of a thing at certain times and its non-existence at another, then there must be a knowledge of existence or non-existence of a thing at certain times. In this way Averroes prepared the way for his idea of the divine knowledge which is not dependent on the appearance of objects of knowledge in actuality. In this way, too, Averroes stated, we remove the controversy in our intellect in relation to predestination of God. In other words when our will is combined together with external causes, the existence of being becomes an actuality. When the deeds are referred only to one of these two conditions, either internal or external, doubts arise.¹⁹⁸

In Averroes discussion of predestination the problem of whether man's action had been fixed by God or not, or whether man has power to do or not to do something does not arise at all, because, in Averroes' view, predestination is not to be understood in the terms set by the Mu'tazilites, the Jabarites, and the Ash'arites. Rather predestination is nothing but the whole system including both internal and external causes, which is set out by God.

Aquinas, also faced a problem similar to Averroes' problem in that some philosophers such as Democritus had denied the predestination by God. According to Aquinas, Democritus said that the natural cause of a thing is exempt from divine providence.¹⁹⁹ The world was fashioned by chance.²⁰⁰ Some held that only immortal

things came under divine providence, whereas mortal things are subject only in their species.²⁰¹ St. Augustine also stated that "we do not say that everything is fated, in fact we deny that anything happens by destiny."²⁰² Augustine made this denial because he held firmly to human freedom. Furthermore he says:

"If there is for God a fixed order of all causes, it does not follow that nothing depends on our free choice. Our wills themselves are in the order of causes, which is, for God, fixed, and is contained in His foreknowledge, since human acts of will are the causes of human activities. Therefore, He who had prescience of the causes of all events certainly could not be ignorant of our decision, which He foreknows as the causes of our action."²⁰³

Aquinas firmly stated that "not only human beings but also angels, as well, are predestined, though they are never unhappy."²⁰⁴ This means Aquinas does not deny that human are predestined by God. This is because Biblical scripture itself mentions predestination. For example, "and those whom He predestined He also called,"²⁰⁵ and the like. Aquinas' affirmation that human beings are predestinated does not mean that they have no power or free will to do something. They can exercise their will or power in their activities in accordance with the providence of God.

Predestination, in general, is the doctrine that all events that have happened, are happening, and will happen have been predetermined to happen by God.²⁰⁶ For Aquinas predestination does not concern anything in the predestined but only in Him who predestines.²⁰⁷ In other words, it is not the function of the creature, rather it is the function of God who governs the whole universe. The concept of predestination, according to Aquinas is

a plan existing in God's mind, for the ordering of some persons to salvation.²⁰⁸

In Aquinas' discussion of the predestination by God he related it very close to providence. There are two sides of providence. First, the planned purpose of things provided. Second, its execution which is called government.²⁰⁹ For the first, God provides for all things immediately and directly. This means that all activities in the world are anticipated in God's mind. God foreknown something before it happens. For the second, divine providence works through intermediaries, for God governs the lower through the higher.²¹⁰ Though Aquinas said that divine providence rules all things, not only in their general nature but also as an individual, this does not mean that God excludes the activities of secondary agents.²¹¹ The secondary agents are still functional to their activities. The function of God's providence is not to fix a certain act which should be performed, especially by human beings, but to plan things to and end.²¹³

Aquinas' concept of predestination, as well as Averroes', did not mean God had already fixed some one to do certain things in a certain time and in a certain place but as a framework exposed to creatures and they carry it out in their actions. It did not put anything into the predestined.²¹³

The view of predestination given by Averroes and Aquinas appear resonable and acceptable. Some problems,however, still stir our mind. For example, both recognized that everything that happens in this world is under the providence of God. If Averroes

concept of predestination is a system arranged by God, and man reacts according to the system, this means his action is still subject to that system. Therefore free will is meaningless. If Aquinas' concept of predestination is as a plan which exists in God's mind, then man reacts according to that which exists in the plan, no more than that. If something happens outside of that plan, this means the providence of God is not complete. This is impossible. Averroes would reply that our intellect cannot explain adequately the concept of predestination, because that is God's business not ours. Aquinas also replied that "if predestination were revealed to some by special privilege, it were better not revealed to everyone; that would breed despair in the non-predestined, and negligence in the predestined."²¹⁴

Notes to Chapter Four

1. Al-Kashf, p. 223.
2. God has power over that which He has endowed men with power and that one movement, as an object of power, is the object of power of two possessors of power, namely, God and man, so that, if God does it, it is by necessity and if man does it, it is by acquisition. For details of the discussion of acquisition see H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 663 ff.
3. Quran, 42:30.
4. Quran, 41:17.
5. Quran, 54:49.
6. Quran, 57:22.
7. Quran, 4:79.
8. Al-Kashf, p. 224.
9. Ibid., p. 224.
10. Al-Kashf, p. 225
11. Ibid., p. 224.
12. For the detailed discussion of Libertarians see H.A. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 613 ff.
13. See H.A. Wolfson, Ibid., p. 602 ff.

14. Al-Kashf, p. 224.
15. Job, 14:4.
16. Romans, 8:30.
17. Hosea, 11:10.
18. Mark, 4:12.
19. R. Seeberg, Text Book of the History of Doctrines, vol. 1, tr. by Charles E. Hay, 7th ed., Michigan, Baker Book House, 1966, p. 157.
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25. Ibid., p. 82.
26. Augustine, Retractations, Book 1, Chapter 9, cited by A. Hayman & James J. Walsh, in Philosophy of the Middle Ages, p. 65.

27. For further information about controversy of predestination see J. Pelikan, op. cit., pp. 81 - 98; R. Seeberg; op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 30 - 33; Geoffrey W. Bromily, Historical Theology And Introduction, Edinburgh, T.T. Clark, 1978, pp. 165 - 170.
28. J. Pelikan, op. cit., p. 271.
29. Quran, 85:16.
30. Quran, 2:109.
31. Al-Kashf, p. 162.
32. Tahafūt al-Tahāfut, p. 438.
33. Ibid., p. 449.
34. Ibid., p. 153.
35. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 151.
36. Ibid., p. 438.
37. Ibid., p. 160.
38. Ibid., p. 427.
39. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 148
40. Ibid., p. 9.
41. Ibid., p. 148.
42. Ibid., pp. 426 - 427.

43. Ibid., p. 9.
44. Ibid., p. 148.
45. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 38:39.
46. Ibid., p. 149.
47. Ibid., p. 149.
48. Al-Kashf, p. 207.
49. Ibid., p. 162.
50. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 157.
51. Ibid., p. 149.
52. Ibid., p. 158.
53. Ibid., p. 148.
54. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 148.
55. Ibid., p. 148.
56. Ibid., p. 450.
57. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 450.
58. Ibid., p. 95.
59. S.C.G., 1, 72; ST1a, q. 19, a. 1.
60. S.C.G., 2, 7 & 22; ST1a, q. 25, a.1.
61. S.C.G., 2, 72.

62. S.C.G., 2, 72.
63. R.L. Patterson, op. cit., p. 325.
64. Romans, 12:2.
65. Genesis, 17:1.
66. ST1a, q. 19, a. 1.
67. S.C.G., 1, 74.
68. S.C.G., 1, 75.
69. ST1a, q. 19, a. 2.
70. ST1a, q. 19, a. 2.
71. S.C.G., 2, 7.
72. ST1a, q. 25, a. 1.
73. S.C.G., 2, 10.
74. S.C.G., 2, 8.
75. ST1a, q. 25, a. 3; S.C.G., 2, 22.
76. ST1a, q. 25, a. 4.
77. ST1a, q. 25, a. 3.
78. S.C.G., 2, 6.
79. S.C.G., 2, 22.
80. S.C.G., 2, 22.

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83. S.C.G., 2, 21.
84. S.C.G., 2, 22.
85. S.C.G., 2, 22.
86. ST1a, q. 25, a. 1.
87. S.C.G., 1, 88.
88. See page 138 ff.
89. Al-Kashf, p. 224.
90. See page 133 ff.
91. Al-Kashf, p. 226.
92. Ibid., p. 226.
93. Al-Kashf, p. 226.
94. Ibid., p. 226.
95. Quran, 13, 11.
96. Al-Kashf, p. 228.
97. Ibid., p. 229.
98. Ibid., p. 229.

99. Al-Kashf, p. 231.
100. Ibid., p. 231.
101. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 221.
102. Al-Kashf, p. 231.
103. Quran, 22:73.
104. Al-Kashf, p. 232.
105. Quran, 37:96.
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110. STla, q. 83, a. 1.
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114. S.C.G., 3, 112.

115. F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, p. 193.
116. ST1a, 2ae, q. 13, a. 2.
117. ST1a, q. 83, a. 4.
118. ST1a, q. 83, a. 1.
119. Burton Z. Cooper, op. cit., p. 49.
120. S.C.G., 2, 16.
121. S.C.G., 2, 21.
122. S.C.G., 2, 16.
123. Muḥammad Yūsuf, Mūsā, op. cit., pp. 174 - 175.
124. Quran, 10: 44.
125. Quran, 14:4.
126. Al-Milal, p. 62.
127. Quran, 41:46.
128. Al-Milal, p. 59.
129. George F. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 10.
130. Al-Kashf, p. 238.
131. Ibid., p. 234.
132. Al-Kashf, p. 234.

133. Quran, 41:46.
134. Al-Kashf, p. 238.
135. Ibid., p. 239.
136. Mahmūd, Qāsim, op. cit., p. 154.
137. Quran, 14:4.
138. Al-Kashf, p. 235.
139. Quran, 39:7.
140. Al-Kashf, p. 235.
141. Al-Kashf, p. 235. cf. Al-Milal, p. 131.
142. Al-Kashf, p. 235.
143. Al-Kashf, p. 236.
144. Mahmūd, Qāsim, op. cit., p. 156.
145. There are two gods in Zoroaster; first Ahura Mazda as god of good, second Ahriman as god of evil.
146. Al-Kashf, p. 238.
147. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 177.
148. Al-Kashf, p. 236.
149. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 177.
150. Al-Kashf, p. 238.

151. Al-Kashf, p. 237.
152. Al-Kashf, p. 237; Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 177.
153. Al-Kashf, p. 237.
154. Quran, 2:30.
155. Al-Kashf, p. 237.
156. ST1a, q. 21, q. 1.
157. ST1a, q. 21, a.4.
158. Psalm, 10:7.
159. James, 1:13.
160. Exodus, 10:1.
161. Isaiah, 63:17.
162. S.C.G., 3, 162.
163. S.C.G., 3, 162.
164. ST1a, q. 21, a. 4,
165. Psalm, 24:10.
166. S.C.G., 3, 161.
167. S.C.G., 3, 161.
168. Romans, 9:21.
169. S.C.G., 3, 71.

170. It is not the author's purpose to discuss the concept of evil completely, rather it is just to show the existence of evil in relation to God's justice.
171. S.C.G., 3, 7.
172. S.C.G., 1, 95.
173. For Averroes see Al-Kashf, p. 235, for Aquinas see S.C.G. 1, 95; ST1a, q. 48, a.
174. S.C.G., 3, 71.
175. S.C.G., 3 71.
176. S.C.G., 3, 11.
177. ST1a, q. 22, a. 2.
178. S.C.G., 3, 71.
179. S.C.G., 3, 71.
180. Isaiah, 45:7.
181. Amos, 3:6.
182. S.C.G., 3, 71.
183. It is not the author's concern to study in detail the discussion of predestination carried out by Mu'tazilites, Jabarites and Ash'arites. It is just to show that there is disputation in this matter among them. For a study of this matter see W.M. Watt, Free Will and Predestination

in Early Islam, chapters III, IV, V & VI, London, Luzac & Co. Ltd., 1948; H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalam, Chapter VIII.

184. Al-Milal, p. 59.
185. Ibid., p. 112.
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187. Quran, 6:59.
188. Quran, 2:6.
189. Quran, 18:29.
190. Al-Kashf, p. 226.
191. Mahmūd, Qāsim, op. cit., p. 145.
192. Mahmūd, Qāsim, op. cit., p. 145.
193. Al-Kashf, p. 227.
194. Ibid., p. 227.
195. Quran, 13:11.
196. Al-Kashf, p. 227.
197. Quran, 27:66.
198. Al-Kashf, p. 228.

- 199. ST1a, q. 22, a. 2.
- 200. ST1a, q. 22, a. 2.
- 201. ST1a, q. 22, a. 2.
- 202. Augustine, City of God, Part 1, Book V, Chapter 9.
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- 208. ST1a, q. 23, a. 2.
- 209. ST1a, q. 22, a. 3.
- 210. ST1a, q. 22, a. 3.
- 211. ST1a, q. 22, a. 3.
- 212. ST1a, q. 22, a. 4.
- 213. ST1a, q. 23, a. 2.
- 214. ST1a, a. 22, a. 1.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Both Averroes and Aquinas were part of a philosophical development in which the controversy between religion and philosophy was central. For both the Christian and Islamic religions in the Middle Ages faced a similar problem regarding the development of philosophy.

The focus of the discussion in this thesis has been a comparison of the ideas of Averroes and Aquinas regarding certain aspects of their understanding of God.

1. In the discussion of the general doctrine of God there is no major controversy between Averroes and Aquinas. Their separate discussion agreed on the point that human nature requires to know God. Intellect has the capacity to know God through the likeness which exists in creatures as God's effect.

However, Aquinas' explanation on how human nature requires to know God is more detailed than that of Averroes. Averroes just referred to the Quranic texts which show that human beings recognize that God exists.

2. Averroes' and Aquinas' discussion are also in agreement on the point that there are two ways by which man can know the nature of God: the negative and the affirmative way. The negative way proceeds by denying all imperfections as attributes of God, and the affirmative way proceeds by affirming that God has perfect attributes. Once again Aquinas' description in this matter is more detailed than that of Averroes.

They also shared a similar outlook in regard to the naming of God. In their commentaries on Aristotle, they called God The Pure Act, The Pure Intellect, The First Principle and The First Unmoved Mover, and when they referred to their own scriptures, they just called God one name. Averroes called God, Allah and Aquinas called God, He Who is.

3. There is also agreement between Averroes and Aquinas in that we can predicate some attributes of God and creatures in an analogical way, and they both also denied that the attributes of God and creatures can be understood in a univocal way. They, however, departed from one another in the case of the equivocal way. Averroes confirmed that some attributes of God and creatures can be predicted in equivocal names, as we have seen in this discussion of God's will and knowledge. Aquinas rejected this idea.

Averroes did not describe, at length or systematically, the concept of analogy between God and creature, while Aquinas once again was more thorough than Averroes. However, even he did not offer a fully systematised account. The basis of analogy as used by Averroes and Aquinas in predicating some attributes of God and creatures is the likeness which we can find on both sides. The analogy employed by Averroes and Aquinas in applying predicates to God and creatures are not used precisely in the same sense, but not in a totally different sense, either.

4. There is also agreement in that both men stated that the essence and attributes of God are one and the same, but their reasons of why God's essence and attributes are the same are

different. For Averroes, if the essence and attributes of God are not the same, this means there are two necessary beings... This is impossible. For Aquinas, if God's attributes are not identical with God's essence, this means God's essence is a composite thing. This is also impossible. Averroes' and Aquinas' discussions are also in agreement in many circumstances on the other aspects of the doctrine of God, for example, the eternity of God, the simpleness of God, the perfection of God, and the like. One difference between them is the concept of anthropomorphism in relation to God. Averroes, so it seems to us did not deny firmly corporeality of God, nor did he affirm it in the ordinary sense in which we use the concept of corporeality. He preferred to follow the Quranic method which mentions clearly the concept of anthropomorphism on God. Against this Aquinas clearly denied any form of corporeality of God.

5. Averroes' and Aquinas' agree that the existence of God is demonstrable. For Averroes, the existence of God can be demonstrated only through physics not metaphysics, but Aquinas apparently accepted both, physics and metaphysics.

Averroes offered two proofs of the existence of God, and Aquinas presented Five Ways to prove the existence of God. Averroes' proofs and Aquinas' proofs were both based on observable facts in the universe. What is different is that Averroes' proofs do not contain philosophical conceptions, rather they were derived from the Quranic verses. Aquinas' proofs stand at the opposite pole of those of Averroes in that they are carefully developed philosophical arguments.

There is only one similarity between Averroes' proof and Aquinas' proof, and that is in Averroes' proof of providence and Aquinas' proof of design or final cause. Though there is similarity in these two proofs, Averroes' proof is more detailed and its scope is wider than Aquinas' proof.

6. In the discussion of God's knowledge we find similarity and dissimilarity in the thinking of Averroes and Aquinas. They both stated that God is intelligent. Their reasons are the same in that they are based on scriptures and on human experience in observing the universe. The rational arguments developed by them are virtually the same.

The focus of their discussion of God's knowledge was on three things: First, God's knowledge of contingent events; second, whether God's knowledge of them is universal or particular; third, God's knowledge and human knowledge.

6a. In the discussion of God's knowledge of contingent events, Averroes' discussion departs from similarity with Aquinas's discussion. Averroes stated that God does not know other things than Himself. This statement of Averroes does not mean that God ignores all existents. With God the intellect and the thing known are the same in every aspect. The reasons Averroes gave for this are consistent with his overall view of God and His relation the world. Aquinas clearly said that God knows contingent events, and the reasons he gave for this are also consistent with his overall position.

In consequence of this discussion, the views held by Averroes and Aquinas disagree on the question of whether God's knowledge increases or does not increase by knowing contingent events. Averroes stated that there is the possibility that plurality exists in God's knowledge, but we do not know the nature of the plurality in God's knowledge. Aquinas stated that God's knowledge does not increase by knowing other things, because His knowledge is not discursive.

Averroes' and Aquinas' views also disagree on the question of whether God's knowledge of events before or after their existence is the same or not. Averroes stated that God's knowledge of existence and non-existence is different, because if it is not different, this means the knowledge of everything, the knowledge of past, present and future, is the same, and this is clearly impossible. Aquinas stated that God knows them together with no past, no present and no future.

6b. Averroes' and Aquinas' views that God's knowledge is not universal, are also similar but the reasons they gave for why God's knowledge is not universal were different.

Aquinas disagreed with Averroes with regard to God's knowledge of particular. Averroes denied that God's knowledge is universal and particular, while Aquinas denied the former and affirmed the latter.

6c. The last part of their discussion in relation to God's knowledge concerns the distinction between God's knowledge and human

knowledge. In Averroes' view, by distinguishing two kinds of knowledge, we can also solve two big problems: whether God knows or does not know other things than Himself, and whether His knowledge is universal or particular.

There is agreement between Averroes and Aquinas' view that God's knowledge is the cause of all existents and human knowledge is the effect of them, but Aquinas did not use this as a criterion to show the difference between God's knowledge and human knowledge. For Aquinas, the difference between the two kinds of knowledge is that God's knowledge is His own essence, while human knowledge is a quality of his essence.

Aquinas disagreed with Averroes' statement that God's knowledge and human knowledge are equivocal, because, according to Aquinas, the way we can speak about God in relation to the creature is only analogical.

7. In the discussion of the doctrine of predestination we have seen that Christianity and Islam share the same problem. This problem can be traced to scripture. Many theologians of both religions have disagreed with one another in their understanding and description of the concept of predestination.

This discussion focuses on three things:

- (i) The will and power of God: There is no fundamental disagreement between Averroes and Aquinas on this matter. They each gave their own reasons for asserting that God has will and power, and each also referred to his own

scripture. They are in agreement that God's will and power is absolute, everything that happens in the universe is under the will and power of God.

Averroes' and Aquinas view are also in agreement that human beings have the power to act and are free to choose good or evil in their actions. Averroes and Aquinas recognized that these two qualities are given by God to men and are the bases of their responsibility for their actions. They were also in agreement that though men can act, their actions are limited for their actions are still subject to the power of God. Furthermore, there is agreement between them that men's power cannot create something, but only can change existents into varieties of quality, while God's power is to create something from non-existence to existence.

- (ii) God's justice: Averroes and Aquinas held a similar view that God is wholly just and we cannot say that God is unjust in any aspect. To show this, they referred to their own scripture. They faced the same problem when they referred to their own scripture, because in the scripture of each there are many verses that show that God is just, and some apparently show that God is unjust.

To solve this problem Averroes and Aquinas had a similar tendency, that is, they tried to interpret the negative verses in order not to contradict the positive verses. Averroes and Aquinas made virtually the same statement to the effect that we have no right to ask God why He does

this or that, because everything in the universe belongs to Him.

Touching on the question of the existence of evil, Averroes and Aquinas similarly held that a small amount of evil is necessary to maintain the whole goodness of creation, and to exclude evil totally is not the function of God's providence. There is however disagreement in their views about the cause of evil. For Averroes, evil is created by God, while, for Aquinas, evil is not caused by God, rather it is a privation of Good.

- (iii) The concept of predestination: There is agreement between Averroes and Aquinas on the point that human beings are predestined by God. But the concept of predestination as understood by each of them does not mean that men's actions have been fixed already in eternity. Their descriptions of predestination are the same, but the manner of their expression is different. For Averroes, predestination is a system which God has established in both internal and external causes. For Aquinas, predestination is a plan which exists in God's mind and is arranged to an end.

Averroes and Aquinas, however, faced the same problem. Their explanation of the concept of predestination cannot satisfy all minds. Thus they reached the conclusion that predestination is God's business, not ours.

From what we have seen in the study we have conducted,

we can make some concluding remarks:

First, it is clear that Averroes and Aquinas praised Aristotle's contribution to human thoughts and in many circumstances their philosophical thought is Aristotle's but this does not mean that they agreed with everything derived from him and so they took what they regarded as correct, and rejected what they regarded as wrong. They also recognized the absoluteness of revelation as words of God, and at the same time, they also agreed that reason is weaker and limited in these matters and therefore it should be enlightened by the grace of God.

We can see Averroes' attitude towards the masses in his discussion of Good. Though he was an intellectual, he did not neglect the masses, the majority of people. He gave priority to them in His discussion of God. He realized that the masses have no high intellectual capability to understand complicated things. Therefore, we find him striving for simple proofs and arguments in his theology. His proofs are easily understood by the laity.

Averroes really believed that every verse in the Quran is suitable to be understood by every level of human mind, the learned and the masses. Thus all his proofs about God were derived from Quranic texts. This, however, does not mean that he denied all intellectual proofs or considered any proof containing logical and philosophical premises as useless. He even used them in certain circumstances. This can be seen in his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut where we find the intellectual argument is raised.

Aquinas' attitude towards the use of argument in relation to God was different from those of Averroes. Aquinas' proofs are closer to the learned than to the masses. This, as we have seen, is clear in the Summa Contra Gentiles. The arguments exploited by Aquinas in this work are based on philosophical conceptions. The reason why he did this was, as we have seen, that he faced intellectual controversy during his teaching in Paris. He, however, did not overlook the Christian beginners in the study of Christian theology, presenting the easier way as we have seen in the Summa Theologiae. In this work he did not use so many sophisticated explanations about God, but inevitably some philosophical elements still persisted. Of course, the unlearned could know with the certitude of faith what the intellectual knows by renowned argument.

Second, if we observe the entire discussions of Averroes and Aquinas in this thesis we find more similarities than dissimilarities. Sometimes their expression seems contradictory, but when we go into detail they are closer than they appear to be at first sight. For example, in their discussions of whether God knows or does not know other things than Himself, there are many similarities. The difference in their reference to scripture is that Averroes started his arguments from the Quranic texts, and then elaborated them in a simple way which was geared to the understanding of the masses. As for Aquinas, he opened his discussion by using intellectual arguments and ended up by referring to scripture. He did not elaborate his arguments from scripture, rather he referred to it as an authoritative source to support his arguments.

We also find weaknesses in the arguments used by Averroes and Aquinas. This is unavoidable, since not only were they both men of their times, they were fallible human beings. For example, in Averroes' argument about God's knowledge, he made complicated assumptions which are not easily understood, and puts our mind in a dilemma, while he himself stressed many times in his treatises that we should use simple arguments as required by revealed law (shar'). So, too, we find some weaknesses in Aquinas' arguments when we relate them to subsequent developments in learning. For example, his theory of motion apparently conflicts with Newton's First Law. In fact, in his five ways of the existence of God there are many criticisms which have been raised by modern writers. Nevertheless, we should remember that Aquinas spoke in mediaeval times and, therefore, his intellectualism should be measured in accordance with the intellectual environment of that age.

Third, we can say, though this is infrequent, that Averroes' ideas influenced Aquinas' thought. This can be seen in the many reference made by Aquinas to Averroes, though the purpose of his reference often may have been to refute Averroes' ideas. For example, Aquinas referred to Averroes in his fifth proof of the existence of God. And, of course, both showed the influence of Aristotle.

From the author's point of view Averroes and Aquinas carried great authority in their own field. Their works still live and are being studied in institutions of higher learning. Aquinas was one of the pinnacles of Christian, especially Roman Catholic thought

and he was arguably a typical intellectualist saint and possibly the greatest philosopher and theologian of the whole Middle Ages. Averroes was the last great Muslim peripateticist who possessed the title "Commentator". His influence spread in many directions, throughout the Middle Ages, and later during the Renaissance and up to the very threshold of modern times. He was regarded as one of the accredited expositors of the accepted philosophy of the church. Therefore, it is not surprising that his star has always shone more brightly in the western Christian world than in the Muslim world where it is dim.

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